







































commercialization.	 Re-examining	 Chinese	 NGOs	 in	 epistemological	 terms,	 through	 the	
language	of	gongyi,	suggests	that	China’s	NGO	sector	has	become	increasingly	heterogeneous.	
The	market	and	rising	entrepreneurship,	with	 the	help	of	 the	 local	 state,	are	shaping	 the	
sector	not	just	financially	but	in	terms	of	knowledge	production.	Moreover,	Chinese	NGOs,	
given	such	changes	in	the	past	decade,	have	strengthened	corporatism	and	social	inequality	
in	 their	 daily	 operation,	 rather	 than	 challenge	 them.	 In	 this	 sense,	 my	 study	 of	 gongyi	
understands	corporatism	in	China	in	two	ways:	how	the	local	corporatism	contributes	to	a	




its	 partner	 organizations	 in	 China,	 this	 research	 reveals	 how	 gongyi,	 a	 language	 that	
popularly	 used	 by	 most	 of	 the	 organizations	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 has	 been	 firstly	
reinvented	by	the	Chinese	business	elites,	applied	in	the	office	of	their	own	foundations,	and	
then	widely	disseminated,	learned,	and	negotiated	in	different	grassroots	organizations	in	
other	 parts	 of	 China.	 This	 research	 presents	 the	 normalization	 of	 different	 forms	 of	
corporatism	in	Chinese	NGO	sector	under	the	name	of	“doing	gongyi”.	At	the	same	time,	my	
ethnographic	 study	of	 the	everyday	 life	of	Chinese	NGO	workers	 reveals	how	gongyi	 and	
corporatism	has	been	performed,	negotiated,	and	challenged	in	various	ways.	Based	on	the	
findings	 at	 both	 organizational	 and	 individual	 levels,	 the	 thesis	 argues	 that	 gongyi	
contributes	to	and	increasingly	depoliticized	and	commercialized	culture	in	Chinese	NGOs,	




























































































I	 could	 never	 imagine	 that	 I	 would	 be	 so	 fortunate	 to	 have	 so	 much	 help,	 supports,	
encouragements,	and	friendship	from	these	two	supervisors.	The	PhD	journey	is	not	easy,	







































chuxin	 	 	 	 	 original	heart	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 初心	
cishan	fa	 	 	 	 charity	law	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 慈善法	
dage	 	 	 	 	 elder	brother	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大哥	
dajie	 	 	 	 	 elder	sister	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大姐	
dalao	 	 	 	 	 big	boss	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大佬	
fanzhengfu	zuzhi	 	 anti-government	organization	 	 	 	 反政府组织	
feizhengfu	zuzhi		 	 NGO	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 非政府组织	
fu	qiang		 	 	 	 wealthy	and	powerful	 	 	 	 	 	 富强	
gongmin	shehui	 	 	 civil	society		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 公民社会	
gongyi	 	 	 	 	 public	interest	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 公益	
gongyi	ren	 	 	 	 a	person	working	for	gongyi		 	 	 	 公益人	
guanxi	 	 	 	 	 relationship	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 关系	
huo	Lei	Feng	 	 	 living	Lei	Feng	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 活雷锋	
jieji		 	 	 	 	 class	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 阶级	
langxing	 	 	 	 wolf	spirit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 狼性	
laoshi	 	 	 	 	 teacher		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 老师	
liudong	renkou	 	 	 floating	people	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 流动人口	
minjian		 	 	 	 among	the	people	 	 	 	 	 	 	 民间	
minjian	zuzhi	guanli	ju	 bureau	of	civil	organizations	administration	 	 民间组织管理局	
minzu	yingxiong		 	 national	hero	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 民族英雄	
	 IV	
qinghuai	 	 	 	 mentality	or	passion	 	 	 	 	 	 情怀 
qunzong	 	 	 	 the	common	people       群众	
rencai	 	 	 	 	 talent	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 人才	
renren	gongyi	 	 	 everyone	can	do	gongyi	 	 	 	 	 	 人人公益	
shehui	jieceng	 	 	 social	strata	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会阶层	
shehui	tuanti	 	 	 social	groups	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会团体	
shehui	zuzhi		 	 	 social	organization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会组织 
sushi	 	 	 	 	 human	quality	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 素质 
tian	zhi	jiao	zi	 	 	 God’s	favored	ones	 		 	 	 	 	 	 天之骄子	
wuzhengfu	zuzhi	 	 anarchic	organization	 	 	 	 	 	 无政府组织	
xiansheng	 	 	 	 Mr.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 先生	
xiaodi	xiaomei	 	 	 younger	brother	and	sister	 	 	 	 	 小弟小妹	
xiongdi	 	 	 	 	 brother		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 兄弟 
xuesheng	gongzuo	 	 student	work	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 学生工作	
zhen	pengyou	 	 	 true	friend	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 真朋友	
zhidao	 	 	 	 	 guide	or	supervise	 	 	 	 	 	 	 指导	
zhiyuanzhe	jingshen	 	 volunteer	spirit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 志愿者精神	
ziwo	fuquan		 	 	 self-empowerment	 	 	 	 	 	 	 自我赋权	
ziyou	zhuyi	zhe	 	 	 liberalist	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 自由主义者	







‘key	 university’	 in	 China.	 Entering	 a	 ‘key	 university’	 means	 a	 lot	 for	 many	
ordinary	 Chinese	 families.	 In	 1998,	 the	 then	 Chinese	 president	 Jiang	 Zemin	
initiated	the	‘Project	985’	to	develop	the	national	higher	education	system	by	
















There	 are	 also	many	 opportunities	 for	 financial	 assistance	 in	 the	 university	
sponsored	by	the	state,	from	student	loan,	studentships,	part-time	jobs,	to	even	












although	 there	 were	 financial	 assistances	 available,	 many	 of	 them	 had	 no	
applicants;	which	means	that	most	of	the	students	in	my	university	today	were	
from	 at	 least	middle-class	 families	 so	 that	we	 can	 hardly	 find	 enough	 ‘poor	







of	 Communist	 Youth	 League	 (the	 youth	 branch	 affiliated	 with	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	 Party)	 on	 campus,	 regulators	 and	 ratifiers	 of	 student	 activities	
(from	 debate	 competition,	 New	 Year	 festival,	 student	 union	 election,	 to	
volunteering	activities).	As	‘student	workers’,	they	would	also	organize	many	
events	 like	 dormitory	 hygiene	 inspection,	 monthly	 political	 ideological	
education,	developing	potential	Communist	Party	members,	launching	singing	
competitions	to	celebrate	Chinese	National	Day	etc.	In	order	help	the	‘student	
work’,	 normally	 one	 or	 two	 students	 in	 each	 class	 would	 be	 chosen	 as	
‘messengers’	 to	report	 to	 the	 ‘student	workers’	 regularly2,	 their	 reports	may	
involve	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 what	 was	 happening	 among	 the	 students,	 from	











The	 different	 experiences	 of	 myself	 and	 my	 cousin’s	 undergraduate	 years	
constituted	the	first	chance	for	me	to	closely	observe	how	authoritarian	politics	
and	social	inequality	have	been	deeply	intertwined	and	performed	in	people’s	




as	a	 ‘national	 talent’,	 I	was	also	 in	a	closer	surveillance	system	which	deeply	








as	 they	 can;	 for	 those	who	wanted	 to	adventure	 in	 the	business	world,	 they	
would	 spend	most	 of	 their	 time	 exploring	 the	 university	 alumni	 network	 to	
ensure	 their	 prioritization	 in	 the	 job	 hunting.	 Interestingly,	 among	 all	 my	
classmates,	 those	who	 spent	most	 of	 their	 time	 in	 the	 library	 studying	 and	
reading,	were	mostly	from	the	peasants’	families.	They	seemed	to	still	stay	in	




programs	 in	 other	 key	 universities	 with	 scholarships;	 about	 10	 students	
received	 well-paid	 offers	 from	 big	 state-owned	 companies	 or	 transnational	
corporates;	 12	 students	 got	 into	 different	 government	 bodies	 including	5	 in	
national	 security	 departments;	 and	 3	 students	 remained	 in	 our	 original	
university	 for	 a	 funded	 doctoral	 program	 (they	 are	 all	 from	 poor	 family	
backgrounds).	While	in	my	cousin’s	case,	about	one	third	of	them	ended	up	with	
unemployed	or	part	time	jobs	when	they	graduated.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	






time,	 they	all	needed	to	save	every	penny	so	 that	 they	can	bring	 the	savings	
back	to	feed	up	the	other	family	members.	The	political	control	in	the	late	1980s	
was	also	much	 looser,	 so	 that	when	 the	college	students	 in	Beijing	 launched	
protests	 and	 movements,	 students	 in	 my	 father’s	 college	 in	 the	 city	 of	
Chongqing,	about	1700	kilometers	from	Beijing,	all	went	to	streets	overnight.	
As	my	father	said,	most	of	them	also	wrote	petition	letters	to	support	Beijing	
students,	 even	 including	 their	 ‘student	workers'	 at	 that	 time.	 But	 things	 got	
changed	dramatically	by	the	end	of	1989,	when	he	just	graduated	that	summer.	
Before	1996,	every	college	student	in	China	would	be	allocated	with	a	job	by	
the	 state	 when	 they	 graduated,	 normally	 these	 jobs	 were	 very	 good	
government	 positions	 in	 the	 big	 cities	 or	 the	 national	ministries.	 But	 in	my	
father’s	graduation	year	of	1989,	all	the	college	students	were	asked	to	‘exercise	
themselves	from	scratch’.	My	father	was	sent	back	to	his	hometown,	working	
for	 township	 government;	while	 some	 others	 sent	 back	 to	 even	 lower	 level	
government	branches	in	the	villages.	From	then	on,	college	students	in	China	
were	never	simply	seen	as	‘national	talents’	only,	but	also	unreliable	subjects	
due	 to	 ‘educated’.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 big	 scale	 political	 reconstruction	 of	 the	
surveillance	 and	 education	 system	 in	 the	 Chinese	 universities,	 from	
compulsory	military	training	of	every	college	freshman,	strengthened	system	






But	 China’s	 national	 development	 in	 the	 recent	 decades	 also	 brought	 me	
chances	 to	 see	 something	 ‘new’	 in	 my	 undergraduate	 years,	 which	 finally	
turned	to	be	the	main	theme	of	my	doctoral	study.	For	instance,	 it	was	in	an	




in	my	university	 can	 take	 a	 fellowship	 each	year	 to	be	 an	 intern	 for	 several	
American	 community-based	 organizations	 for	 at	 least	 six	 months.	 Students	
awarded	with	this	fellowship	turned	out	to	be	a	new	type	of	‘national	talent’	on	
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campus,	 featured	with	 their	 ‘intercultural	 cooperation’	 and	 ‘global	 learning’.	
These	are	something	that	my	parents	never	heard	about.	 I	also	organized	an	
underground	reading	club	with	some	friends	to	read	classic	political	theories	
on	 civil	 society	 together,	 taking	 NGOs	 as	 a	 new	 politics	 in	 China	 with	
transformative	 forces	 in	a	 long	term.	After	 finishing	my	master’s	program	at	
LSE,	I	was	determined	to	work	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector,	with	the	belief	that	it	
could	 be	 the	 place	 to	make	 some	 real	 changes	 in	 the	 country.	 But	 soon,	my	






reputation	 among	 many	 grassroots	 organizations	 in	 China,	 providing	 small	
grants	 and	 training	 programs	 for	 these	 organizations.	 However,	 during	 my	
working	with	this	institute,	I	found	that	most	of	the	work	that	myself	and	other	
colleagues	 did,	 was	 no	 longer	 around	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 but	
maintaining	good	relations	with	various	governmental	officials.	Just	like	what	










maker,	 something	 new	 in	 the	 society,	 but	 my	 daily	 work,	 especially	 the	
banqueting	 and	drinking	 events,	 just	made	me	 realize	how	deeply	 this	 ‘new	
sector’	has	been	embedded	within	the	politics	of	corporatism	in	today's	China,	
just	like	its	university	system.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
My	director’s	blurred	face	strategy	did	reward	the	institute	in	many	ways.	With	
good	 relations	 of	 various	 government	 officials,	 the	 institute	 gained	 political	
shelters	at	multiple	government	levels	from	the	province,	city	to	district.	This	
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was	particularly	 helpful	when	 the	whole	 organization	was	 suspected	 by	 the	
national	security	departments	due	to	its	international	donations.	At	the	same	
time,	 state	 funding	 from	 various	 governmental	 bodies	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	
biggest	financial	resources	in	the	institute;	it	became	a	useful	hand	in	helping	
the	 local	 government	 in	 regulating	 the	 grassroots	 organization	 in	numerous	
ways	 from	 policy	 drafting	 and	 implementation	 to	 large	 scale	 survey	 of	 the	
volunteer	groups.	Although	I	was	not	sure	whether	the	flooding	funding	from	
the	state	could	really	make	a	change	for	the	Chinese	NGOs,	it	was	obvious	that	
the	 funding	 did	 change	 someone’s	 personal	 life.	 My	 director,	 for	 instance,	





pounds	 per	month)	 were	 below	 the	 average	 level	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Guangzhou	
(around	700	pounds	in	2014),	I	understood	that	in	fact	my	then	income	was	
already	 higher	 than	 many	 other	 ordinary	 workers	 in	 the	 grassroots	
organizations.	 Comparing	 to	 my	 college	 classmates	 who	 had	 become	 ‘real	
talents’	by	working	in	the	business	world	or	government	bodies,	as	an	ordinary	
NGO	worker,	I	‘successfully’	achieved	certain	kind	of	social	mobility	in	China:	




















myself,	 there	were	 about	100	participants	 from	various	 social	 organizations	
and	volunteer	groups	across	the	province,	sitting	in	the	conference	room.	In	the	
conference	 program	 book,	 there	 were	 two	 organizers:	 a	 government	
department	called	the	Civil	Affairs	Bureau	(CAB)	of	the	municipal	government;	
the	other	was	a	local	social	organization	called	Gongyi	Heart	(GH).	As	a	research	
student,	 GH	workers	were	my	 informants	 during	my	 yearlong	 fieldwork	 on	
Chinese	NGOs	from	June	2016	to	July	2017.	GH	was	important	to	my	research	
because	I	was	doing	research	on	a	big	Chinese	foundation	called	AF,	established	
by	 a	 group	 of	 domestic	 entrepreneurs,	 and	 GH	 was	 one	 of	 their	 partner	
organizations	in	the	K	Province.	Before	visiting	GH	in	the	city	of	Nan,	I	had	spent	
six	months	working	and	living	in	AF’s	office	and	staff	dormitory	as	an	intern	to	
study	 their	 internal	 organizational	 culture	 and	 politics.	 In	 order	 to	 better	




hours	 of	 boring	 speeches	made	 by	 several	 officials	 from	 the	 provincial	 and	
















although	 the	 occasional	 free	 buffets,	 refreshments	 and	 hot	 drinks	 provided	
helped	us	stay	awake.	 	
About	 two	months	before	 the	conference,	 I	had	been	 told	by	Humphrey,	 the	
leader	of	GH,	that	he	would	organize	a	closed	event	after	the	Chinese	New	Year	
getting	all	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	the	province	together,	to	discuss	what	





both	 Sue	 and	 Humphrey,	 I	 knew	 that	 GH	 had	 been	 doubted	 and	 regularly	
checked	on	by	the	local	government	since	its	establishment	five	years	ago,	due	
to	 their	connections	with	several	 international	donors.	As	 the	organizational	
leader,	Humphrey	had	little	choice	but	to	say	yes	to	the	CAB	demands.	From	
then	on,	the	whole	event	went	in	a	very	different	direction.	The	CAB	officials	set	
up	 most	 of	 the	 conference	 schedules:	 during	 the	 day	 there	 had	 to	 be	
government	speeches	made	by	the	provincial	and	city	level	CAB	officials,	while	
GH’s	 local	 networking	 activities	 could	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 evenings.	
Moreover,	 as	 the	 co-organizer	 of	 this	 ‘big	 event’,	 GH	was	 asked	 by	 the	 CAB	
officials	to	donate	about	600	pounds	to	support	the	conference.	In	Sue’s	phone	








That	 was	 the	 reason	 why	 I	 found	 myself	 attending	 this	 conference.	 In	 the	
morning,	 there	 were	 long	 official	 speeches	 about	 the	 ‘extraordinary	
achievements’	 of	 the	 local	 CAB	 in	 developing	 the	 local	 social	 organizations;	
there	were	 graphs	 and	 charts	 to	 show	 the	 fast-increasing	numbers	 of	 social	




So,	 in	 the	 next	 few	 years,	 organizations	 in	 the	 province	 should	 think	 about	





















started	 the	 session	 with	 some	 jokes,	 calling	 the	 attendees	 ‘my	 dear	 gongyi	
sisters	and	brothers’.	 	
	 	




of	 the	disaster	relief	projects	 that	 they	had	done	 in	 the	 last	winter.	With	 the	
direct	 instructions	 from	AF,	GH	 set	up	 some	awards	 for	 those	organizations	
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which	had	sent	out	the	most	disaster	relief	materials,	those	that	could	get	the	





‘organizational	 capacity’	 for	 the	 attendees,	 while	 the	 guest	 trainer,	
recommended	by	AF,	was	working	at	an	Internet	company	as	the	manager	of	





from	 their	 daily	 operation;	 in	 his	 words,	 ‘We	 need	 to	 embrace	 this	 time	 of	
modern	gongyi’.	The	trainer	used	many	cases	of	 the	most	successful	Chinese	
internet	 companies	 in	 demonstrating	 how	 effective	 their	 online	 platforms	
could	be	in	‘mobilizing	public	participation’,	and	this	attracted	most	attendees’	
attention.	 	 	 	 	 	
Just	several	minutes	before	the	end	of	this	short	training,	Sue	suddenly	asked	
me	whether	I	could	stay	for	one	more	hour	afterwards,	since	they	were	going	
to	have	another	 smaller	meeting,	 for	which	 they	needed	a	volunteer	 to	 take	
some	 notes	 and	 write	 a	 brief	 summary.	 I	 agreed.	 This	 unexpected	 session	
started	 at	 8	 pm	with	 about	 15	 people.	 As	 the	 hotel	worker	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
evening	 sessions	 asked	 all	 of	 us	 to	 leave	 their	 conference	 room	 at	 8:30pm,	
therefore	Sue	decided	to	just	hold	this	one-hour	meeting	in	the	lobby	outside	




with	 GH	 in	 the	 past	 two	 years	 to	 improve	 the	 public	 barrier-free	 facilities	









time,	 it	was	 only	 the	members	 of	 the	 disabled	 group	 sharing	 their	 different	
experiences	 during	 the	 past	 two	 years.	 At	 the	 very	 beginning,	 I	 felt	 a	 bit	
awkward	because	there	was	a	very	foul-smelling	toilet	just	besides	the	lobby,	
which	seeped	into	the	whole	 lobby.	The	 light	 in	the	 lobby	was	very	dim	too;	
there	were	several	sofas	in	the	lobby,	but	they	looked	more	like	pieces	of	old	
furniture	abandoned	by	the	budget	hotel,	full	of	dust.	However,	the	attendees	
seemed	 to	 be	 fine	 with	 all	 these	 conditions	 and	 continued	 without	 any	
complaint.	Although	I	did	not	get	the	chance	to	ask	them	questions,	I	could	still	












creature’	 created	 by	 Chinese	 economic	 reform	 and	 open-up	 policy,	 the	 past	
three	 decades	 have	 witnessed	 the	 growth	 of	 various	 non-governmental	
organizations	in	China.	As	most	of	the	social	organizations	were	demolished	in	
the	 socialist	 era,	 many	 of	 the	 NGOs	 have	 gained	 vigor	 from	 the	 legacies	 of	
traditional	 clans	 and	 the	 entering	 of	 various	 international	 donors	 since	 the	
1980s.	According	to	the	national	statistics	of	the	year	20182,	there	were	more	
than	 816	 thousand	 organizations	 registered	 with	 various	 government	
departments	 in	China,	 covering	numerous	 fields	 from	education,	health,	 and	












Alongside	 these	 growing	 numbers	 of	 organizations,	 however,	 are	 also	 the	














day,	 its	 strong	 influence	 among	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 and	 its	 close	
connections	with	the	local	government	can	also	be	well	demonstrated	by	the	





early	 2000s	 and	 most	 of	 them	 had	 been	 founded	 by	 the	 government,	 the	
number	of	Chinese	 foundations	had	 increased	 to	more	 than	7500	by	August	




entrepreneurs	 or	 their	 companies,	 and	 they	 have	 out-numbered	 the	
government-established	 foundations	 since	 2007.	 From	 the	 two	 evening	
sessions	above,	we	may	also	find	that	these	new	domestic	donors	may	differ	
from	their	international	counterparts	in	many	ways.	They	sponsored	different	
projects,	 used	 different	 languages	 and	 knowledge,	 enjoyed	 very	 different	
relations	with	the	Chinese	state,	and	built	up	their	local	network	with	different	
strategies.	 	 	
What	 interests	me	most	 in	these	three	different	settings	 is	 the	 language	that	
different	 actors	 used	 in	 different	 situations.	 Although	 the	 CAB	 officials,	
Humphrey	 and	 the	 guest	 trainer	 in	 the	 evening	 session	 all	 used	 the	 same	
language	 of	gongyi	 to	 communicate	what	 they	 thought	NGOs	 should	 do,	 the	







this	 governmental	 performance	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 new,	 domestic	



























and	 isolated	 in	 the	 mainstream	 society.	 Their	 organization	 were	 neither	
recognized	by	the	state	nor	the	emerging	domestic	donors	such	as	AF.	This	was	
highlighted	by	the	fact	that	their	meeting	had	to	be	held	quietly	under	the	dim	





recent	 history	 of	gongyi	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	 since	 this	 is	 the	 period	 that	 the	
whole	Chinese	NGO	industry	reached	its	highest	number	and	growth	rate,	along	
with	 new	 knowledge,	 actors,	 and	 politics.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	




from	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 the	 accompanying	 changes	 of	 knowledge	












My	 research	 aims	 to	 answer	 the	 following	 interconnected	questions.	 Firstly,	
given	the	rise	of	the	Chinese	private	economy	and	the	authoritarian	state,	how	
did	Chinese	entrepreneurs	identify	themselves	as	new	donors	under	the	name	






question	 is	 mostly	 based	 on	my	 six-month	 ethnography	 in	 AF’s	 head	 office	
working	as	a	full-time	intern.	Frequently	reported	as	a	‘national	gongyi	model’,	
AF’s	 founders,	 a	 small	 group	 of	 the	most	 successful	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	





question.	 	 	 	
Secondly,	 how	did	 the	Chinese	 state	 think	 about	 and	 contribute	 to	 this	 new	
gongyi	in	different	local	contexts?	This	question	analyzes	why	and	how	gongyi,	




of	 the	 different	 NGO-government	 relations	 in	 multiple	 sites:	 between	 the	
municipal	 government	of	 Shenzhen	city	and	AF,	between	 the	government	of	
city	Nan	 and	GH,	 and	 so	 forth.	My	 answer	 to	 this	 question	presents	 various	
forms	 of	 corporatism	 in	 China	 which,	 I	 argue,	 is	 very	 important	 for	 us	 to	
understand	how	gongyi	 can	be	disseminated,	 learned,	 and	negotiated	across	
the	country.	 	 	 	 	 	
Thirdly,	 what	 did	 this	 gongyi	mean	 for	 ordinary	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers,	 in	
particular,	 how	 did	 gongyi	 shape	 the	 private	 life	 and	 personal	 identities	 of	
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Chinese	NGO	workers,	and	how	did	 they	deal	with	gongyi	 in	different	ways?	
This	 question	 looks	 at	 how	 gongyi	 worked	 at	 an	 individual	 level	 from	 the	
perspectives	 of	 gender,	 religion	 and	 cultural	 norms.	 The	 answer	 to	 this	
question	is	based	on	the	first	two	questions.	On	the	one	hand,	my	ethnographic	




AF’s	 local	 partners	 also	 helps	 us	 understand	 how	 the	 different	 forms	 of	
corporatism	 in	 the	 local	 society	 can	 be	 practiced	 as	 an	 arrangement	 of	





In	 answering	 these	 three	 main	 questions,	 this	 research	 understands	 the	
multiple	meanings	and	performances	of	gongyi	by	applying	it	to	the	dynamic	
NGO-state	 relations	 in	 China	 as	 well	 as	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	
workers.	Considering	the	crucial	roles	that	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	played	
in	shaping	Chinese	NGOs,	I	present	the	process	of	how	gongyi,	once	a	socialist	
morality,	 has	 become	 increasingly	 commercialized	 in	 recent	 years.	 The	 new	
meanings	 of	 gongyi	were	 firstly	 reinvented	 by	 these	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	
which	were	called	as	‘modern	gongyi’.	By	looking	at	the	daily	operation	of	AF	in	
the	 city	 of	 Shenzhen,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 modern	 gongyi	 is	 producing	 new	
knowledge	and	skills.	 	 As	a	 farewell	 to	 the	 socialist	 traditions,	 this	 ‘modern	
gongyi’	 puts	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 spirit	 of	 aggressiveness	 in	 NGO	 workers’	




were	 seen	 to	be	better	 equipped	with	 the	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 to	do	modern	gongyi,	
while	 female	workers	were	 increasingly	marginalized	 in	China’s	NGO	sector.	
Furthermore,	 this	 research	 also	 argues	 that	 although	 gongyi	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
“commercialized	(and	seemingly	depoliticized)”	knowledge	reinvented	by	the	
Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	 its	 dissemination	 and	 reproduction	 is	 largely	
embedded	in	various	forms	of	local	politics	in	different	places.	In	some	cases,	
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the	 modern	 gongyi	 model	 helped	 strengthen	 corporatism	 by	 building	
partnerships	 between	 AF,	 the	 local	 government,	 and	 government-organized	
NGOs	(GONGOs).	In	some	others,	however,	it	turned	out	to	be	a	political	shelter	
for	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 to	 disguise	 their	 cooperation	 with	








in	 more	 indirect	 and	 decentralized	 ways	 by	 collaborating	 with	 the	 private	
sector,	 entrepreneurs	 and	 some	 NGO	 leaders	 in	 different	 places	 across	 the	






society	 organization	 (gongmin	 shehui	 zuzhi,	 公民社会组织 ).	 	 In	 many	
literatures	 and	 news	 reports,	 these	 words	 are	 taken	 as	 equivalent	 to	 one	
another,	pointing	to	some	vague	and	broadly	defined	forces	or	groups	outside	
the	 state.	 But	 in	 China’s	 context,	 they	 are	 used	 in	 very	 different	 ways	 by	
different	groups	of	people,	indicating	different	political	meanings	and	types	of	
organizations.	Therefore,	it	is	first	helpful	to	clarify	the	kinds	of	organization	I	
am	specifically	 looking	at	 in	 this	 thesis.	The	 first	one,	 ‘social	organization’	 is	
widely	 used	 in	 governmental	 documents,	 especially	 when	 people	 try	 to	
categorize	 various	 GONGOs,	 community	 centers,	 academic	 associations	 and	
business	 unions.	 It	 covers	 a	wide	 range	 of	 organizations	 both	 including	 for-
profit	 and	 non-profit	 ones,	 without	 mentioning	 the	 autonomy	 of	 these	
organizations.	 The	 second	 one,	 the	 non-governmental	 organization,	 or	 fei	
zhengfu	zuzhi,	 is	a	Western	word	 imported	 into	China	 in	 the	1980s.	While	 it	
reflects	organizations’	independence	from	the	state,	this	translation	is	also	the	
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most	controversial	 in	China.	In	some	cases,	 feizhengfu	zuzhi	 is	confused	with	
wuzhengfu	 zuzhi	 (anarchic	 organization),	 or	 fanzhengfu	 zuzhi	 (anti-
government	organization)	(Suo,	2008).	In	my	former	work	experience	and	this	
fieldwork	with	Chinese	NGOs,	the	word	‘NGO’	has	been	very	popular	among	the	
Chinese	 organizations	 deeply	 influenced	 by	 various	 international	 donors.	
These	organizations	often	posit	themselves	as	part	of	‘the	growing	third	sector’	
or	 ‘civil	 society’	 outside	 the	 state	 and	 the	 market,	 working	 for	 social	
development	 issues	 in	 China.	 Given	 NGOs’	 controversial	 translations	 and	







years.	 Hence,	 ‘CSO’	 in	 China	 has	 been	 often	 related	 to	 social	 or	 political	
movements	 and	 is	 more	 welcomed	 among	 advocacy	 groups	 and	 political	
activists.	 	
In	this	thesis,	 the	organizations	I	study	overlap	between	‘social	organization’	
and	 ‘NGO’	 in	China’s	 context.	All	 of	 them	would	publicly	 claim	 that	 they	 are	
‘social	organizations’	doing	‘gongyi	deeds’,	or	simply	‘gongyi	organizations‘.	But	
many	 of	 the	 organizations’	 workers	 I	 study	 had	 personal	 connections	 with	
international	donors;	they	may	have	been	a	former	worker	of	the	international	








debates	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 understanding	 state-society	 relations	 in	
reformist	 China.	 In	 particular,	 I	 present	 the	 debates	 around	 two	 different	
scholarly	 traditions	 in	 understanding	 Chinese	 NGOs:	 civil	 society	 and	
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corporatism.	 	 In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	the	corporatism	framework	would	be	
better	 than	 the	 civil	 society	 approach	 in	 analyzing	 the	 internal	 structural	
changes	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade,	as	it	still	provides	a	very	
useful	 framework	in	understanding	the	changing	regulatory	strategies	of	 the	





sector	 into	consideration.	On	the	other,	 the	thesis	goes	further	to	 look	at	the	




process	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 is	 largely	 based	 upon	 the	 deeper	
development	 of	 corporatism	 in	 different	 places	 across	 the	 country.	 Then	 in	
section	1.2.4,	 I	 turn	to	the	second	major	theme	of	the	thesis:	everyday	life	 in	
reformist	China.	 	 Given	the	changing	landscape	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	and	
the	 dynamic	 political	 environment,	 the	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	 NGO	
workers’	everyday	lives	demonstrate	the	cultural	and	social	meanings	of	“doing	
gongyi”	 in	 China’s	 context.	 In	 this	 section,	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 existing	
literature	on	Chinese	popular	language	and	everyday	life	in	the	reformist	era,	I	
pay	 attention	 to	 the	meanings	 of	gongyi	 from	 two	perspectives:	 gender	 and	




debating	 Chinese	 NGOs,	 developing	 from	 different	 academic	 traditions	 and	
historical	periods.	To	better	understand	the	discussion	around	corporatism	in	
this	section,	I	will	first	introduce	the	civil	society	approach	and	its	debates.	 	 	 	
Many	scholars	rely	on	insights	from	the	literature	on	civil	society,	which	usually	
assumes	that	social	actors	have	a	contentious	or	counterbalancing	relationship	
with	 the	 state	 (Cohen	 and	 Arato,	 1992;	 Fine,	 1997)	 and	 that	 the	 various	
activities	 it	 explains	will	 lead	 to	 political	 change	 (e.g.	 Putnam,	 1993;	 Keane,	
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2003).	The	dominant	 literature	maintains	 that	NGOs	could	be	a	 challenge	 to	
authoritarianism	 by	 increasing	 political	 participation	 (especially	 among	
marginalized	populations)	and	keeping	state	power	in	check	 	 (Mercer,	2002),	
and	thus	a	fundamental	source	of	democratization	(Diamond,	1994).	Most	civil	




have	 been	 ongoing	 since	 the	 1989	 Student	 Movement	 in	 Beijing.	 	 In	 his	
research,	Zhao	(1998,	2002,	2013)	analyzed	how	the	weaknesses	of	the	various	
movement	 organizations	 in	 Beijing	 finally	 contributed	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
larger	 movement,	 and	 this	 he	 attributed	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 ‘civil	 society’	 and	
‘organizational	 capacity’	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	 Zhao	 called	 for	 more	
‘intermediate	 organizations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 society’	 in	 China,	 a	
perspective	which	shares	many	common	arguments	with	 the	NGO	 literature	
referred	to	above.	 	







in	 the	 society	 indicating	 the	 possibilities	 of	 a	 separate,	 more	 independent	
sphere	 outside	 the	 state.	 Among	 the	 studies	 of	 the	 ‘middle	 class	 and	 civil	
society’,	researchers	on	Chinese	social	media	and	NGOs	directly	link	these	new	
phenomena	with	political	change	(Yang	and	Calhoun,	2007;	Yang,	2012,	2017).	
While	 studies	 on	 religious	 associations	 and	 women’s	 groups	 offered	 the	
possibilities	of	how	these	‘voluntary	associations’	may	lead	to	the	development	
of	 an	 autonomous	 social	 sphere	 (e.g.	Howell,	 1995,	 2007,	 2012;	 Cao,	 2008),	
researchers	of	Chinese	online	platforms	and	marketized	media	emphasize	the	
various	ways	 that	 this	 rising	sphere	may	change	 the	political	agendas	of	 the	
Chinese	state	around	many	social	 issues	(e.g.	Yang	and	Calhoun,	2007;	Zhan,	








existence	 of	 these	 social	 organizations	 (e.g.	 Morton,	 2005).	 In	 recent	 years,	
there	 have	 been	 researchers	 looking	 at	 the	 increasing	 number	 and	 various	




with	 the	 Chinese	 state	 (Hsu	 and	 Jiang,	 2015;	 Zhu,	 Ye	 and	 Liu,	 2018).	 Many	
studies	 on	 China’s	 NGOs	 today	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 organizational	
collaboration	between	NGOs	to	form	a	stronger	‘civil	society’,	so	as	to	provide	





evidence	 in	 China’s	 context.	 Some	 scholars	 have	 come	 to	 realize	 that	 civil	




consideration	 when	 using	 the	 concept	 of	 civil	 society	 (Chamberlain,	 1993;	












independent	 grassroots	 organizations,	 are	 working	 toward	 democratic	
purposes’	(p35).	Ogden	(2002)	argues	that	some	NGOs	may	weaken	the	state,	





Given	 these	 challenges	 in	 the	 liberal	 civil	 society	 approach,	 some	 scholars	
rectify	 this	with	 the	 Gramscian	 concept	 of	 civil	 society,	 suggesting	 that	 civil	
society	is	more	like	an	extension	of	the	capitalist	state.	In	this	regard,	Howell’s	
research	(2012)	tries	to	bring	market	back	to	the	analysis	of	Chinese	NGOs.	By	




various	 attitudes	 and	 changing	 regulations	 towards	 different	 types	 of	
organizations.	 The	 correlations	 between	 NGO	 development	 and	 economic	
growth	can	be	best	 found	 in	the	early	2000s	when	China	had	 just	 joined	the	
World	Trade	Organization.	Since	then,	China	as	a	‘world	factory’	has	witnessed	
a	rapidly	increasing	number	of	labor	unrest,	and	the	state	has	also	begun	to	take	
a	 more	 hostile	 strategy	 towards	 organizations	 working	 on	 labor	 rights	
protection	issues.	Howell’s	research	inspires	us	to	question	the	dichotomized	
nature	 of	 the	 state-society	 (or	 state-NGO)	 relations	 in	 China,	 as	 the	




To	 some	 degree,	 researchers	 of	 the	 corporatism	 tradition	 have	 some	
similarities	with	the	Gramscian	approach	mentioned	in	the	last	section.	Both	of	
them	 look	 at	 the	 political	 economy	 factors	 in	 shaping	 the	 state	 and	 society	
relations	in	China,	evaluating	political	and	social	change	from	a	longer	historical	
perspective.	 But	 the	 Gramscian	 approach	 and	 corporatism	 framework	 are	
trying	 to	answer	different	questions.	By	putting	 the	development	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 neoliberalism	 at	 the	 global	 level,	 the	 Gramscian	
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approach	 is	 useful	 in	 evaluating	 the	 dynamics	 between	 the	 state	 and	 NGOs	







where	 organizations	 are	 given	 “representational	 monopoly	 within	 their	
respective	 categories	 in	 exchange	 for	 observing	 certain	 controls	 on	 their	
selection	 of	 leaders	 and	 articulation	 of	 demands	 and	 supports”.	 Corporatist	
insights	 have	 been	 increasingly	 adopted	 to	 explain	 the	 negotiated,	 highly	




holds	 that	 China’s	 corporatist	 tradition	 should	 be	 better	 understood	 in	 its	
socialist	history	of	state-owned	factories,	which	created	a	system	of	public	ties	
between	 selected	 subordinates	 (the	 ordinary	 factory	 workers)	 and	 their	
superiors	(factory	leaders)	that	was	in	accord	with	the	dictates	of	Party	policy.	
This	system	almost	inevitably	slipped	sideways	into	personalized	patron-client	
relationships	 and	 favors	 trading,	 which	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 touched	 by	 the	
national	economic	reform.	Instead,	this	clientelist	corporatism	constitutes	an	
important	 feature	of	China’s	 economic	development	model	 in	 the	past	 three	
decades.	For	instance,	Wank	(1999)	and	Pearson	(1997)	find	that	despite	the	





Shue	 (1988)	 and	 Duckett	 (1998),	 suggest	 that	 the	 local	 state	 can	 be	











organizations,	 rather	 than	 the	 non-state	 ones,	 that	 have	 been	 dominating	
China’s	NGO	sector	in	the	past	three	decades	(Spires,	2011;	Hildebrandt,	2011;	




Kang,	 2019).	 More	 importantly,	 given	 the	 restrictions	 and	 repressive	













link	 between	 democracy,	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 NGO	 development	 in	
China.	Empirical	evidence	of	East	Asia	has	demonstrated	that	liberalization	in	
both	 economy	 and	 politics	 could	 be	 tolerated	 within,	 or	 even	 mutually	
consolidates,	 authoritarianism	 (Evans,	 1995;	 Leftwich,	 1995).	 So,	 the	
techniques	 used	 to	 discipline	 Chinese	 NGOs	 could	 be	 more	 advanced,	
complicated,	subtle	and	invisible	(Howell,	2019).	In	recent	years,	inspired	by	
the	corporatist	political	economy	studies	of	China’s	local	states,	more	and	more	
researchers	 have	 examined	 the	 differences	 between	 how	 NGOs	 are	
administered	 in	 different	 areas	 in	 China,	 how	 local	 states	 implement	 the	
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the	 ‘normalization’	 process	 of	 how	 the	 NGO	 community	 in	 an	 authoritarian	
state	 like	China	have	moved	 from	an	underground,	marginalized,	or	political	
opposition	 status	 (as	 discussed	 by	 many	 civil	 society	 scholars)	 to	 an	
overground,	legitimatized	industry,	without	greatly	challenging	the	status	quo.	 	
Based	on	the	current	corporatism	literature	that	mostly	focuses	on	the	relevant	














or	 NGO	 workers	 as	 homogenous	 actors.	 Instead,	 I	 present	 the	 various	
performances	and	understandings	of	gongyi	by	putting	it	back	to	different	local	
contexts.	In	this	sense,	I	present	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	Chinese	state	and	
analyze	 how	 this	 fragmentation	 has	 contributed	 to	 different	 state-NGO	
relations.	 In	 the	 past	 ten	 years,	 the	 Chinese	 state	 at	 the	 national	 level	 has	
strengthened	its	political	control	towards	the	international	donors	as	well	as	
NGOs	 involved	 with	 contentious	 politics.	 But	 the	 changing	 regulatory	
framework	has	never	performed	evenly	in	the	local	society.	The	thesis	argues	
that	 although	 gongyi	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 “commercialized	 (and	 therefore	
depoliticized)”	 knowledge	 reinvented	 by	 the	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	 its	
dissemination	and	reproduction	is	largely	embedded	in	various	forms	of	local	
politics	 in	 different	 places.	 The	 widely	 used	 language	 as	 gongyi	 in	 the	 last	
decade	is	never	a	phenomenon	of	depoliticizing	in	its	nature,	or	a	retreat	from	
a	more	contentious	politics	in	China;	rather	it	is	still	a	highly	political	language	













Chinese	NGOs	 the	 legitimacy	 for	 their	 daily	 activities,	 so	 they	 are	 no	 longer	
‘underground’	anymore.	However,	 it	 also	means	 that	all	 these	organizations,	
including	 AF	 and	 GH,	 have	 to	 be	 checked	 by	 the	 local	 authorities	 regularly.	
According	to	the	national	NGO	regulations	(see	more	in	Chapter	6),	AF	and	GH	
must	 submit	 their	 annual	 work	 plans,	 financial	 reports,	 funding	 resources,	






these	 organizations	 and	 their	workers	 understood	 and	 used	 gongyi	 is	 quite	
different.	For	foundation	workers	in	one	of	the	biggest	cities	in	China,	they	try	




a	 certain	 institution),	 as	 this	 name	gives	 them	more	 flexibility	 in	presenting	




of	 organizing	 people’s	 everyday	 life	 from	 their	 social	 relations,	 political	
ideology,	family	life,	to	their	religions.	
However,	this	research	should	not	be	understood	as	a	mere	counter	argument	








For	 instance,	 the	market	 (and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 it)	 is	 not	 a	 ‘new’	 actor	 in	
influencing	Chinese	NGOs	today;	as	I	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	they	have	been	
seen	as	 ‘natural	allies	of	Chinese	NGOs’	since	the	failure	of	 the	1989	Student	
Movement	 in	 Beijing	 (Wang,	 2011).	 	 As	 the	 corporatism	 literature	 shows,	
clientelism	 between	 Chinese	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 the	 local	 states	 has	
been	deeply	embedded	in	the	national	economic	development	process	during	
the	 past	 three	 decades.	 Therefore,	my	 ethnographic	work	 on	 their	 relations	




Moreover,	 my	 research	 goes	 further	 to	 examine	 how	 and	 when	 such	
corporatism	 in	 different	 places	 can	 be	 challenged	 or	 solidified.	 As	 my	
ethnography	on	Chinese	NGO	workers	 (and	 the	next	 section)	 shows,	 people	






would	 raise	 political	 doubts	 from	 the	 national	 leaders.	 In	 other	 words,	 my	
ethnographic	 account	on	 corporatism	 in	China	 is	not	 in	 an	 institution-based	
approach	 to	provide	a	 large-scale	 sample	of	 testing	which	 theory	 (be	 it	 civil	
society	 or	 corporatism)	 is	 correct	 or	 not.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	 practice-
oriented	work	to	take	corporatism	as	an	arrangement	of	organizing	people’s	
personal	network,	social	relations,	career,	and	private	life	(Zhang,	2002).	Given	
the	 increasing	 corporatism	 in	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	
different	 actors	 need	 to	 find	 their	 own	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with,	 negotiating,	
resisting	and	making	sense	of	this	situation	in	their	daily	life.	This	thesis	aims	















quality),	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 ‘key	word’	 in	 understanding	 the	making	 of	 social	
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initiated	 by	 the	 discussions	 of	 population	 control	 and	national	 development	
within	an	elitist	group	of	Chinese	physical	scientists	and	missile	engineers.	She	
puts	the	policy	making	process	of	China’s	One	Child	Policy	from	the	1970s	to	






(Zheng,	 2009;	Woronov,	 2016).	Inspired	by	 the	 studies	 on	 ‘suzhi’,	 this	 thesis	





from	many	 aspects	 including	 housing,	 consumption,	 profession,	 and	 family.	
However,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘middle	 class’	 is	 controversial	 in	 these	 discussions,	
since	 the	 word	 ‘class	 (jieji,	 阶级)’	 is	 rarely	 used	 in	 China	 today	 (Woronov,	
2015).	As	researchers	note,	class	has	been	closely	related	to	China’s	socialist	
revolution	history	of	 ‘class	struggles’,	when	Chinese	people	were	categorized	












as	 structural	 social	 categories	 inexorably	 in	 conflict	 with	 each	 other,	 as	 in	
Maoist	 social	 theory,	 has	 now	 been	 replaced	 with	 a	 neoliberal	 concept	 of	
individual	responsibility,	so	each	person	is	individually	responsible	for	his	or	
her	own	“social	status”	(Anagnost,	2008;	Tomba,	2009;	Ren,	2013).	Woronov’s	
(2016)	anthropological	 study	on	China’s	vocational	 schools	 reveals	how	 this	
depoliticized,	individualistic	concept	of	‘social	strata’	can	be	strengthened	and	
reproduced	among	younger	generations	in	school.	Often	identified	as	‘stupid’	




My	study	of	gongyi	 in	 this	 thesis	echoes	with	 the	studies	on	 ‘social	strata’	 in	
China:	 as	 witnessed	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 ‘doing	 gongyi’	 (or	 participating	
charitable	activities)	on	many	public	occasions	has	been	seen	as	‘a	new	lifestyle	
of	 being	 middle	 class’	 in	 urban	 China	 today,	 and	 was	 particularly	 popular	
among	 the	 various	 foundation-organized	 ‘charity	 marathons’	 in	 the	
metropolitans.	 But	 behind	 this	 ‘new	 lifestyle’,	 as	 Woronov’s	 study	 (2016)	
shows,	 is	 the	alienation	and	exclusion	of	 the	beneficiaries	of	 their	charitable	
projects	in	rural	China.	Similar	to	‘social	strata’,	the	practices	of	the	increasingly	







Dalian	 City’s	 job	 market	 argues	 that	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 labor	 flows	 and	
professionalism	 in	 reformist	 China	 should	 be	 understood	 from	 the	 gender	
perspective;	 gender-specific	 differences	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 ideas	
about	 professionalism.	 Hoffman	 finds	 that	 the	 emerging	 private	 sector	 was	
seen	as	a	 ‘battlefield’	with	more	risks	and	potentially	higher	payment.	Inside	
many	 Chinese	 families,	 there	were	 “one	 family,	 two	 systems”:	women	were	
often	those	to	stay	 inside	the	remaining	socialist,	 ‘less	competitive	(and	thus	






the	 ideas	of	 ‘national	 talents’	 are	 linked	with	new	visions	of	what	a	 ‘secure’,	
‘happy’	modern	family	should	be	 like,	based	on	the	 ‘strategical	split	of	 labor’	
within	families.	Hoffman’s	findings	have	been	further	developed	by	other	social	
scientists	 intersecting	with	 different	 aspects	 of	 everyday	 life	 in	 China.	 Cao’s	
(Cao,	2010)	research	on	the	discourse	of	‘xinyang	suzhi	(faith	quality,	信仰素
质)’	of	the	Christian	church	in	the	city	of	Wenzhou,	for	instance,	suggests	how	
suzhi	 has	 become	 increasingly	 masculinized	 in	 the	 everyday	 practice	 of	




performed	 in	 the	grand	evangelical	banquets	organized	by	 the	affluent	head	





since	their	‘faith	quality’	was	not	‘high	enough’.	 	 	 	 	
My	fieldwork	on	Chinese	NGO	workers	also	finds	a	very	similar	family	structure	
in	 their	 private	 life	 of	 ‘one	 family,	 two	 systems’.	 As	 there	were	many	more	
women	than	men	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector,	most	of	the	female	workers	were	
not	expected	to	be	the	major	bread	winners	of	the	family	while	their	partners	
worked	 in	 other	 ‘competitive,	 profitable’	 industries.	 Such	 family	 structure	
made	the	 low	payment	widely	acceptable	among	most	of	 the	NGO	workers	 I	
met,	 which	 consequently	 led	 to	 a	 more	 extraordinary	 status	 of	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 in	 this	 sector:	 gongyi	 needed	 to	 be	 more	 ‘competitive’	 by	




strengthened	 the	 existing	 ‘one	 family,	 two	 systems’	 as	 it	 requires	 longer	
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working	 hours	 and	 less	 family	 obligations,	 which	 finally	 turns	 to	 a	 major	
obstacle	for	most	women	workers	and	“good	daddies”	in	their	career	ladder.	 	 	 	 	
My	research	into	gongyi	attempts	to	deepen	the	current	discussions	of	language	
and	 everyday	 life	 in	 reformist	 China	 in	 the	 following	 ways.	 Firstly,	 as	 the	
literature	of	 language	and	everyday	life	presented	as	above,	the	old	and	new	
languages	 in	 reformist	China	are	not	only	a	cultural	or	 linguistic	expression.	
They	 have	 become	 important	 thinking	 patterns,	 knowledge,	 and	 power	
structures	that	ordinary	Chinese	people	use	to	make	sense	of	their	everyday	






in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector.	 Inspired	 by	 studies	 on	 ‘suzhi’	 as	 a	 ‘key	 word’	 in	
understanding	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 social	 hierarchies	 in	 reformist	 China,	 I	
argue	that	gongyi	should	also	be	understood	as	the	‘key	word’	in	understanding	
the	changing	landscape	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	over	the	past	decade.	 	




to	 the	daily	work	and	 life	of	 individual	NGO	workers	 in	 terms	of	 their	 class,	
gender	and	religious	background.	Seen	as	a	‘progressive	force’	in	China,	Chinese	





on	 the	 increasing	 social	 inequality	 and	 injustice	 during	 China’s	 economic	






on	 suzhi	 have	 shown	 as	 above,	 the	 popularity	 of	 suzhi	 language	 is	 largely	 a	
political	product	of	the	neoliberal	national	development	model	in	China,	and	a	
farewell	 to	 the	 socialist	 language	of	 ‘class	 struggles’.	 But	 as	Hoffman	 (2006)	
demonstrates	in	her	research	on	college	students	in	Dalian,	high	suzhi	college	
students	may	not	necessarily	be	 self-claimed	 individualists;	 on	 the	 contrary,	
they	would	identify	themselves	with	a	new	political,	collective	value:	“patriotic	
professional”.	Although	this	thesis	unveils	the	polarization	and	inequalities	of	
various	NGO	workers	 in	 their	 everyday	 life,	my	 fieldwork	also	discusses	 the	
reasons	why	 such	 inequalities	 have	been	 tolerated	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 to	
some	degree	and	how	different	workers	consider	each	other.	As	my	research	
shows,	‘doing	gongyi’	in	some	cases	is	not	just	a	job,	but	also	a	‘standing	with	
private	 entrepreneurs’	 and	 other	 NGO	 workers	 to	 ‘reform	 the	 state’.	 While	
learning	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 be	 more	 ‘wolf-like’,	 certain	 political	
ideologies	-	identified	as	‘liberalist	values’	in	my	fieldwork	-	still	remain	crucial	
factors	 in	 shaping	 NGO	 workers’	 career	 choice	 and	 self-identity	 in	 their	
everyday	 life.	 Although	 these	 ‘liberalist	 values’	 have	 been	 performed	 as	 a	
departure	 from	 the	official	 socialist	propaganda	as	with	 suzhi,	 somehow	 the	
organizations	and	NGO	workers	in	these	cases	can	be	warmly	welcomed	by	and	













in	 authoritarian	 states.	Many	 researchers	 of	 this	 debate	 connect	 NGOs	with	
democratization,	 regime	 change,	 state	 governance,	 or	 governmentality,	
discussing	to	what	degree	that	NGOs	as	part	of	the	‘growing	civil	society’	can	
help	 challenge	 the	 existing	 regimes	 (Mercer,	 2002;	 Lewis,	 2013;	 Froissart,	
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2014).	Such	work	 is	particularly	extensive	on	Eastern	European	countries	 in	
the	 post-socialist	 transition,	 as	 well	 as	 China,	 Vietnam,	 Cuba,	Myanmar	 and	
sometimes	the	Middle	East.	However,	research	on	NGOization	and	civil	society	
has	begun	to	challenge	those	literatures	in	a	broader	context,	stating	that	most	




“professional	 organizations”	 to	 delivery	 projects,	 rather	 than	 those	 that	 are	
deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 local	 political	 and	 social	 movements	 (Choudry	 &	
Kapoor,	2013).	In	Banks	at	al	(2015)’s	research,	they	classify	the	NGO	world	
into	 two	 types:	 one	 is	 the	 NGOs	 that	 project-based	 and	 donor-dependent,	
aiming	 to	 be	 a	 professional	 service	 delivery	 organization;	 the	 other	 is	 that	
membership-based	organizations	 such	as	 labor	unions	 and	 religious	 groups,	
with	deeper	roots	and	transformative	forces	in	the	local	society.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ishkanian’s	 (2008)	 study	 of	 NGOs	 in	 post-socialist	 Armenia	 embraces	 the	
criticisms	 of	 NGOization	 in	 authoritarian	 states.	 Except	 for	 the	 trend	 of	
technocracy	 in	 the	 development	world,	 she	 goes	 further	 to	 understand	why	
most	 NGOs	 in	 Armenia	 failed	 to	 bring	 structural	 change	 by	 contextualizing	
international	donors	 and	 their	 local	 partner	organizations	 in	 social,	 political	
and	economic	changes	in	Armenia.	Her	anthropological	research	demonstrates	
that	the	international	donors	and	the	booming	new	organizations	in	Armenia	
could	 be	 more	 like	 a	 useful	 strategy	 for	 social	 mobility	 in	 NGO	 workers’	
everyday	life,	which	is	a	product	of	the	dramatic	social	and	economic	change	in	
a	certain	historical	period	that	cannot	be	simplified	as	something	‘new,	liberal	
politics’	 or	not.	Being	 “a	professional	NGO	worker”	 in	Armenia	 in	 the	1990s	
became	 an	 important	 social	 ladder	 for	 the	 previous	 ‘socialist	 workers’	 to	
maintain	 their	economic	conditions	and	deal	with	 the	political	uncertainties.	
Also,	 establishing	 a	 professional	 NGO	 and	 networking	with	Western	 donors	
could	be	a	bonus	for	the	former	socialist	politicians	to	win	elections	in	the	new	
democracy,	rather	than	to	change	the	status	quo.	
Banks	 (2015)’s	 and	 Ishkanian’s	 ethnographic	 account	 set	 up	 an	 insightful	
framework	for	me	to	look	at	the	multiple	roles	that	NGOs	play	in	a	country	in	
political	 transition.	 As	 my	 case	 studies	 present,	 my	 focus	 is	 on	 those	




Armenian	 NGO	 workers	 did	 in	 the	 1990s,	 becomes	 a	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	
political	and	economic	uncertainties	and	rebuilding	their	own	social	identities	
in	 this	 fast	 changing	 country.	 This	 research	 echoes	 with	 the	 criticisms	 of	
NGOization	 literatures,	 revealing	 the	 fact	 that	 Chinese	 NGOs	 are	 “palliative	
rather	than	transformative”	(Banks	et	al	2015:	709).	 In	 fact,	my	case	studies	
unveil	 that	 most	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGOs	 have	 become	 more	 service	 delivery	
oriented	after	the	leaving	of	international	donors.	Like	Ishkanian,	in	order	to	
understand	why	Chinese	NGOs	fail	to	be	a	driver	of	transformative	forces,	this	
research	 puts	 these	 organizations	 and	 their	 workers	 back	 to	 the	 changing	
landscape	of	Chinese	NGO	sector	and	its	dynamic	relations	with	the	state.	 	 	 	 	 	 	






the	 links	 between	 gongyi	 and	 the	 middle	 class	 in	 China:	 by	 bringing	 new	






society.	 	 	 	
This	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 second	 debate	 around	 business	 elites	 and	 the	 current	




influence	 on	 national	 and	 international	 development	 agenda	 (Eikenberry	 &	
Mirabella,	 2018).	 Scholars	 understand	 philanthrocapitalism	 both	 as	 a	
neoliberalist	ideology	and	certain	ruling	practices	in	the	development	industry.	 	
	 37	
For	 instance,	Wilson	 (2014)’s	 research	 on	 a	 development	 project	 in	Uganda	
finds	that	the	project	sponsor,	a	philanthropic	organisation	based	in	New	York,	
tries	to	create	a	“fantasy”	(1144)	since	its	cause-related	marketing	campaigns	





charitable	 foundations	 based	 on	 their	 previous	 business	 experiences	 and	
influenced	the	state	education	programs	through	their	big	donations	in	the	US.	 	 	










Chinese	 society	 since	 the	establishment	of	 the	 socialist	 state	 in	1949.	As	we	
discuss	 in	Chapter	2,	 they	have	been	 long	viewed	as	a	 “progressive	 force”	 in	
China’s	economic	reform	in	the	past	four	decades,	which	is	different	from	their	
counterparts	 in	 the	 capitalist	 societies	 like	 the	 US.	 Davies’s	 anthropological	
research	 on	 Chinese	 celebrity	 entrepreneurs	 (Davies,	 2010:	 193-215)	 takes	
these	entrepreneurs	as	a	new	cultural	and	political	phenomenon.	His	research	
observes	 how	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 performed	 as	 a	 new	 role	model	 in	
Chinese	 society.	 The	 ‘new’	 image	 they	 are	 presenting	may	 offer	 them	 great	
power	over	not	only	reshaping	the	Chinese	economy,	but	also	over	the	political	
ideologies	and	social	relations	of	ordinary	Chinese	people	including	grassroots	








as	 their	 internal	structure	and	organizational	culture.	This	 is	also	something	
that	the	AF	workers	called	as	“wolf	spirit”	in	their	daily	work	(see	Chapter	4	
and	 5).	 However,	 China’s	 case	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 current	
philanthrocapitalism	 debates	 by	 bringing	 the	 important	 role	 that	 the	 state	
plays	 in	 shaping	 those	 philanthropists’	 practices.	 As	 we	 may	 find	 from	 the	
current	literatures,	most	of	the	research	takes	the	state,	whether	in	the	US	or	
Africa,	 as	a	 relatively	passive	 role	 in	dealing	with	 the	big,	 individual	donors.	
However,	 China’s	 case	 may	 present	 us	 a	 different	 story	 of	 how	
philanthrocapitalism	can	take	place	in	a	different	way.	 	 	
As	I	previously	discuss	in	this	chapter,	research	on	Chinese	entrepreneurs	has	
been	 long	 connected	 with	 corporatism	 of	 the	 local	 state.	 Although	 some	
researchers	 acknowledge	 the	 roles	 that	 entrepreneurs	 play	 in	 the	 policy	
making	process	(e.g.	Oi,	1995;	Schubert	&	Heberer,	2017;	Tsai,	2005),	others	
argue	that	the	Chinese	state	still	remains	to	be	the	decisive	power	in	shaping	
private	 entrepreneurs’	 political	 attitudes	 and	 daily	 practices	 towards	 the	
existing	regime,	rather	than	vice	versa	(Tsai,	2005;	Dickson,	2007,	2008,	2018;	














in	 reformist	 China	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 scholarly	 world,	 and	 how	my	





late	 1980s	 to	 early	 2000s;	 and	 the	 past	 decade.	 Specifically,	 I	 discuss	 the	
process	 of	 how	gongyi	 has	 firstly	 been	 closely	 linked	under	 the	 influence	 of	
Western	donors	to	the	ideas	of	civil	society,	and	then	how	it	turns	to	the	market	
given	the	policy	changes	in	the	recent	years.	Chapter	3	presents	the	process	and	
reflections	 of	 how	 I	 did	my	 fieldwork	 in	 researching	gongyi	with	AF	 and	 its	
partner	 organizations	 in	 different	 places.	 During	 my	 yearlong	 ethnographic	
work,	 I	 had	 different	 professional	 identities	 whilst	 working	 with	 different	
organizations.	For	the	first	half	of	the	fieldwork,	I	was	an	intern	working	with	
AF	and	living	with	its	workers,	learning	to	be	a	‘professional	gongyi	worker’	as	





discuss	 the	 series	 of	 highly	 commercialized	 reform	 launched	 by	 the	





this	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 was	 affecting	 AF	 workers’	 everyday	 life	 and	 how	 it	 finally	
strengthened	and	reproduced	the	social	inequalities	between	men	and	women	
both	in	the	workforce	and	at	home	in	China.	I	argue	that	this	commercialized	
gongyi	was	not	 just	happening	 to	 the	AF	or	 the	workers,	but	 that	 it	 is	also	a	
product	of	collaboration	between	the	local	state	and	entrepreneurs	in	the	city.	
Chapters	 6	 to	 7	 turns	 to	 the	 partner	 organizations	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 China.	
Although	all	the	partner	organizations	of	AF	spoke	the	same	language	of	gongyi	
in	 my	 fieldwork,	 the	 ways	 that	 they	 imagined	 and	 performed	 gongyi	 were	
different	 from	 one	 place	 to	 another.	 The	 two	 chapters	 present	 the	
dissemination	process	of	gongyi	as	negotiations	between	local	states	and	NGOs	









identification	 features	 the	 importance	 of	 cultivating,	 bridging	 and	managing	
various	social	relations	in	the	local	society	(but	not	attaching	themselves	to	a	
specific	 big	 foundation).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 new	 identity	 reveals	 how	 being	
incorporated	into	the	local	state	has	become	a	way	of	living	in	the	local	society,	
and	how	people’s	family	life,	personal	faith,	and	social	relations	have	all	become	









formal	 and	 institutional	 way,	 covering	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 the	 NGO	 issues	 like	
registration,	fundraising,	internal	governance,	accountability,	and	so	on.	When	
I	 was	 doing	 my	 fieldwork,	 many	 Chinese	 NGOs,	 foundation	 workers	 in	
particular,	were	talking	about	this	law	with	very	mixed	opinions.	As	a	law	that	
had	been	drafted	in	Beijing	for	years	before	its	enforcement,	what	interests	me	
most	 is	 the	 language	 that	 the	 ruling	 party	 uses	 to	 define	 the	 various	 social	
organizations	in	the	country.	In	fact,	this	law-drafting	work	can	be	dated	back	
to	the	late	1980s,	when	the	then	Chinese	political	leader	Zhao	Zhiyang	launched	
a	 series	 of	 political	 reform	 plans	 along	with	 economic	 reforms;	 therefore,	 a	
working	group	was	set	up	in	the	central	government	to	draft	laws	on	citizens’	
associational	 rights	and	 freedom	of	 speech	 in	1987	 (Wang,	2014).	However,	
this	working	group	was	dismissed	after	the	1989	Student	Movement	in	Beijing,	




law	 on	NGO	 issues	 on	 the	 national	 scale.	 But	 this	 time	 in	 this	 new	 law,	 the	











Brief	 translates	 it	 as	 ‘public	 interest’.	 I	 have	 also	 seen	 another	 translation	
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(5)	 Preventing	 and	 alleviating	 pollution	 and	 other	 public	 hazards,	
protecting	and	improving	the	eco-environment;	
(6)	Other	public	interest	activities	in	accordance	with	this	law.	
During	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 China,	 I	 have	 heard	 some	 comments	 from	 legal	




the	 law	 as	 a	 compromise	 in	 the	 state-society	 negotiations	 and	 struggles	 in	
China’s	context.	From	the	law	drafting	on	associational	rights	to	the	charity	law,	
Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 at	 large,	 have	 gone	 through	 a	 very	 long	
negotiating	process	with	the	state.	These	negotiations	are	still	undergoing,	and	
the	 multiple	 understandings	 of	 gongyi	 are	 the	 products	 of	 this	 negotiating	
process.	However,	most	of	comments	I	have	heard	from	Chinese	NGO	workers	
and	 news	 reports	 in	 the	 field	 were	 positive.	 Many	 of	 them	 hold	 that	 the	
establishment	of	the	law	means	that	NGOs	in	China,	once	a	‘political	threat’	in	
the	relevant	regulations,	have	finally	gained	a	normalized	status	in	the	country.	
Some	 of	 their	 roles	 and	 functions,	 defined	 by	 “doing	 gongyi”,	 have	 been	
	














student	 activities	 approved	 by	 the	 ‘student	 workers’	 on	 my	 campus	 were	
allowed	(as	I	introduced	in	the	preface).	Likewise,	outside	the	campus,	only	the	










entrepreneurs,	 and	 NGO	 workers	 in	 China?	 This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	













many	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 used	 to	 identify	 what	 they	 did.	 The	 rising	 of	
gongmin	 shehui	 in	 that	 historical	 period	 came	 with	 the	 entering	 of	 various	
international	 donors	 and	 national	modernization	 projects	 in	 the	 country.	 In	
many	aspects,	the	change	from	gongmin	shehui	to	gongyi	indicates	the	changing	
NGO	 regulations	 and	 state-society	 relations	 in	 China:	 the	 Chinese	 state	 has	
begun	to	take	a	more	hostile	attitude	towards	international	donors	and	social	
activists,	it	encourages	more	organizations	to	work	as	social	service	deliverers	
under	 its	 new	 regulations.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 the	 deepening	
development	 of	 state	 corporatism	 and	 surveillance	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 that	
finally	 led	 to	 the	 censorship	 of	gongmin	 shehui	 language	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 a	
(seemingly)	 depoliticized	 gongyi.	 Furthermore,	 the	 state	 corporatism	 has	
become	 more	 complicated	 by	 collaborating	 with	 the	 new	 rich	 Chinese	 and	
corporates	under	the	name	of	gongyi	marketization.	In	the	end	of	this	chapter,	
I	also	talk	about	the	increasing	heterogenous	nature	of	Chinese	NGO	sector	by	
looking	at	those	who	stopped	using	the	gongyi	language	in	their	work.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
2.1	Gongyi	and	the	socialist	state	
Gongyi,	normally	 translated	as	 ‘public	 interest’,	was	originally	an	 intellectual	
term	used	by	scholars	and	revolutionaries	 in	 the	 late	1800s.	As	a	 translated	
word	from	Japanese,	people	used	this	word	to	clarify	a	political	sphere	beyond	




one	 isn't	 the	 king's	 subjects."3	 In	 the	 revolution	 of	 destroying	 the	 last	 Qing	














be	 ‘cut	 down’,	 which	 included	 private	 businesses,	 traditional	 clans,	 private	
hospitals	and	schools,	private	cinemas	and	publishing	industry,	etc.	In	this	‘new	








ROC	period,	 but	 a	 ‘role	model’	 called	Lei	 Feng	 (雷峰),	 one	of	 the	most	well-




















Feng	 was	 changed	 from	 “being	 loyal	 to	 communism,	 class	 struggle	 and	
chairman	Mao”	to	“doing	deeds	every	day	to	serve	the	people”,	no	matter	which	













new	 interpretation	of	socialist	morality.	Gongyi	 is	 still	promoted	as	part	of	a	




launched	 by	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 China	 Communist	 Party:	 the	
Construction	of	Socialist	Spiritual	Civilization	(CSSC)	in	the	late	1970s.	CSSC	in	
the	 early	 1980s	 was	 put	 forward	 to	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 Marxist	
education,	 so	 as	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 Chinese	 people,	 in	 the	 chaos	 and	
uncertainties	of	the	post-Mao	era,	could	still	maintain	the	ideals	of	communism	
and	comradeship	among	people.	But	very	soon	in	1986,	when	the	then	political	
leader	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 was	 determined	 to	 deepen	 the	 economic	 reform,	 the	
contents	 of	 CSSC	 were	 also	 changed:	 its	 aim	 was	 redefined	 as	 ‘nurturing	
patriotic	 socialist	 citizen’	 in	 order	 to	 ‘push	 forward	 national	 modernization	
development	 and	 speed	 up	 comprehensive	 reform	 and	 opening	 up	 policy’	
(Zhan,	2017).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
It	is	in	this	context,	in	the	late	1980s,	that	gongyi	was	incorporated	into	a	state	
discourse,	 part	 of	 a	 project	 to	 create	 ‘new’	 supporters	 of	 China’s	 economic	
reform	who	are	 ‘patriotic’	and	 ‘more	modernized’.	As	 the	discussion	of	suzhi	
discourse	presented	(Hoffman,	2010),	the	Chinese	state	at	that	time	was	trying	
to	create	its	people,	especially	the	university	students,	as	‘national	talents’	to	
support	 the	new	market-based	economy,	 for	which	 the	state	 initiated	a	new	




collective	 spirit	 in	 the	 daily	 practices	 of	 Chinese	 universities,	 for	which	 she	
called	it	as	‘patriotic	professionalism’.	Under	this	background,	the	various	social	
activities	 organized	 by	 the	 state	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘doing	 gongyi’	 became	 very	







2008).	 In	many	mainstream	media	 reports	 in	 China,	 these	 volunteers	 were	










they	 did	 not	 only	 have	 more	 advanced	 knowledge	 in	 China,	 but	 also	 they	


















early	 stages,	 these	 NGOs	 looked	 like	 many	 other	 government-organized	












specific	 state	 regulations	 or	 institutions	 specifically	 for	 administrating	 any	
social	organizations	in	China.	This	led	to	a	relatively	open	space	for	many	self-
claimed	minjian	organizations	showing	up	after	Mao’s	death	between	1976	to	
1988.	As	Veg	 (2019),	 in	 this	period,	as	 long	as	 these	organizations	were	not	
identified	 as	 a	 direct	 political	 threat	 to	 social	 stability,	 they	 were	 simply	
neglected	or	tolerated	by	Beijing.	 	
However,	 the	various	political	movements	 in	 the	1980s,	 especially	 the	1989	




the	 past	 three	 decades	 (Howell,	 2012).	 In	 these	 regulations,	 business	
associations	which	were	beneficial	 for	 the	economic	development	have	been	
encouraged;	 organizations	 with	 government	 supports	 as	 their	 supervisory	





underground	 student	 organizations	 and	 religious	 groups	 were	 strictly	
prohibited	(ibid.).	Moreover,	state	apparatus	began	to	set	up	across	the	country	
for	 close	 surveillance	 from	 organizational	 registration,	 financial	 resources,	
annual	check,	staff	background	review,	to	detailed	instructions	of	establishing	
a	 ‘qualified’	 board	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 1998,	 a	 government	 department	 called	 	




death,	 the	 ruling	 party	 in	 China	 has	 been	 through	 many	 changes	 in	




the	 state.	 In	 this	 period,	 the	 language	 of	 gongyi	 did	 not	 enter	 the	 official	








socialist	 gongyi,	 they	 were	 people-based	 organizations,	 not	 a	 government	
apparatus.	 Secondly,	 they	were	 not	 ‘political	 threats’	 to	 the	 country	 and	 its	
people;	 they	were	organized	to	promote	gongyi,	or	public	 interest.	The	 first-
generation	 NGOs	 were	 mostly	 funded	 by	 various	 international	 agencies,	
establishing	 their	 own	 organizational	missions	 (Ji,	 2000).	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	
some	 of	 them	 turned	 into	 environmental	 advocacy	 groups,	 women’s	









of	 Chinese	 theorists	 attempting	 to	 understand	 the	 differences	 between	 a	




society	was	more	 like	 an	urgent	 solution	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
student	movement.	It	was	these	‘liberal	intellectuals’	that	greatly	impacted	the	
emerging	Chinese	NGOs.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	find	that	some	founders	of	the	
first-generation	 NGOs	 in	 China	 had	 close	 links	 with	 the	 1989	 Student	
Movement5 .	 Some	 of	 them	were	 activists	 in	 the	movement	 themselves	 and	
therefore	 maintained	 close	 relations	 with	 the	 political	 dissidents.	 Others	
admitted	 that	 their	 ideas	 of	 civil	 society	 were	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 these	
activists6 .	 In	 the	 1990s	 to	 early	 2000s	 that	 Chinese	 NGOs	 began	 to	 use	 the	
notion	of	gongmin	shehui,	or	civil	society,	in	terms	of	what	it	was	against	rather	
than	 what	 it	 stood	 for.	 By	 distancing	 themselves	 from	 the	 state-sponsored	









personal	 backgrounds	 are.	 One	 of	 my	 interviewees,	 Humphrey,	 often	
complained	to	me	that	he	had	severe	conflicts	with	Perry,	a	leader	of	another	
organization.	 These	 two	 organizations	were	 both	 sponsored	 by	 AF,	 but	 had	
very	different	 ideas	about	how	to	redistribute	 the	sponsor’s	 funding	 in	 their	









upper	 class	 in	 a	 Chinese	 metropolitan.	 He	 also	 had	 his	 own	 companies,	
properties	and	cars	in	the	city.	Perry’s	proposals	tended	to	be	more	ambitious	
than	 Humphrey’s	 and	 aimed	 at	 mobilizing	 more	 state	 funding	 and	 well-off	
citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 his	 charitable	 projects.	When	 I	 asked	 him	whether	










NGOs.	 Moreover,	 gongmin	 shehui	 changes	 ‘gongyi’	 to	 be	 an	 action-oriented	
knowledge.	As	one	NGO	worker	told	me,	‘gongmin	shehui	is	not	done	by	talking,	
















reports	 and	 research,	 2008	 was	 being	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘year	 of	 China’s	
gongmin	 shehui’	 (e.g.	 Deng,	 2008;	 Teets,	 2009;	 Yang,	 2017).	 That	 is	 largely	
because	 for	 the	 first	 time,	people	 found	NGOs	 in	China	did	not	have	to	work	
underground:	a	large	number	of	volunteers	and	social	organizations	joined	in	
the	disaster	relief	work	following	the	devastating	Sichuan	earthquake	that	year.	




major	 sponsors	 behind	 many	 national	 organizations	 promoting	 ‘gongmin	
shehui’	from	the	early	2000s	were	international	agencies	and	have	been	seen	
as	a	threat	to	the	state.	Since	2010,	Oxfam	China	has	been	under	strict	political	
surveillance	 and	 their	 volunteer	 recruitment	 in	 all	 Chinese	 universities	was	






of	 so-called	gongmin	 shehui	 that	 some	Western	countries	have	 set	 for	us’	 10.	
Subsequently,	 gongmin	 shehui	 was	 listed	 in	 an	 internal	 Communist	 Party	
propaganda	document	as	one	of	the	‘seven	don’t-says’.	
To	some	degree,	the	Chinese	government’s	reaction	confirms	that	the	notion	of	
gongmin	 shehui	 has	 become	 a	 contentious	 force	 threatening	 mainstream	
propaganda.	Since	the	censorship,	a	very	visible	change	is	that	people	no	longer	












not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 new	 meanings	 of	 gongyi	 would	 be	 absolutely	
different.	Despite	government	censorship,	gongmin	shehui	 is	still	the	focus	of	
discussion	and	has	had	a	profound	political	impact,	in	terms	of	the	way	in	which	
people	 think	 about	 their	 relationship	with	 others	 and	with	 the	 state.	 In	my	
fieldwork,	I	often	found	many	foundation	leaders	and	ordinary	NGO	workers,	
though	 quite	 different	 from	 political	 dissidents	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 work	 and	
personal	background,	in	many	private	occasions	they	all	tried	to	explain	to	me	
that	 they	were	 strong	 supporters	 of	 ‘China’s	gongmin	 shehui’	 and	were	 just	






said,	 for	 the	 advocates	 of	 a	 gongmin	 shehui,	 entrepreneurs	 are	 seen	 as	 an	
important	 ally	 rather	 than	 something	 outside	 of	 it.	 Although	many	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 have	 begun	 to	 set	 up	 their	 own	 foundations	 or	 donate	 to	
charitable	 projects	 as	 early	 as	 the	 late	 1980s,	 the	 attempts	 of	 taking	
entrepreneurs	and	the	private	sector	as	a	crucial	part	of	gongyi	and	Chinese	
NGO	sector	did	not	appear	until	2010,	which	has	been	summarized	as	a	school	
of	 ‘gongyi	marketization’	 in	many	news	 reports11.	 Interestingly,	 if	we	 search	

















for	 Youth	 Communist	 League	 (YCL),	 the	 youth	 branch	 of	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	Party	from	1970s	to	1980s,	during	which	he	drafted	the	political	
reform	proposal	 for	 the	 YCL,	 trying	 to	 launch	 competitive	 elections	 and	 de-
administration	reform	within	YCL.	By	the	end	of	1989,	he	established	the	China	





do	 the	 resource	 mobilization	 and	 promotion	 work	 in	 Greater	 China	 (Zhan,	
2011).	 The	 promotion	 strategy	 of	 this	 project	 was	 dominantly	 patriotic:	 to	
claim	that	the	motherland	was	suffering	from	heavy	financial	burdens,	it	should	
be	 everyone’s	 (including	 overseas	 Chinese)	 responsibility	 to	 “help	 the	weak	
compatriots”	(ibid).	From	1989	to	2004,	the	Hope	Project	received	more	than	
220	million	yuan	(about	2.2	billion	pounds)	from	public	donation,	supported	
more	 than	2500,000	 students,	 and	 funded	9508	elementary	 schools	with	 its	
own	 namesake	 (Hsu,	 2017).	 In	 many	 aspects,	 Xu’s	 Hope	 Project	 was	 more	
aligned	with	the	collective,	socialist	morality	of	gongyi	and	a	distinctive	state-
centric	feature.	Therefore,	 for	a	very	long	time,	Xu	and	the	Hope	Project	was	











activists	had	 to	act	 in	a	 low	profile,	 and	more	 international	donors	began	 to	









people	 enjoying	 special	 ties	 with	 the	 Chinese	 state	 and	 business	 elites	 had	
bigger	voices	in	China’s	NGO	community.	In	my	fieldwork,	I	was	surprised	to	
find	 that	 some	 of	 the	 young	 NGO	workers	 in	 recent	 years	 only	 knew	 Liang	
Xiaoyan	as	a	grassroots	NGO	worker	working	for	rural	education.	But	Liang	was	
quite	 famous	 in	my	 college	 years	 as	 an	 activist	 and	 a	 survivor	 of	 the	 1989	




his	early	years.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
In	2006,	Xu	resigned	his	leadership	at	CYDF	and	joined	Narada	Foundation,	a	
private	foundation	that	was	fully	funded	by	a	real	estate	company	in	Shanghai.	
Since	 then,	 he	 has	 become	 the	 board	 chair	 of	 Narada	 Foundation.	 In	 many	
interviews	and	reports,	Xu	described	the	Hope	Project	as	“a	social	innovation	
to	reform	the	state-owned	welfare	system”,	declared	himself	as	‘an	explorer	of	
Chinese	 gongyi	 industry’.	 According	 to	 Xu,	 gongyi	 was	 neither	 a	 socialist	
morality	 nor	 a	 liberal	 political	 stance,	 rather	 it	 should	 be	 like	 a	 formal	
profession	 with	 its	 own	 knowledge,	 logics	 and	 skills.	 But	 where	 did	 the	









processes.	 Xu	 also	 identified	 that	 NGO’s	 working	 procedures	 should	 be	
designed	 from	 ‘marketing	 positioning’,	 ‘product	 development’,	 ‘pricing’,	 to	
‘marketing’;	just	the	same	as	any	companies.	In	2016,	Xu	went	further	to	argue	
that	‘only	the	gongyi	projects	that	can	be	replicated	in	a	large	scale	should	be	





were	 very	 much	 implemented	 in	 the	 new	 foundations	 like	 AF	 and	 then	
disseminated	across	 their	partner	organizations.	Moreover,	 the	new	 ideas	of	
gongyi	 embraced	 the	 changing	 regulatory	 strategies	 in	 Beijing.	 In	 2010,	 the	
then	 Chinese	 president	 Hu	 Jintao	 made	 a	 speech	 on	 ‘scientific	 social	
management’,	 in	which	 he	mentioned	 eight	major	 tasks	 for	 the	 ruling	 party	
including	“supporting	people’s	organizations”	and	improving	the	management	
of	services	for	marginalized	groups	(Howell,	2019).	Since	then,	more	and	more	
government	 funding	 from	 various	 levels	 of	 the	 state	 has	 entered	 into	 the	
Chinese	NGO	sector,	under	the	name	of	social	service	subcontracting.	Although	
the	 government	 subcontracting	 trend	 is	 not	 the	 major	 topic	 of	 this	 thesis,	
almost	all	the	NGOs	I	visited	in	the	research	were	involved	in	this	government	
subcontracting	more	 or	 less.	 According	 to	 Kang’s	 research	 (2019),	 the	 two-
pillared	 funding	 game	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 new	 foundations	 is	
largely	based	on	the	same	logic:	learning	from	the	market	competition.	In	order	
to	 succeed	 in	 the	 funding	 game,	NGOs	 need	 to	 compete	with	 each	 other	 for	
‘higher	project	efficiency’,	accept	the	status	quo,	and	fit	themselves	into	various	














their	disagreements	with	Xu.	During	my	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 city	of	 Shenzhen,	 I	










positive	 side	 started	 their	 speeches	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 economist	 Frieditch	
Hayek,	 saying	 that	 “anything	without	market	 could	only	 lead	 to	 ‘the	 road	 to	
serfdom’”.	Then	 they	 iterated	Xu’s	 ideas	and	 took	marketization	as	 the	most	
valuable	 experience	 that	 China	 has	 been	 through	 in	 the	 past	 three	 decades.	
Meanwhile,	the	negative	party	held	that	the	logics	behind	the	market	and	the	
‘gongyi	 sector’	 could	 be	 very	 different,	 so	 they	 were	 worried	 that	 this	















The	 workers	 I	 present	 here	 questioned	 gongyi	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 knowledge	
resources,	 internal	hierarchies,	 and	working	purpose.	 Some	of	 them,	 though	
quite	 limited,	 were	 from	 within	 AF.	 But	 more	 were	 from	 grassroots	
organizations	 working	 for	 ‘sensitive	 issues’	 in	 China,	 especially	 those	 from	
grassroots	women’s	group	working	for	the	immigrant	workers’	communities.	
They	 felt	 that	 they	 had	 been	 largely	marginalized	 in	 this	 new	 “professional	
gongyi”	 13.	 	 In	my	 interviews,	 some	of	 them	began	 to	deny	what	 they	do	as	
‘gongyi’,	 an	 identity	 that	 they	 once	 shared	 with	 many	 ‘gongmin	 shehui	
supporters’.	Some	of	them	told	me	directly	that,	“don’t	call	me	a	gongyi	worker,	
I	am	not	doing	gongyi”.	Instead,	they	preferred	to	use	the	new	term	of	‘feminists’	
or	 ‘women	 workers’,	 rather	 than	 putting	 themselves	 back	 into	 a	 shared	
community	with	other	types	of	NGOs	again.	 In	 interviews	with	two	women’s	
organizations,	 some	 informants	 suggested	 that	 the	 biggest	 difficulty	 of	 their	
community	organization	was	to	get	domestic	funding	from	new	donors.	For	a	
long	 time,	 they	 had	 been	 funded	 by	 international	 donors,	 but	 international	
funding	 has	 been	 now	 strictly	 prohibited	 by	 Beijing.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 new	
















Therefore,	 their	 funding	 applications	 with	 these	 new,	 domestic	 foundations	
could	hardly	succeed	since	their	work	in	the	immigrant	workers’	community	
cannot	 be	 proved	 as	 ‘efficient’	 and	 ‘professional’.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 these	





the	 negative	 side	 arguing	 against	 the	 marketization	 trend	 finally	 won	 the	
debate,	the	reality	was	just	the	opposite:	none	of	the	women’s	groups	had	been	
invited	for	this	debate;	in	fact	I	 	 could	hardly	see	any	organizations	working	
for	 the	 female	 factory	 workers’	 rights	 among	 the	 hundreds	 of	 organization	
attendees.	 Just	 before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 charity	 fair,	 two	 grassroots	
organizations	working	 for	 immigrant	 factory	workers	 in	Shenzhen	were	 just	
shut	down	by	the	city	government.	







the	 political	 dynamics	 and	 funding	 draining	 anymore.	 Given	 her	 working	
experience	in	women’s	work,	Daisy	had	tried	to	find	an	NGO	job	in	the	field	of	

















customers’	donations	automatically,	 so	 that	 to	remind	people	 to	buy	more	 if	
their	 donation	 numbers	 go	 down.	 Customers	 with	 high	 online	 orders	 and	
donations	would	be	 given	 some	delivery	priorities,	 named	as	 “red	 soldiers”.	
This	new	Lei	Feng	Diary	was	 soon	 reported	by	 the	People’	Daily,	 one	of	 the	
biggest	official	newspaper	in	China,	calling	this	as	the	“gongyi	of	our	times”.	 	
So	far,	the	chapter	provides	a	historical	understanding	of	the	language	of	gongyi	





China	were	seen	as	 their	 ‘natural	allies’	 in	 front	of	 the	state,	although	INGOs	
supported	most	of	these	organizations	in	the	post	Tiananmen	era.	However,	we	
may	also	find	that	such	thinking	about	the	Chinese	state	and	market	would	be	
soon	 challenged:	 the	 regulatory	 strategies	of	 the	Chinese	 state	have	become	
more	adaptive	and	selective	in	dealing	with	different	types	of	organizations;	the	
market	and	 the	 rising	Chinese	entrepreneurs	have	a	very	ambiguous	 face	 in	
front	of	the	state.	Meanwhile,	the	individuals	who	are	now	working	in	this	new	
gongyi	era	are	never	new:	they	could	be	just	from	the	state	and	INGOs.	From	
the	 people	 who	 are	 no	 longer	 use	 gongyi,	 the	 changing	 history	 of	 gongyi	
presents	the	widening	social	gap	in	the	Chinese	society	in	terms	of	class	and	
gender.	 In	 the	 later	 empirical	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 present	 my	
ethnographic	 study	of	 the	everyday	practices	of	 this	new	gongyi	 in	different	
contexts	 in	China,	analyzing	how	its	new	meanings	have	been	shaped	by	the	






The	 cases	presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 from	my	yearlong	ethnographic	work	
with	 a	Chinese	 foundation,	AF,	 and	 their	partner	organizations	 in	difference	















could	be	 finally	 legally	 registered	as	 a	public	 foundation	 in	Shenzhen	city	 in	
2011.	By	the	end	of	2010,	an	influential	Chinese	TV	program	interviewed	one	
of	 AF’s	 founders	 J	 on	 his	 work.	 In	 this	 program,	 he	 publicly	 expressed	 his	
disappointment	with	China’s	national	foundation	regulations,	saying	he	desired	
to	innovate	the	“traditional	gongyi”	by	setting	up	this	new	public	foundation	so	
that	 more	 Chinese	 people	 can	 get	 involved.	 Soon	 this	 interview	 was	
broadcasted	on	 the	 state-owned	China	Central	Television.	 In	 the	early	2011,	
being	 introduced	 by	 a	 senior	 official	 of	 the	 central	 government,	 the	 city	
government	of	Shenzhen	permitted	AF	to	register	as	a	public	foundation	with	
public	fundraising	rights	within	the	city.	This	was	taken	as	a	milestone	of	NGO	
regulation	reform	in	China	at	that	time.	 	 	 	 	
Except	its	registration	story,	what	made	AF	to	be	the	pioneer	of	“Chinese	gongyi”	
were	two	unexpected	GONGO	scandals.	As	we	discussed	in	the	history	of	gongyi	
language,	 gongyi	 was	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 a	 socialist	 morality	 with	 close	
connections	with	the	Chinese	state.	For	a	long	time,	people	viewed	gongyi	as	an	
equivalent	of	GONGO,	Fei	Long	or	the	collective	spirit.	However,	gongyi’s	close	





was	 received	 by	 various	 GONGOs.	 However,	 given	 more	 and	 more	 media	
reports	on	governmental	corruption	of	these	donations,	GONGOs	cannot	escape	




luxurious	 life	online,	but	she	had	a	 job	 title	as	a	manager	of	CRC.	Millions	of	
Chinese	 netizens	 soon	 responded	 with	 angry	 posts.	 This	 scandal	 launched	
massive	 suspicions	 and	 criticisms	 towards	 GONGOs	 nationally.	 In	 2011	 and	
2012,	the	public	donation	that	CRC	received	decreased	dramatically	by	80%.	




It	 is	 these	 two	 consecutive	 scandals	 that	 give	 the	 rise	 of	 “new	 foundations”.	
Taking	AF	as	an	example,	in	2007	it	only	received	about	1	million	pounds	when	
it	was	still	affiliated	with	a	GONGO	 in	China.	But	 in	 the	next	year	during	 the	
Sicuan	 earthquake,	 AF’s	 donation	was	more	 than	 20	million,	most	 of	which	
came	from	small	individual	donors.	This	number	was	much	higher	than	most	of	
the	GONGOs	at	that	time.	After	the	Guo	Meimei	scandal,	AF	became	one	of	the	
most	 trusted	 foundations	 to	 receive	 public	 donation.	 In	 the	 2013	 Ya’an	
earthquake,	AF	received	about	40	million	pounds,	becoming	one	of	the	richest	
foundations	 in	China.	The	extraordinary	fundraising	performance	made	AF	a	








very	 different	 backgrounds,	 from	 government,	 public	 relations,	 media,	
branding,	 sales	 and	 digital	 marketing,	 banking,	 to	 traditional	 international	
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development	 agencies	 like	 Save	 the	 Children	 and	 Oxfam.	 In	my	 fieldwork,	 I	
found	that	its	workers	had	very	different	views	of	their	founders	and	colleagues.	
It	was	a	big	and	influential	organization	in	China,	but	full	of	internal	tensions,	
debates	or	 even	 struggles	about	how	 to	do	gongyi	 correctly.	While	 some	AF	









AF	 was	 also	 deeply	 embedded	 into	 the	 politics	 between	 different	 local	
governments,	grassroots	organizations	and	the	local	communities.	In	the	fifth	
chapter,	we	find	that	some	of	AF’s	local	partner	organizations	would	like	to	take	
advantage	of	AF’s	 famous	 founders	 to	socialize	with	 the	 local	business	elites	
and	officials;	but	others	use	its	fame	to	leverage	political	recognition	from	the	
local	 government.	 Although	 almost	 all	 the	 actors	 involved	 spoke	 the	 same	
gongyi	language,	studies	of	how	AF’s	work	can	be	done	at	the	local	level	can	let	

































comparative	 study	 between	 the	 ‘old’	 and	 ‘new’	 organizations	 to	 multi-sited	
ethnographic	 research	 of	 AF’s	 “industrial	 chain”	 under	 the	 name	 of	 doing	
modern	gongyi.	
Multi-sited	 ethnography	 has	 been	 popularly	 used	 in	 the	 studies	 of	 social	
mobility,	immigration,	and	globalization	in	recent	years.	 	 According	to	Falzon	
(Falzon,	 2009:2),	 “the	 essence	 of	 multi-sited	 research	 is	 to	 follow	 people,	





conversations	 reminded	me	not	 to	 take	AF	and	other	organizations	as	mere	
different,	 scattered	case	 studies	as	my	original	 research	plan,	but	 to	analyze	
their	 connections	 and	 differences	 in	 a	 bigger	 picture:	 how	 these	 different	











be	possible	 in	 Silicon	Valley	 given	 the	production	of	 “IT	 grooms”	 in	Andhra,	




in	 another	 article	 (Xiang,	 2013),	multi-sited	 ethnography	 "constructs	 rather	
merely	 reflects	 reality",	 therefore	 ethnographers	 should	 "trace	 people's	
concerns,	calculations,	and	strategies…according	to	the	logic	of	how	the	reality	
is	 internally	 constituted	 in	 practice"	 (p.	 296).	 My	 ethnographic	 work	 with	
Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 in	 their	 dorm,	 teahouse,	 and	 homes	 gave	 me	 more	
perspectives	 to	 analyze	 and	 reconstruct	 the	 meanings	 of	 gongyi	 that	 I	 had	
observed	 in	 various	 NGOs’	 offices.	 People’s	 multiple	 interpretations	 and	
performances	 of	 gongyi	 with	 the	 flowing	 donation	 from	 AF	 to	 the	 other	
organizations	have	indicated	that	the	language	of	“gongyi"	was	never	a	random	
pick	in	their	daily	work	and	life,	rather	it	is	based	on	many	careful	calculations	
of	 their	 own	 social	 status,	 economic	 conditions,	 gender,	 and	 the	 dynamic	
political	environment	in	different	local	societies.	 	
The	first	half	of	my	fieldwork	was	mostly	done	by	participant	observation	and	














formal,	one	to	one	 interviews,	 though	all	 the	AF	staff	had	already	known	my	
dual	 identities.	The	data	was	 from	my	daily	participant	observation	 and	 the	
organizational	 documents,	meanwhile,	 I	 also	 kept	 a	 diary	 every	 day	 to	 take	
down	field	notes	and	my	reflections.	 	









visited	AF's	 former	employees,	 and	ended	up	with	more	 interviews	of	 some	
other	 foundation	 workers.	 My	 interviews	 were	 done	 in	 11	 different	 cities	
covering	7	provinces	in	China;	most	of	the	interviewees	were	the	organizations'	
leaders.	 During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 found	 that	 all	 the	 foundation	workers	 I	 had	
worked	with,	whether	via	formal	interviews	or	participant	observations,	were	
located	 in	 the	 most	 prosperous	 cities	 in	 China:	 Beijing,	 Guangzhou,	 and	
Shenzhen.	Most	of	their	partner	organizations	I	have	ever	visited	were	in	the	




how	I	deal	with	research	ethics	both	in	the	field	and	at	desk.	 	 	 	 	
For	 my	 whole	 fieldwork,	 I	 did	 40	 one	 to	 one	 interviews,	 mostly	 done	 in	
November	2016,	 and	 from	March	 to	 July	2017.	Most	 of	 the	 interviews	were	
conducted	in	various	restaurants,	along	with	dinners	or	lunch.	Among	all	the	
interviewees,	15	are	AF's	 then	or	 former	workers;	11	are	 from	AF's	partner	
	 68	















with	 a	 Western	 university	 more	 difficult 1 .	 Under	 this	 condition,	 it	 is	 not	
surprising	to	find	that	many	organizations	would	be	quite	hesitant	and	cautious	
to	 researchers,	 especially	 those	 unknown	 to	 them	 and	 from	 a	 Western	
university.	They	might	simply	not	want	to	reveal	their	“illegal	working	details”	
which	may	make	them	in	trouble.	 	
However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 researching	 NGOs	 in	 a	 party-state	 is	
impossible.	On	the	contrary,	in	many	Chinese	NGOs’	eyes,	scholars	and	public	
intellectuals	 could	 be	 their	 “natural	 allies”	 (Wu,	 2012).	 In	 March	 2016,	 a	
popular	Chinese	magazine	named	China	Philanthropist	launched	a	special	issue	
on	a	group	of	five	social	scientists	researching	Chinese	NGOs,	calling	them	“yi	
shi	 (intellectuals	 for	 public	 interests)”.	 A	 common	 feature	 of	 these	 five	
researchers	is,	they	all	have	senior	faculty	positions	in	Chinese	universities,	at	
the	same	time	they	keep	very	close	connections	with	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	as	
active	 participants.	 Three	 of	 them	 had	 their	 own	 organizations,	 including	
	
1	 During	my	fieldwork	with	AF	and	some	of	its	partner	organizations	between	

















In	 the	 international	academic	world,	 there	are	also	more	and	more	research	
and	publications	on	NGOs	 in	China,	 from	large-scale	survey	(e.g.Hildebrandt,	














their	 informants	 and	understand	 the	political	 dynamics	 in	 the	 local	 context;	
therefore,	 a	 researcher	 with	 an	 insider's	 perspective	 could	 have	 more	
advantages	in	getting	access	to	his	or	her	fieldwork	(Zhao,	2017).	 	













2	 During	my	 internship,	 I	 found	 at	 least	 two	 Ph.D.	 students	 and	 one	 senior	
faculty	 from	 overseas	 universities	 had	 already	 visited	 AF	 for	 their	 research	
projects.	Meanwhile,	AF	also	had	experiences	of	hiring	Chinese	researchers	as	
their	consultants	from	time	to	time.	











my	way	back	 to	 China.	 This	 time,	 the	 interviewer	was	 Cindy’s	 line	manager	
Justin;	 he	 was	 calling	 to	 know	 more	 about	 my	 personal	 and	 working	
background.	 Justin	 also	 showed	 his	 interests	 with	 my	 research	 topic	 and	
discussed	how	my	research	may	contribute	to	AF’s	work	and	the	whole	NGO	
sector	 in	China.	Although	Justin	said	that	 I	would	receive	a	 formal	offer	very	
soon,	a	week	later	I	was	caught	by	surprise	when	I	received	the	third	call	from	
the	 human	 resource	 department,	which	 turned	out	 to	 be	 another	 interview.	
This	human	resource	interview	was	quite	different	from	the	former	two,	with	
many	 standardized	 managerial	 questions	 like	 "what's	 your	 advantage	 and	
disadvantage",	 "what	 is	 your	 career	 plan"	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 their	 questions,	 I	
came	to	realize	that	the	human	resource	team	was	confused	with	my	dual	roles	
both	 as	 an	 intern	and	a	 researcher;	 they	did	not	quite	understand	why	as	 a	






circle;	what	 they	 did	 in	 the	 first	 two	 interviews	were	 conducted	 to	 test	my	
knowledge,	 personal	 network,	 and	 political	 understanding	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	
sector,	to	make	sure	that	I	would	be	a	"sympathetic	researcher"	to	understand	
the	 complexity	 of	 AF.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 my	 interview	 with	 the	 human	
resource	team	shows	there	is	another	different	force	that	tried	to	restructure	





Very	 soon	 when	 Justin	 came	 back,	 he	 invited	 me	 and	 all	 the	 other	 project	
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officers	 to	 have	 dinner	 together,	 during	 which	 he	 did	 a	 very	 detailed	











Comparing	 with	 AF,	 the	 processes	 of	 approaching	 its	 partner	 organizations	
were	more	complicated.	 In	order	 to	guarantee	the	voluntary	participation	of	

















workers;	but	 I	had	also	been	 refused	by	 three	organizations.	All	 these	 three	
	
4	 I	 have	mentioned	Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 introduction	
chapter,	more	of	their	stories	can	be	found	in	chapter	6	and	7.	 	
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organizations	had	very	 close	 ties	with	 the	 local	 government;	 although	 I	was	
introduced	 by	 Sue	 as	 her	 ‘good	 friend’,	 they	 became	 very	 cautious	with	my	
identity	as	a	research	student	in	a	Western	university.	Furthermore,	as	I	discuss	




in	May	 2017,	 for	 instance,	 he	 criticized	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue's	 organizational	
leadership	because	they	'could	not	be	more	integrated	into	the	local	business	












protect	 participants'	 privacy	 by	 effective	 anonymization,	 and	 how	 to	
disseminate	 the	 research	 findings	 in	 different	 situations,	 etc.	 Although	 I	 do	
acknowledge	 and	 understand	 the	 possible	 risks	 of	 researching	 the	 "illegal	
activities"	 and	 "underground	 organizations"	 in	 China,	 the	 general	 research	






of	 “disclosure”.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 large-scale	 existence	 of	 “underground	
organizations	 and	 illegal	 activities”	 is	 more	 likely	 a	 result	 of	 negotiation,	
compromise,	and	cooperation	between	some	Chinese	NGOs	and	the	state;	they	
have	 been	 tolerated	 by	 the	 state	 in	 non-institutional	 ways	 (Tang	 and	 Zhan,	
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2008).	In	these	conditions,	the	state	or	officials	may	have	already	known	"the	
underground	 world"	 very	 well.	 What	 more	 important	 for	 the	 researcher	 in	
conducting	 ethical	 fieldwork	 in	 this	 dynamic	 environment	 then,	 is	 not	 to	
essentialize	the	concept	of	“political	sensitivity”	in	the	local	context.	Instead,	an	
ethical	 researcher	 should	 carefully	 observe	 and	 recognize	 the	 changing	




tolerated	 in	 AF's	 case	 can	 be	 largely	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distinctive	











although	 I	 am	 researching	 a	 seemingly	 "politically	 sensitive	 issue"	 in	 China,	











we	wouldn’t	 call	 his	 full	 name.	 This	 is	 his	 exclusive	 name	here”,	 the	 project	
assistant	 answered.	 Xiansheng	 is	 a	 traditional	 Chinese	 title	 to	 honor	 those	
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these	 elite	 research	 participants	 like	 many	 other	 powerless	 groups	 in	 the	
society,	 some	 researchers	 of	 elite	 studies	 also	 put	 forward	 that	 in	 practice	
researchers	should	manage	their	project	strategically,	being	aware	of	possible	
interventions	 from	 the	 powerful	 researched	 in	 knowledge	 production	
(Cookson,	1994).	
	 76	
Being	 a	 Chinese	 woman,	 my	 gender	 did	 help	 me	 in	 getting	 access	 to	 the	
roommates.	By	the	end	of	the	first	month,	in	dinner	they	began	to	talk	about	
their	working	problems	especially	the	payment	issues	in	front	of	me,	asking	for	







cases,	 it	 was	 the	 various	 social	 events,	 casual	 talks,	 and	 dinners	 after	work	
brought	me	more	 useful	 insights	 into	 understanding	 how	AF	workers	 think	
about	 their	work.	Quite	often	 I	would	have	dinner	or	have	coffee	during	 the	











my	 fieldwork.	 As	 Osburg	 (2013a,	 2013b)	 argues	 in	 his	 ethnography	 in	
Chengdu’s	 businessmen,	 drinking	 and	 banqueting	 together	 were	 very	
important	ways	in	performing	their	masculinity,	reclaiming	elites’	power,	and	
strengthening	 the	 “brotherhood	culture”	 for	 future	profit-making.	Therefore,	
drinking	and	banqueting	constituted	important	parts	of	Osburg’s	ethnographic	
work	in	China.	My	fieldwork	echoes	with	Osburg’s	experience.	Quite	often	being	








their	 family	 life,	 their	 pressures	 and	 anxieties,	 and	 their	 understandings	 of	
Chinese	politics.	Joining	this	drinking	culture	did	bring	me	some	benefits	in	my	
fieldwork	later.	After	taking	three	glasses	of	wine	for	the	first	time	in	front	of	a	













struggling;	 and	 how	 the	 junior	 male	 and	 female	 workers	 who	 actively	
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participated	in	drinking	and	toasting	each	other	successfully	became	“a	brother”	
of	 his	 or	 her	 line	manager.	 As	 a	 person	with	 a	 slight	 allergy	 to	 alcohol,	my	
participation	 in	 this	drinking	 culture	 confirmed	my	gendered	 identity	 in	 the	
eyes	 of	my	 informants	 and	 demonstrated	 how	powerful	 that	 these	 drinking	
events	 were	 in	 shaping	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers’	 career	 and	 daily	 work	 in	
unexpected	ways.	Banqueting	and	drinking	in	this	sense	were	a	performance	of	
reclaiming	 the	 existed	 power	 relations	 in	 the	 office;	 by	 discussing	 "private	
matters",	these	relations	extended	to	other	aspects	of	life.	Ethnography	in	this	
context	means	that	I	as	a	female	NGO	researcher	needs	to	enter	and	explore	in	







me	 miss	 some	 opportunities	 of	 knowing	 those	 'extraordinary	 workers'.	 	












others	 too,	 from	 tailor-made	 shirts	 to	 designer	made	 skirts.	 Although	 these	
workers	 may	 have	 very	 different	 positions	 at	 AF,	 from	 directors	 to	 project	
assistant,	 what	 threaded	 them	 together	 were	 two	 things:	 ‘local	 citizens’	 of	
Shenzhen	and	experiences	of	studying	abroad	from	a	very	young	age.	
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During	 my	 first	 days	 at	 AF,	 I	 encountered	 a	 project	 assistant	 of	 this	
‘extraordinary	 group’,	 who	 just	 finished	 her	 a-level,	 undergraduate	 and	
master’s	program	in	the	UK.	She	came	up	to	me	and	asked	whether	I	was	‘from	
the	UK	too’.	She	then	asked	many	details	of	my	personal	backgrounds	from	my	
hometown,	 undergraduate	 university,	 master’s	 program,	 to	 my	 current	







any	 social	 events.	 My	 family	 background	 as	 an	 immigrant	 of	 Shenzhen,	 my	
casual	clothes	in	the	office,	and	the	close	relationships	with	the	other	‘ordinary	
workers’	built	up	through	the	lunches	and	dinners	together,	largely	defined	that	
what	I	 looked	like	at	AF.	 I	was	not	a	typical	 ‘local	Shenzhener’,	 ‘high-end’,	or	
‘international’	person	as	they	expected.	 	
The	second	thing	indicated	my	‘failure’	in	a	more	direct	way.	Two	months	after	
I	arrived	at	AF,	 I	came	across	Tim	 in	 the	 lift.	At	 the	age	of	28,	Tim	had	been	
promoted	as	the	fundraising	director	at	AF;	he	was	almost	like	a	‘leader’	of	the	





that	 you	 are	 graduated	 from	 the	 London	 School	 of	 Economics?	Me	 too!”	 He	
turned	to	me:	“oh	really?	What	degree	do	you	get	from	there	then?	Master’s	or	
undergraduate?”	“Master’s”,	I	replied.	“Ok,	well,	I	got	my	undergraduate	degree	









During	my	whole	 internship	 at	 AF,	 I	 hardly	 had	 any	 chances	 to	 talk	 to	 Tim	






of	 the	polarized	nature	of	 the	gongyi	workers	 in	 their	 daily	 life,	 particularly	
those	 AF	 workers	 who	 lived	 in	 the	 dorm.	 After	 talking	 to	 Tim	 in	 the	 lift,	 I	





Given	my	 ‘failures’,	 sympathetic	 stance	with	 the	 ‘ordinary	workers’,	 and	 the	
changing	positionality	in	doing	the	fieldwork,	the	empirical	data,	and	analysis	
presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 producing	 “situated	 knowledge”(Stoetzler	 and	
Yuval-Davis,	 2002) 7 .	 Situated	 knowledge	 production	 allows	 me	 to	 become	
answerable	for	what	I	learn	to	see	–	that	is,	accountability	means	that	‘analyses	
cannot	 be	 complicit	 with	 dominant	 representations	 which	 reinscribe	
inequalities’	and	that	the	researcher	must	be	accountable	for	their	knowledge	
claims	 (Bhavnani,	 1994:	 29).	 Except	 being	 a	 researcher	 from	 a	 Western	
university,	 my	 sub-identities	 including	 a	 woman,	 a	 second-generation	
immigrant	in	Shenzhen,	a	former	NGO	worker	in	China,	an	intern,	a	roommate,	
and	sometimes	a	 friend	of	my	 informants,	 largely	determine	what	 I	 can	 see,	
hear,	 and	 experience	 in	 the	 field	 (Giwa,	 2015).	 Particularly,	 my	 academic	









1994).	Therefore,	 according	 to	 the	 feminist	 objectivity	 (Haraway,	 1988),	my	
research	 is	 based	 on	 limited	 location	 and	 position	which	 produces	 situated	
knowledge,	rather	than	transcendence	and	splitting	of	subject	and	object.	This	










K	 Province.	 GH's	 openness	 to	my	 research	 provided	me	 a	 better	 horizon	 to	






successful	 in	 guaranteeing	my	 next	 interview,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 organizational	
leaders	were	“friends”	with	GH’s	leaders.	But	sometimes	GH’s	introduction	did	
not	 get	 any	 feedback,	which	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 silent	 decline.	Most	 of	 such	




These	 research	experiences	of	 “silent	decline”	 confirmed	 the	 closedness	and	









who	 never	 met	 me	 before,	 all	 of	 them	 accepted	 my	 interview	 invitations	
without	much	hesitation,	when	they	knew	that	I	was	an	intern	at	AF.	 	 It	is	the	
life	experience	and	personal	networks	that	 indicate	one’s	political	 ideologies	
and	 the	 “circle”	 that	 one	 belongs	 to,	 which	 largely	 decides	 the	 attitudes	 of	
Chinese	NGOs	to	different	researchers.	 	
Researching	AF’s	partner	organizations	was	quite	a	different	experience	from	
its	 headquarters.	 Given	 AF	was	 an	 important	 financial	 resource	 for	most	 of	
these	organizations;	I	decided	to	use	my	personal	network	to	approach	them	to	
ensure	their	voluntary	participation,	rather	than	being	introduced	by	AF	or	its	
current	workers.	 I	was	 taken	as	a	very	different	person	 in	 interviewing	AF's	
partner	organizations.	For	GH,	as	we	had	many	mutual	friends,	they	also	took	
me	like	"an	old	friend"	who	was	supposed	to	be	understanding	and	sympathetic	
to	 what	 they	 were	 doing.	 For	 other	 grassroots	 organizations	 that	 were	
unknown	 to	me,	many	of	 them	 thought	highly	 of	my	 education	background,	
viewing	me	as	an	"authority	of	gongyi”.	Most	of	them	called	me	“teacher	Zhao	




"gendered	subordinate”	but	an	outsider	and	an	authority	in	many	cases.	 	 	 	
But	my	fieldwork	with	these	partner	organizations	was	never	easier	than	in	the	
AF	 office.	 Given	 many	 of	 the	 organizations,	 I	 planned	 to	 visit	 were	 very	
financially	 depended	 on	 AF's	 funding,	 at	 the	 beginning	 I	 thought	 their	
understandings	of	gongyi	might	have	many	similarities	with	AF.	But	I	gradually	
realized	 that	 these	 partner	 organizations	 were	 quite	 different	 than	 I	 had	
imagined	in	many	aspects;	their	relations	with	various	donors	and	their	daily	








clearly.	The	 caller	was	 complaining	 that	GH	did	not	distribute	 the	 resources	
received	from	various	foundations	more	among	its	“local	brothers”	in	the	city;	
at	the	end,	the	caller	threatened	Humphrey	that	“you	need	to	be	more	careful	




“This	 happens	 almost	 every	 month,	 the	 local	 organizations	 were	
watching	 us.	 These	 organizations	 are	 not	 easy	 to	 deal	 with…they	





an	 official	 working	 in	 the	 city	 government	 in	 charge	 of	 social	 organization	
issues.	In	the	local	NGO	community,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	township	
and	village	level,	such	kinds	of	organization	leaders	were	not	rare	to	be	seen;	
these	 groups	 constituted	 important	 parts	 of	 AF’s	 national	 disaster	 relief	
network.	 Just	 as	 Sue	 said,	 I	 encountered	 another	 call	 like	 this	 during	 my	
research	with	GH,	asking	Humphrey	to	“think	about	his	local	brothers	more”.	 	 	
These	two	calls	made	me	realize	that	for	many	Chinese	NGOs,	maintaining	good	





manage	 their	 social	 relations	 very	 carefully,	 which	 had	 been	 a	 very	 big	
challenge	for	them.	During	my	fieldwork	with	various	organizations,	most	of	
the	organization	 leaders	were	only	 open	 to	 the	 ‘formal’	 questions	 regarding	
their	development	history,	financial	resources,	governmental	relations,	etc.	But	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 their	 personal	 networks	 and	 private	 life,	 most	 of	 the	






political	 and	 business	 elites,	 and	 sometimes	 their	 religions;	 although	 at	 the	
same	time	they	were	more	open	to	discuss	the	NGO	regulations	and	other	more	
politically	sensitive	issues	in	China.	The	different	interactions	between	me	and	
different	 organization	 leaders,	 their	 hesitance	 in	 particular,	 to	 some	 degree	




me	 to	 the	 questions	 of	 how	 to	 deal	with	 research	 ethics	 in	 different	 power	
relations	and	contexts.	For	AF	and	some	of	its	partner	organizations,	they	had	
established	 very	 solid	 connections	 with	 the	 local	 government	 since	 their	
registration;	what	they	did	were	not	only	tolerated	but	also	encouraged	or	even	
privileged	 by	 the	 Chinese	 state	 in	 China's	 NGO	 sector.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
organizations	like	GH	were	more	likely	a	semi-underground	organization,	often	
seemed	 like	 a	 "trouble-maker"	 in	 eyes	of	 the	 local	 government.	Taken	 these	
differences	 into	consideration,	 it	would	be	problematic	 if	we	essentialize	the	
"political	sensitivity"	question	across	these	different	organizations,	since	they	
may	face	very	different	levels	of	political	risks.	In	this	research,	I	use	a	slightly	





























which	 offers	 researchers	 the	 power	 to	 write	 and	 publish	 critically.	 This	
hypothesis	and	argument	are	challengeable	in	many	ways.	At	the	global	level,	
given	more	and	more	business	elites	are	now	entering	the	non-profit	world	by	
big	 donations	 and	 setting	 up	 their	 own	 charities,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 to	 find	
many	of	 them	also	 support	 large	numbers	of	 research	and	higher	 education	
programs,	 which	 in	 return	 legitimatizes	 their	 wealth	 and	 power	 in	 many	
academic	discussions	(McGoey,	2012).	Therefore,	“a	sympathetic	researcher”	
of	 these	 elites	 and	 their	 organizations	 would	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
analysis	in	class	and	other	forms	of	social	inequality.	In	my	fieldwork	of	China’s	
newly	 founded	 foundations,	 I	 find	 some	 of	 them,	 like	 their	 international	
counterparts,	also	pay	attention	to	the	academic	world.	 	
Take	 AF	 for	 example,	 they	 have	 sponsored	 many	 international	 academic	
conferences	 in	China	 every	 year	 in	 the	 field	 of	 child	protection	 and	disaster	
relief,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 research	projects	 directly	 collaborated	with	 social	







Two!	 But	 AF	 has	 none.	We	 should	 let	 ourselves	 be	 known	 by	 the	 academic	
world;	we	should	make	AF	a	good	case	so	when	people	study	Chinese	gongyi,	




























life	 with	 the	 normalization	 of	 the	 whole	 NGO	 sector	 in	 the	 country,	 paying	











designed	 for	 its	 council	board	chair,	general	 secretary,	and	 for	conferencing.	
Five	months	before	 I	 started	my	 fieldwork	at	AF,	 the	 then	general	 secretary	
decided	to	set	up	two	fingerprint	readers	near	the	 lift;	every	AF	worker	was	
required	to	input	their	fingerprints	before	starting	work	each	day	in	order	to	
monitor	 their	 working	 hours.	 This	 was	 part	 of	 a	 large	 internal	 reform	 of	
‘learning	from	corporate	management’.	There	was	a	reception	area	and	a	fridge	
with	soft	drinks	sponsored	by	Coca	Cola,	so	that	everyone	could	have	unlimited	
free	 drinks	 during	 their	 working	 hours.	 The	 whole	 working	 space	 of	 AF	 is	
wrapped	around	by	clear	glass,	along	with	a	visitors’	corridor	throughout	the	
whole	working	 space.	 So,	 the	 office	 is	much	 like	 a	 huge	 fish	 tank:	 from	 the	
visitors’	 corridor,	 people	 can	 see	 very	 clearly	what	 every	worker	was	doing	
inside.	In	the	corridor,	there	were	pictures	showing	AF’s	achievements	from	the	
past	 decade,	 from	 handshaking	 with	 the	 then	 vice	 Prime	 Minister	 in	 2012,	











Shenzhen.	 	 However,	 AF’s	 office	 is	 provided	 by	 a	 local	 GONGO	 (called	 the	
Shenzhen	Non-governmental	Organization	Association,	SNOA)	for	free,	in	order	
to	 demonstrate	 how	 successful	 the	 city	 government	 is	 in	 supporting	 local	





social	 organizations	 were,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 of	 entrepreneur-sponsored	














least	 from	 its	 founders	 and	 funding	 structure),	 legally	 registered,	 and	 doing	
‘gongyi’.	But	from	its	office,	though	seemingly	different,	we	can	still	have	a	sense	
that	 their	 daily	 operation	 might	 be	 greatly	 shaped	 by	 the	 Chinese	 state.	
Compared	with	some	other	local	governments	that	I	studied	in	the	fieldwork1,	
	






the	 Shenzhen	 government	 was	 much	 more	 generous	 and	 sophisticated	 in	
dealing	with	NGO	issues,	and	they	had	a	clear	definition	of	what	gongyi	should	
be	 for	 in	 the	 city.	 AF,	 as	 a	 good	 example	 of	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs’	 rising	
awareness	 of	 social	 responsibilities,	 has	 been	 accepted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 local	
government’s	social	development	projects.	 	 	 	 	
	
This	chapter	discusses	the	very	popular	term	of	‘modern	gongyi’	since	this	was	
the	 word	 that	 I	 heard	 very	 frequently	 from	 many	 Chinese	 foundations,	
grassroots	 organizations,	 government	 officials,	 news	 reports,	 and	 the	 ‘big	
philanthropists’	 throughout	 my	 yearlong	 fieldwork.	 I	 have	 discovered	 that	
‘modern	 gongyi’	 is	 never	 a	 simple	 linguistic	 term,	 but	 an	 influential	 concept	
with	specific	knowledge,	skills	and	political	indications	in	China’s	NGO	sector.	
As	 a	 role	 model	 of	 Chinese	 ‘modern	 gongyi’,	 AF	 workers	 were	 performing	




and	 how	 has	 it	 been	 reinvented	 as	 knowledge	 about	 Chinese	 NGOs	 in	 the	
context	of	Shenzhen?	What	are	 the	roles	 that	 the	Shenzhen	government	and	
entrepreneurs	have	played	 in	shaping	 the	knowledge	production	of	 ‘modern	






creature,	 departing	 from	 the	 GONGOs	 that	 have	 been	 seen	 as	 ‘traditional’	
socialist	legacies.	As	a	farewell	to	the	‘traditional’,	this	‘modern	gongyi’	puts	an	









NGOs	 with	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 have	 no	 longer	 been	 a	 mere	 ‘follower’	 of	 the	
international	development	agencies,	even	though	some	of	their	workers	have	
had	 working	 experiences	 with	 various	 international	 donors.	 Instead,	 these	
Chinese	NGOs	have	become	a	‘competitor’	of	the	Western	donors.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Secondly,	 ‘modern	 gongyi’	 has	 brought	 new	 languages,	 skills,	 and	
organizational	structure	changes	to	the	Chinese	NGO	sector.	 It	has	brought	a	
‘donor/customer-centered’	 culture	 that	 can	 be	 better	 promoted	 among	 the	








gongyi’	 has	 become	part	 of	 the	 reproduction	mechanism	of	 ‘one	 family,	 two	
systems’	in	China,	contributing	to	the	widening	gender	gap	in	the	workforce.	 	 	 	 	
	
The	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 analyzes	 the	 different	 approaches	 in	
understanding	Chinese	NGOs,	in	which	I	argue	that	the	corporatism	framework	
is	more	relevant	for	this	thesis	in	analyzing	the	politics	of	NGO-state	relations	
in	 China.	 This	 chapter	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 theoretical	 debates	 on	 the	
corporatism	approach	by	looking	at	the	process	of	making	‘modern	gongyi’	in	
AF’s	 office.	 For	 most	 of	 the	 time	 during	 my	 internship	 with	 AF,	 the	 city	
government	did	not	show	up	directly	in	the	office	on	a	daily	basis.	It	was	the	
ideas	 and	 commands	 from	 entrepreneurs	 and	 the	 senior	management	 team	
that	occupied	most	of	my	energy	in	learning	how	to	be	a	‘modern	gongyi	worker’	
at	AF.	However,	in	several	public	crises	that	AF	encountered	in	2016,	I	began	to	




‘modern	 gongyi’	 in	 China,	 but	 athey	 were	 also	 questioning	 the	 increasing	
influence	 of	 private	 entrepreneurs	 in	 Chinese	 society.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	
patronage	 and	 support	 from	 the	 Shenzhen	 government	 did	 help	 AF	 and	 its	
modern	gongyi	model	to	be	‘normalized’	in	China,	and	this	provides	us	with	a	







also	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 process	 of	 how	 it	 has	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	













from	 there	 to	 other	Chinese	 cities.	While	 I	was	waiting	 for	my	 flights	 at	 the	


























the	 bookshops	 mostly	 included	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 in	 different	 permutations	 from	
‘wolf-like	 marketing	 skills’,	 ‘wolf-like	 team	 building	 and	 human	 resource	
management’,	 ‘wolf-spirit	 culture	 in	e-commerce’	 and	so	 forth.	Then	what	 is	
this	‘wolf-spirit’	about	and	how	could	it	be	introduced	to	the	non-profit	world	




The	 ‘wolf-spirit’	was	originally	 from	a	best-selling	Chinese	novel	 called	Wolf	
Totem	in	2004.	The	book	is	about	a	Chinese	man	in	his	late	twenties	who	left	








be	 discarded,	 and	 the	 Han	 Chinese	 should	 learn	 from	 the	 other	 cultures	
especially	those	which	had	been	historically	more	aggressive:	the	Westerners,	
for	example,	given	they	were	the	‘wolf	on	the	sea’.	Although	this	wolf-like	spirit	
seems	 to	 be	 too	 aggressive	 and	 racist	 in	 many	 ways,	 it	 is	 somehow	 in	








The	 major	 organizational	 culture	 of	 Huawei	 Company,	 which	
demonstrates	 the	 set	of	 key	values,	 beliefs	 and	attitudes	 shared	by	
organizational	 members,	 is	 known	 as	 ‘wolf-culture’.	 The	 first	
character	 of	 wolves	 is	 bloodthirsty.	 Employees	 of	 Huawei	 are	
extremely	 sensitive	 to	 the	market	 information	 and	 could	 response	
promptly	to	any	changes.	The	second	character	of	wolves	is	resistant	
to	coldness.	The	fearlessness	of	difficulties	and	eagerness	of	making	
progress	 are	 insisted	 by	 every	member	 of	 Huawei,	 no	matter	 how	
complicated	the	hardship	is…	The	‘wolf-culture’	brings	Huawei	a	high	
level	 of	 keen	 insight	 about	 the	 unsteady	 market	 and	 assists	 the	
company	 to	quickly	 react	 to	any	existing	opportunities.	As	a	 result,	











I	 had	 never	 heard	 about	 this	 word	 from	 any	 organizations	 I	 knew.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 ‘aggressiveness’	or	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 seemed	not	 to	be	welcomed	among	
many	 organizations,	 and	 NGO	 workers	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 present	 their	
‘softness’.	In	my	interviews	with	different	NGO	workers,	most	of	them	would	





a	new	word	in	many	NGOs’	daily	work.	 	 	 	 	
	 	
At	AF,	this	“wolf-spirit”	was	firstly	introduced	by	Jack	Ma	to	define	what	modern	
































































































Jack	Ma	was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 promote	 the	 ‘wolf-sprit’	 at	 AF.	 During	my	
fieldwork,	 I	heard	and	read	repeatedly	 from	various	 internal	documents	and	
ordinary	 workers	 about	 how	 the	 general	 secretaries	 of	 the	 foundation	 had	
problems	in	communicating	with	their	council	board	members.	They	had	been	
criticized	as	having	a	“lack	of	wolf-spirit"	when	they	found	themselves	having	
difficulties	 in	 achieving	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 fundraising	 targets	 set	 up	 by	 the	







assignment	 was	 to	 motivate	 the	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 among	 the	 AF	 leadership	 to	
‘challenge	 themselves’,	 so	 that	 they	could	 ‘stimulate	more	personal	potential	
and	team	spirit’	in	attracting	funding	and	donors.	When	he	discovered	that	the	

























China.	 Although	 Larry	 was	 the	 second	 worker	 to	 have	 jumped	 across	 from	
Oxfam,	in	his	eight	years	at	AF	he	had	witnessed	more	and	more	people	joining	








“In	 2010	 and	 11,	 our	 board	 member	 Si	 saw	 the	 effective	 work	 of	
Oxfam’s	disaster	 relief	 team	 in	 several	 earthquakes	 in	China.	 So	he	
asked	us	to	take	Oxfam	as	our	‘benchmarking	organization’.	But	now	
[in	2016],	we	have	already	been	far	beyond	Oxfam.	The	main	reason,	
to	 be	 frank,	 is	 that	we	 have	 enough	money.	We	 can	 spend	 a	 large	
amount	of	money	on	disaster	 recovery	and	backup	 infrastructures,	
building	large-scale	warehouses,	maintaining	good	supply	chains	and	
purchasing	 massive	 disaster	 relief	 materials	 beforehand.	 Now	 the	
scale	of	our	disaster	preparation	system	 in	western	China	 is	2	 to	4	
times	larger	than	Oxfam.	If	I	were	still	in	Oxfam,	I	can	never	do	that,	
since	 its	 internal	examination	and	approval	procedures	would	 take	










flexible,	more	space,	and	a	larger	platform	for	personal	development”.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
From	Larry’s	speech,	we	may	find	that	his	agreement	with	the	entrepreneurs	
was	partly	based	on	the	criticism	of	 the	 international	organizations’	work	 in	
China,	which	also	partly	explained	the	withdrawal	of	INGOs	from	China	in	the	
past	 decade.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 compared	 to	 the	 domestic	 foundations,	
international	 organizations	 had	 lost	 their	 dominant	 status	 as	 a	 financial	
resource	 in	 China.	 The	 rising	 entrepreneurs	 and	 domestic	 foundations	 had	
begun	 to	 “win	 the	 battlefield”	 by	 using	 more	 aggressive	 strategies	 of	
organizational	 branding,	 marketing,	 fundraising	 mobilization,	 etc.	 	 On	 the	
























in	 2005	 that	 Calvin	 decided	 to	 leave	 his	 community	 development	 work	 in	





living	 conditions	 but	 also	 hollow	out	 the	 villages.	 The	 “slow”	 or	 “long-term”	
community	development	projects,	in	Calvin’s	eyes,	were	too	“outdated”	to	get	
























































thought	 only	 the	 “power	 of	 e-commerce	 can	 really	 help	 people	 in	 the	 rural	
areas",	and	therefore	“it	is	better	to	teach	people	to	do	online	business,	rather	
than	any	community	development	projects”.	Very	early	on	in	2006,	Calvin	went	





“wolf-like”	 entrepreneurs	 is	 also	 embedded	 in	 their	 political	 stances	 with	






speech,	 Jack	Ma	made	 it	 clear	 that	 every	AF	worker	 should	 try	 their	best	 to	
“mobilize	 people	 for	more	 donations”.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 seemed	 that	many	 AF	










one	 of	 the	 top	 10	 foundations	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 government.	
Although	we	tried	so	hard	to	do	fundraising	last	year,	we	only	reached	






“You	 know,	 the	 GONGOs	 have	 so	 many	 special	 links	 with	 various	
ministries	 and	 government	 branches,	 so	 they	 do	 not	 need	 to	 do	
anything	at	all.	Companies,	whether	 they	were	 foreign	or	domestic,	
would	 just	 donate	 to	 them	 so	 eagerly	 in	 order	 to	 build	 up	











criticized	 as	 capitalists,	who	 should	be	politically	 repressed	 (Guthrie,	 2009).	
However,	 after	 Mao’s	 death	 and	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	
entrepreneurs	have	been	seen	as	one	of	the	most	important	forces	to	stimulate	
	 104	
China’s	 economic	 development.	 Researchers	 have	 found	 that	 most	 of	 the	




tolerant	and	open	 in	 terms	of	political	participation	 (Tsai,	2005).	Under	 this	
background,	 in	many	 people’s	 eyes,	 including	 Calvin	 and	 his	 colleagues,	 the	
entrepreneurs	 were	 the	 “progressive”	 force	 in	 China.	 In	 fact,	 private	
entrepreneurs	in	China	have	long	been	seen	as	a	“natural	alliance”	with	Chinese	
liberal	intellectuals	and	social	movements.	This	was	first	discussed	in	the	post	








progressive	 force”,	but	 they	also	 felt	 they	 shared	 the	 same	 “battlefield”	with	




state	 had	 withdrawn	 from	 many	 industries,	 private	 enterprises	 have	 been	
systematically	excluded	from	a	great	number	of	profitable	industries	including	
banking	and	finance,	energy,	public	transport,	telecommunications	and	so	forth.	










the	 ‘modern	gongi’	by	distancing	 itself	 from	the	state	and	GONGOs.	The	wolf	
spirit,	in	this	context,	helped	to	set	up	a	new	image	of	‘being	an	innovator’	and	






















“too	 product-oriented	 but	 not	 client-centered	 enough”.	 Actually,	 during	 the	
fieldwork,	 it	 took	me	 a	while	 to	 understand	William’s	 language,	 such	 as	 the	
















‘products’	 (for	 attracting	 more	 donations);	 donors	 become	 ‘clients’	 and	 the	















William’s	 reform	 gained	most	 support	 from	 the	 other	 two	 Internet	 tycoons	
sitting	on	AF’s	board;	 since	 their	e-commerce	companies	were	 so	 influential	
among	the	ordinary	Chinese	people,	therefore	when	AF’s	projects	have	had	free	
access	 to	 campaigning	 through	 their	 e-commerce	 websites	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	
since	2013,	this	new	foundation	won	a	huge	advantage	in	terms	of	marketing	







not	 about	what	was	 going	on	at	 the	project	 sites,	 but	 the	different	donation	
numbers	 of	 different	 projects.	 From	 July	 to	 August	 2016,	 those	 meetings	
became	once	a	week,	since	a	big	online	fundraising	event	called	“Gongyi	Day”	
was	 going	 be	 held	 by	 one	 of	 the	 Internet	 tycoons	 sitting	 on	 AF’s	 board	 in	
September,	under	the	name	of	‘enhancing	rational	gongyi	in	China”.	During	that	
period,	 AF	 workers,	 from	 the	 public	 communications	 team,	 and	 finance	
managers,	 to	 disaster	 relief	 assistants,	were	 all	 trying	 their	 best	 to	mobilize	
their	partner	organizations	across	the	country,	mostly	grassroots	NGOs,	to	help	
promote	their	projects	 in	different	places	 in	order	to	attract	more	donations	























very	much	 like	 an	 army	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 gender.	 For	most	 of	 the	 high-tech	





The	general	situation	in	China’s	NGO	sector	is	quite	different.	 	 	 Although	there	
is	 no	 comprehensive	 data	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	workers’	 personal	 information,	 a	
national	survey	conducted	by	one	of	the	largest	Chinese	foundations	shows	that,	
in	2016,	more	than	60%	of	Chinese	NGO	workers	were	women;	however,	only	
30%	of	 the	 organizations	were	 led	 by	women.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 although	men	
dominated	 the	 leadership	positions	 in	China’s	NGO	 sector	 like	 the	high-tech	
companies	in	Shenzhen,	in	order	to	be	as	‘wolf-like’	as	the	entrepreneurs,	most	
of	 China’s	 NGO	 leaders	 were	 male	 and	 their	 employees	 were	 not.	 In	 my	
fieldwork	at	AF,	I	found	that	even	though	AF’s	board	members	were	calling	for	
more	‘wolf-spirit’,	or	‘competitiveness’	in	the	foundation	workers,	many	of	their	
employees	were	not	 that	motivated	 to	 be	 ‘aggressive’	 and	 ‘devoted’	 to	 their	















the	 married	 women	 workers,	 all	 of	 their	 husbands	 worked	 in	 “more	
competitive	industries”	like	high-tech	and	finance	in	the	city.	None	of	them	had	







2016	was	 700	pounds	 per	month.	 This	 indicated	 that	 these	 female	workers	
were	not	the	major	breadwinners	in	their	own	families;	their	salaries	may	only	
constitute	a	small	part	of	the	family	income.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Hoffman’s	(2006)	ethnographic	research	 in	 the	city	of	Dalian	 found	that,	 the	
emerging	 private	 sector	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘battle	 field’	 with	 more	 risks	 and	
potentially	 higher	 payment.	 Inside	 many	 Chinese	 families,	 there	 were	 “one	
family,	two	systems”:	women	were	often	those	who	stayed	inside	the	remaining	
socialist,	 ‘less	 competitive	 (and	 thus	 less	 profitable)’	 bodies,	 like	 the	 state-
owned	companies,	public	education	institutes,	and	public	services.	Even	though	
these	 jobs	 could	 be	 much	 lower	 paid	 than	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 ‘low	
competition	and	stable	welfare’	can	make	sure	that	they	had	enough	energy	for	










when	asked	why	 they	 chose	 to	work	 in	 the	non-profit	 sector,	many	of	 them	
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would	make	 it	 clear	 that	 they	were	 not	 coming	 for	 “wealth	 or	 power”.	 As	 a	
colleague	D	aged	22	said,	“Who	would	come	to	AF	if	one	wants	to	make	money?”.	
Instead,	 many	 of	 the	 female	 workers,	 especially	 the	 married	 ones,	 would	
attribute	their	career	choice	to	their	own	interests	or	religion	(mostly	Tibetan	
Buddhism),	 and	 they	 held	 that	 working	 in	 the	 non-profit	 sector	 was	 less	
stressful	 than	most	of	 the	companies	 in	Shenzhen.	Only	 two	 female	workers	
(both	 single)	 directly	 connected	 their	 career	 choice	 with	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	
political	 ideology	 or	 their	 education	 backgrounds	 (philosophy	 and	
anthropology).	F,	a	fundraising	manager	told	me	that	she	would	never	do	the	
same	 job	 as	 her	 husband	 did	 in	 an	 Internet	 company	 in	 the	 city,	 since	 her	
husband	 needed	 to	 work	 about	 12	 hours	 a	 day,	 six	 days	 a	 week.	 “It	 is	 too	
competitive	in	the	business	circle	and	I	was	so	tired	of	it.	So,	my	husband	asked	
me	to	find	a	job	that	can	make	me	happier.	Then	I	found	working	for	a	charity	







were	men.	 In	 its	 senior	managers’	 team,	more	 than	70%	were	men;	and	 the	
salary	 gap	 between	 the	 highest	 and	 lowest-paid	 staff	 in	 the	 organization	
(among	the	80	workers)	was	more	than	15	times,	which	indicated	a	big	pay	gap	
between	 different	 genders.	 During	 my	 internship,	 most	 of	 the	 messages	 I	
received	 from	 E	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	 then	 general	 secretary)	 were	 about	 the	
introduction	of	new	colleagues.	More	than	10	new	employees	joined	the	senior	
management	team	during	my	internship,	all	of	which	were	from	the	business	
world,	 just	 as	 the	 general	 secretary	 noted	 in	 the	 email,	 “To	 create	 a	 more	
competitive	 atmosphere	 within	 our	 organization,	 we	 need	 to	 bring	 more	
wolves	to	AF”.	Not	surprisingly,	only	two	of	these	new	senior	managers	were	
women,	all	of	them	were	working	for	the	public	communication,	branding,	and	

















the	Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	we	 can	hardly	 attribute	 its	 impacts	 to	 the	 rising	
private	 sector	 in	 China	 only.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 taking	
private	entrepreneurs	as	ambitious	innovators	and	reformers	has	been	a	very	
important	part	of	the	national	modernization	project	for	the	Chinese	state	in	its	
economic	 reform.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 though	 performing	 the	 gesture	 of	
distancing	 itself	 from	 the	 socialist	 moralities	 (just	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	









Before	 the	 economic	 reform,	 ‘entrepreneurs’	 were	 known	 as	 ‘capitalists’	
according	to	Maoism.	They	were	the	class	that	should	be	eradicated	socially	and	






popularly	used	 in	China	until	 the	open	up	policy	 launched	 in	1992	by	Deng.	
Deng’s	call	for	further	reform	by	setting	up	special	economic	zones,	stopping	
ideological	debates,	and	opening	up	to	the	external	markets	and	capital	in	1992	
greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	of	private	businesses	 in	China’s	 coastal	 areas	
(Coase	 and	 Wang,	 2016).	 A	 visible	 consequence	 of	 the	 booming	 private	
business	was	the	phenomenon	of	 ‘xiahai’	 (jumping	 into	the	sea):	government	
officials,	 employees	 of	 state-owned	 companies,	 university	 scholars	 gave	 up	
their	 ‘tie	 fanwan’	 (iron	 rice	 bowl)	 and	 opened	 up	 their	 own	 businesses.	
According	 to	 the	 national	 statistics,	 in	 1992	 alone,	 there	 were	 about	 120	












As	 a	 major	 beneficiary	 of	 Deng’s	 reform,	 Shenzhen	 was	 the	 first	 special	
economic	zone	in	China	thirty	years	ago,	and	it	has	also	been	‘the	experimental	
site	of	Beijing’	(Keith	et	al.,	2013;	Yang,	2013).	In	just	two	decades,	the	city,	once	
a	 fishing	village,	has	become	the	 largest	manufacturing	and	hi-tech	center	 in	
China.	At	the	beginning	of	the	establishment	of	Shenzhen,	this	coastal	city	was	
actually	one	of	the	 ‘seas’	 that	many	people	 ‘jumped	into’.	Compared	to	many	
other	Chinese	cities	 like	Beijing	and	Shanghai,	Shenzhen	had	much	less	state	
investment	 and	manufacturing	 infrastructure.	Much	 of	 the	 capital	was	 from	





In	 many	 Chinese	 news	 reports	 and	 the	 official	 statements,	 Shenzhen’s	
development	achievement	is	not	only	limited	to	its	GDP;	the	city	has	been	also	
defined	 by	 various	 types	 of	 “new	 person”	 in	 the	 grand,	 official	 narrative	 of	
China’s	reform	(Walder,	1995).	These	‘new	persons’	include	the	‘open-minded’	
local	government	officials	who	tolerate	the	new	economic	activities	and	create	
a	 ‘business-friendly	 environment’,	 ‘innovative’	 private	 entrepreneurs	 who	
make	 their	 own	 business	 thanks	 to	 that	 friendly	 environment,	 to	 ordinary	
workers	who	took	the	risks	to	look	for	their	first	gold,	and	so	forth	(Yang,	2013).	




























finds	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 been	 portrayed	 in	 the	 mainstream	 Chinese	
media	in	interesting	ways.	Successful	businessmen	have	become	a	role	model	
of	 how	 to	 “zuoren	 (做人 ,	 literally	 translated	 as	 ‘make	 person’	 or	 ‘become	
person’)”	 in	 China’s	 fast	 changing	 marketization	 reform,	 emphasizing	 their	
outstanding	personal	qualities	(such	as	perseverance,	creation	and	hard	work)	
and	talents	(knowing	how	to	manage	people	and	money).	By	studying	several	
phenomenal	 ‘reality	 shows’	 of	 national	 business	 competitions	 on	 China’s	
Central	TV,	Davies	suggests	that	Chinese	entrepreneurs	are	not	presented	as	an	
‘individual	 success’	 or	 ‘wealthy	 business	 model’	 only;	 their	 image	 has	 been	
deeply	 framed	 into	 the	 national	 discourse	 of	 making	 China	 ‘wealthy	 and	
powerful	 (fu	 qiang,	 富强 )’.	 The	 successful	 entrepreneurs	 have	 become	 a	
symbol	of	national	developmental	efforts,	a	‘national	hero	(minzu	yingxiong,民
族英雄)’	representing	the	bright	future	of	the	country	in	the	global	competition.	
Moreover,	 the	 repeated	 reports,	 TV	 programs,	 and	 the	 flooding	
autobiographical	 publications	 of	 celebrity	 entrepreneurs	 in	 China	 are	 also	









incorporated.	 In	 performing	 the	 wolf-spirit	 as	 something	 competitive	 and	
different	 from	 the	 GONGOs	 and	 Western	 international	 agencies,	 Shenzhen	






Civil	 Affairs	 in	 Beijing,	 which	was	 the	 start	 of	 the	 ‘Shenzhen	Model	 of	 NGO	
development’	(Lai	et	al.,	2015).	One	of	the	most	visible	policies	in	the	reform	
was	 to	 simplify	 the	 NGO	 registration	 procedures	 in	 Shenzhen;	 private	
foundations	and	service	delivery	organizations	were	particularly	encouraged	
to	 set	 up	 in	 this	 city	 (I	will	 discuss	 this	 policy	 further	 in	 the	 sixth	 chapter).	
Additionally,	 the	 Shenzhen	 Civil	 Affairs	 Bureau	 (CAB),	 the	 governmental	
institution	 in	 charge	 of	 NGO	 regulations,	 launched	 the	 ‘market-based’	 social	
service	 purchase,	 calling	 all	 the	 NGOs	 to	 join	 in	 the	 competitions	 for	
governmental	funding.	More	than	100	million	pounds	of	government	funding	
has	flooded	into	various	‘gongyi	competitions’	in	the	name	of	“venture	capital	
investment”	 every	 year	 (ibid.).	 From	 the	 community	 level	 to	 district	 and	
municipal	 levels,	 many	 government	 bodies	 have	 participated	 in	 sponsoring	
such	competitions.	At	the	same	time,	 in	order	to	raise	the	competitiveness,	a	
number	of	GONGOs	named	‘social	organization	incubation	centers’	have	been	
established	 in	every	district	 to	 ‘create	more	NGOs	 for	 the	city	development’.	
This	means	 that	 the	whole	NGO	 sector	 has	 become	 an	 industry	 that	 can	 be	
manufactured	on	a	large	scale.	In	this	Shenzhen	model,	the	local	government	is	
no	longer	just	a	regulator;	rather	it	has	become	a	more	powerful	but	invisible	











AF	 has	 set	 up	 two	 boards	 above	 the	 executive	 team:	 the	 council	 board,	
consisting	of	entrepreneurs;	and	the	supervisory	board,	consisting	of	auditing	




seemed	 to	 be	 a	 political	 signal	 that	 AF	 had	 strong	 support	 from	 the	 city	
government.	 AF	 has	 never	 been	 a	 foundation	 of	 China’s	 emerging	
philanthropists.	To	a	large	degree,	just	like	the	economic	development	model	
of	 Shenzhen,	AF	 is	 also	 a	 product	 of	 the	national	 reform	 from	Beijing	 and	 a	
creation	 of	 the	 corporatism	 in	 Shenzhen 20 .	 Indeed,	 in	 many	 cases,	 the	
registration	of	AF	has	become	a	major	achievement	of	Shenzhen	CAB’s	social	













appreciated	 by	 the	 government	 officials.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	 some	 local	
CAB	officials	would	even	ask	AF’s	senior	managers	to	organize	some	training	
programs	 for	 the	 other	 foundations	 in	 Shenzhen,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 their	
modern	gongyi	model	in	the	city.	However,	the	good	relations	with	Shenzhen	
government	 as	 well	 as	 the	 greater	 social	 impact	 are	 not	 enough	 for	
	
20	 As	I	have	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	this	thesis	aims	to	present	a	more	complex	
picture	of	how	corporatism	works	at	 the	 local	 level	 in	China	(but	not	to	take	
corporatism	as	a	state	regulatory	framework).	AF’s	case	here	shows	us	vividly	
how	 Chinese	 NGOs	 can	 be	 more	 incorporated	 into	 the	 state	 by	 the	 close	
collaboration	 between	 the	 emerging	 ‘philanthropists’	 and	 local	 government	
officials.	Although	the	new	foundations	like	AF	had	been	doubted	by	Beijing	at	
the	 very	 beginning,	 their	 special	 ties	 with	 the	 local	 state	 and	 government	




two	stories	demonstrated	 the	moments	when	 the	wolf-spirit	and	 its	alliance	
with	 private	 entrepreneurs	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 problem	 for	 Chinese	 NGOs	
(rather	than	a	benefit).	These	two	cases	can	help	us	to	better	understand	the	











but	 the	 way	 it	 was	 working	 had	 been	 largely	 mediatized:	 its	 work	 was	
‘constrained	 to	 take	 on	 a	 form	 suitable	 for	 media	 representation’	 (Couldry,	
2008:	 376).	 Also,	 in	 order	 to	 do	 organizational	 branding,	 all	 of	 AF’s	 local	
partners	and	volunteers	were	required	to	wear	AF	uniforms	in	public.	But	all	

















a	 nearby	 town	when	 the	whole	 city	was	 flooding	 everywhere.	 But	
when	 we	 were	 going	 to	 take	 actions,	 we	 just	 found	 that	 the	 city	
government	was	very	short	of	such	things.	How	can	we	send	out	so	
many	materials	and	rescue	boats	with	AF	logos	so	quickly,	when	the	
capital	 government	 has	 no	 boat	 at	 all!	 What	 would	 the	 national	






from	Lei	Feng”.	 	 	 	 	
	











commercialized	 area.	 Although	AF	workers	were	 imagining	 themselves	 as	 a	
political	alliance	with	the	private	entrepreneurs	against	the	totalitarian	state,	
their	“progressiveness”	was	quite	limited.	 	 	 	
	





the	 entrepreneurs	 and	 AF.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 2016,	 an	 upcoming	 Chinese	
romance	 film	 was	 drawn	 into	 a	 political	 drama,	 as	 pressure	 from	 Chinese	
patriots	online	led	to	its	lead	character	being	removed	for	his	alleged	support	
of	Taiwan	independence.	While	the	lead	character	was	a	Taiwanese	actor,	Vicky,	
a	 popular	Mainland	Chinese	 actress,	 directed	 the	movie23.	 The	online	 attack	
came	 at	 a	 time	 when	 activity	 on	 the	 country’s	 social	 media	 platforms	 was	
agitated	 after	 the	 international	 court’s	 unfavorable	 ruling	 for	 China	 on	 the	
South	China	Sea.	The	social-media	protests	against	Vicky	were	backed	up	by	
state-owned	media,	 including	 a	military	 newspaper,	which	 asked	 her	 not	 to	
“touch	the	bottom	line”	of	“national	feelings.”	As	a	close	friend	of	several	board	
members	 of	 AF	 as	 well	 as	 a	 Buddhist,	 Vicky	 had	 just	 donated	 about	 100	






In	 response	 to	 the	 attack,	 AF	 sent	 out	 an	 official	 statement	 denying	 all	 the	
accusation	and	claiming	that	as	‘a	patriotic	organization’,	it	had	reported	all	the	
required	 information	 to	 Shenzhen	 government	 regularly.	 However,	 several	



















accepted	 by	 the	 society,	 being	 seen	 as	 an	 affiliate	 of	 the	 Chinese	 private	














During	 this	 crisis,	 the	 city	 government	 of	 Shenzhen	 helped	 AF	 again.	 By	
introducing	 AF	 to	 the	 leaders	 of	 China	 Central	 Television,	 the	 Shenzhen	











organizational	 reforms	 launched	by	 the	 entrepreneurs	 of	AF,	we	may	 find	 a	
highly	commercialized	culture	has	been	established	in	the	foundation.	But	this	
commercialized	 gongyi	 should	 not	 be	 simply	 understood	 as	 a	 cultural	





the	 local	 state	 in	 Shenzhen.	 In	 this	 sense,	 as	 a	 reformer	 of	 the	 traditional	






has	 also	 shaped	many	 ordinary	 AF	workers’	 professional	 identity	 and	 their	
imagination	of	their	personal	life.	The	new,	“wolf-like”	NGO	workers	asked	for	
a	more	 “competitive”,	 “manly	man”	 in	 the	workplace,	 which	 put	 the	 female	





























AF	 workers	 very	 frequently.	 The	 inequalities	 between	 men	 and	 women	
workers,	 between	 those	 from	 rich	 family	 conditions	 and	 disadvantaged	
backgrounds	were	discussed	during	the	lunchtime	break	very	often.	 	 As	Cindy	
and	I	were	in	the	same	working	team	under	the	leadership	of	Justin,	there	were	
only	 four	 full	 time	 workers	 (including	 me	 and	 Justin).	 In	 my	 internship,	 I	
witnessed	the	working	team	expanded	to	seven	project	officers	in	a	year,	but	
currently	 only	 Justin	 still	 remained	 there.	Workers	 at	 the	middle	 level,	 like	
Cindy,	had	the	highest	turnover	rate	at	AF1;	many	of	them	would	change	their	
jobs	in	less	than	two	years.	The	reasons	for	such	high	turnover	were	different	
from	one	 to	 another.	 For	 some	of	 them	who	 transitioned	 from	 the	 business	
	
1	 Interestingly,	 the	workers	at	 the	top	and	bottom	level	were	the	most	stable	
groups.	I	will	discuss	these	different	groups	of	workers	in	the	later	sections.	 	
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world	 to	 the	 NGO	 sector,	 they	may	 feel	 difficult	 to	 get	 used	 to	 the	working	




AF’s	 office.	 As	 the	 chapter	 argued,	 NGO	 workers	 were	 expected	 by	 the	




partner	 organizations	 in	 other	 different	 places	 in	 China,	 this	 chapter	 goes	
further	 to	 discuss	 ‘modern	gongyi’	 outside	 the	 AF	 office,	 looking	 at	 how	AF	
workers’	 imagined	 and	 dealt	 with	 their	 jobs	 in	 their	 private	 life	 with	more	
details.	Although	AF	workers,	like	many	of	its	partner	organizations,	were	doing	
very	similar	jobs	from	project	management,	meeting	relevant	stakeholders,	and,	
so	 forth,	 the	way	that	 they	 thought	of	 their	 job	could	be	different	 from	their	















workers’	working	hours,	 family	 structures,	 income	and	daily	 routines,	 I	 find	
that	 the	 new	domestic	 donors	 like	AF	 are	 creating	 and	 reproducing	 various	
forms	of	social	inequalities	among	its	workers,	rather	than	reducing	them.	To	
be	more	 ‘competitive’	and	 ‘efficient’,	 the	 foundation	asked	 for	more	workers	
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with	 longer	 and	 flexible	 working	 hours	 with	 lower	 pay.	 Hence,	 overtime	
working	was	quite	popular	among	most	of	its	workers,	more	jobs	with	lower	
paid	were	created.	 	 This	type	of	‘wolf	like’	workers	at	AF	highly	impacted	its	
staff’s	 family	 life:	 the	 harder	 they	work,	 the	more	 likely	 that	 they	would	 be	
promoted	 and	 gain	 a	 higher	 salary,	 the	 more	 ‘heroic’	 they	 can	 be.	 On	 the	
contrary,	the	more	they	were	devoted	to	being	family	caretaker,	the	more	likely	




NGOs	 is	 producing	 a	 new	way	 of	 living	 and	working	 as	 ‘professional	gongyi	
worker’.	 The	 making	 of	 this	 new	 gongyi	 worker	 needs	 to	 learn	 the	 new	
commercialized	 language	 and	 skills	 (as	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter);	meanwhile	a	professional	gongyi	worker	must	restructure	his	or	her	







managers,	middle	 level,	 and	entry	 level.	But	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	dividing	
them	 into	 three	 groups	 simplifies	 the	 complicated	 hierarchy	 of	 this	
organization	in	reality.	In	the	office,	there	were	66	workers	categorized	with	9	
different	 levels.	 For	 the	 same	 level	workers,	 their	 titles	were	 different	 from	
















































































































































































































Female	 40	(60.6%)	 3	(30%)	 11	(37.9%)	 26	(96.3%)	








working	 experiences,	 and	 family	 conditions,	 I	 argue	 that	 their	 different	
imaginations	 of	 “professional	 identities”	 are	 largely	 based	 on	 their	 different	
gender	and	religion.	Given	most	of	the	senior	managers	were	male	at	AF,	they	
were	expected	to	be	a	‘manly	man’	in	their	own	families	as	the	breadwinner.	At	
the	 same	 time,	given	 the	 longer	working	hours	and	 frequent	 travel	between	
different	AF	offices,	these	male	leaders	were	also	the	“missing	daddies”	in	their	
own	 families,	 which	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 good	 story	 of	 showing	 their	
“devotedness”	 to	 gongyi.	 Then	 I	 move	 to	 the	 workers	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	





female	workers	at	 the	bottom	of	 the	organization	could	 tolerate	 it	while	 the	
male	 workers	 could	 not.	 Finally,	 I	 summarize	 and	 discuss	 the	 different	 AF	
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two	vice	general	 secretaries)	had	chances	 to	 speak	 in	 these	meetings.	There	
















of	 Economics	 in	 2007,	 affiliated	 with	 a	 GONGO	 in	 Shenzhen.	 Tim	 has	 been	




the	 council	 board	meeting	 notes	 that	 I	 read	 during	my	 internship,	 all	 these	





the	 government	 awards,	 Tim	 was	 also	 very	 popular	 among	 many	 other	
organizations	since	he	started	working	with	AF	as	a	fundraising	officer.	He	has	
been	 as	 a	 “gongyi	 expert”	 in	 many	 NGO	 trainings	 in	 China,	 listed	 as	 a	 paid	
consultant	 in	 “gongyi	 professionalization”	 in	 a	 Chinese	 service	 outsourcing	





1.5	pounds	per	meal),	Tim	never	 appeared	 in	 the	 canteen	 that	was	 just	 five	
minutes’	walk	from	the	office.	Instead,	he	would	normally	invite	two	or	three	
colleagues	out	for	lunch	in	the	fancy	shopping	malls	several	kilometers	away,	





that	 Tim	 was	 working	 here	 only	 to	 build	 up	 connections	 with	 the	 board	
members,	which	may	help	him	to	establish	his	own	business	later.	
In	fact,	Tim	was	the	youngest	in	AF’s	senior	management	team.	In	just	five	years,	
he	 had	 got	 several	 promotions	 from	 an	 ordinary	 fundraising	 officer	 to	 the	











“From	4-5pm,	 I	would	 go	 to	 the	 gym,	 and	 then	having	dinner	with	
some	 business	 friends...you	 know,	 I	 also	 need	 to	 help	 my	 family	
business.	Then	I	will	work	on	my	own	companies,	I	have	been	running	
a	start-up	company	since	last	year,	and	I	have	some	other	investments	
too...I	won’t	let	AF	to	occupy	all	my	time,	it	simply	isn’t	worth	it”.	 	 	 	 	
In	all	of	my	informants,	Tim	seemed	to	be	the	most	“relaxed”	worker	I	have	ever	
met.	Just	like	the	other	married	female	workers	that	I	have	discussed	in	the	last	













in	 the	 board,	 they	 want	 something	 much	 bigger;	 they	 wanted	 to	
change	culture,	they	are	eager	to	colonize	Chinese	people’s	brain	with	
a	new	idea,	just	like	a	religion”.	 	 	 	
In	many	ways,	Tim	is	an	exceptional	case	among	his	colleagues.	He	had	his	own	






were	 often	 praised	 as	 role	 models,	 not	 only	 because	 they	 had	 ‘made	 some	
achievements	 in	 gongyi’,	 but	 also	 they	 had	 ‘a	 wonderful	 family	 and	 a	





office	 but	 very	 few	 people	 knew	 about	 him,	 Justin	 had	 a	 very	 different	
personality.	 As	 the	 director	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 research	 and	 post-disaster	
construction	 projects	 at	 AF,	 Justin	 travelled	 frequently	 in	 between	 different	
project	sites	and	offices	but	everyone	knew	him.	For	the	first	time	when	I	met	
him	 in	 the	 Shenzhen	 office,	 he	 just	 finished	 his	 travel	 in	 a	 village	 in	 Sicuan	
province,	carrying	a	big	backpack	with	him.	He	said	hello	 to	everyone	 in	 the	
office	and	then	turned	to	me	with	a	big	smile:	“You	must	be	Hailing!	Welcome!”.	 	
Justin	was	one	of	the	most	hard-working	people	at	AF.	He	often	started	his	work	




the	office.	Sometimes,	 if	 Justin	 just	 finished	a	 long	period	of	 travelling,	 these	
team	meetings	would	 be	 extended	 to	 dinners	 together,	which	 could	 last	 for	





















Oxfam	 worker.	 “In	 all	 my	 training,	 I	 have	 been	 told	 that	 I	 am	 a	 rural	
development	worker”,	Justin	told	me	in	a	dinner,	“but	that	period	was	passed.	I	
need	 to	be	a	professional	gongyi	worker	now”.	 In	an	 interview	with	him4	 in	
May	2017,	Justin	talked	more	about	his	family	and	the	reason	why	joined	AF:	
“I	 did	 enjoy	my	working	 experiences	with	Oxfam…Oxfam	 is	 an	 old	
farmer	who	is	very	knowledgeable	in	how	to	deal	with	his	soil,	how	to	
plough	 the	 land;	 it	 is	 intensive	 agriculture.	 But	 AF	 is	 like	 an	













instance,	 obtained	 the	 same	 higher	 education	 as	 his	 course	 mate.	 She	 was	



















“entrepreneur-like	 mind”,	 had	 successfully	 saved	 the	 struggling	 NGOs	 from	
financial	 broke	 to	 be	 a	 greater	 “change	 maker”.	 But	 Justin’s	 story	 often	




was	 giving	 birth	 to	 their	 first	 child.	 These	 self-sacrifice	 stories	 have	 been	
repeatedly	 mentioned	 throughout	 my	 ethnographic	 work,	 in	 various	 AF’s	
fundraising	campaigns	and	the	official	news	reports.	In	these	similar	narratives	
and	 stories,	 senior	managers	 like	 Justin	were	 described	 as	 an	 “reluctant	 Lei	
Feng”:	on	the	one	hand,	AF’s	founders	understood	that	this	new	foundation	as	
a	 ‘modern	gongyi’	 promoter	 should	not	 stick	 to	 the	old	 socialist	 tradition	as	
being	 a	 ‘Lei	 Feng’.	 However,	 as	 gongyi	 as	 an	 emerging	 profession	 is	 still	
neglected	 by	 the	mainstream	Chinese	 society,	 AF	workers	 like	 Justin	 had	 to	
work	harder	and	 sacrifice	more	 for	promoting	 gongyi.	 	 What	often	was	not	








worker,	 with	 Tim’s	 “professional	 skills”	 and	 Justin’s	 “gongyi	 hearts”,	 has	
constituted	a	perfect	 image	of	 ‘modern	gongyi”	 for	AF	and	 its	workers.	Such	
conclusions	 greatly	 help	 to	 make	 the	 senior	 male	 workers	 as	 “legendary	
heroes”,	getting	rid	of	their	image	as	an	“ordinary,	less-earned	man	working	in	
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a	 non-competitive	 sector”	 that	 was	 not	 “manly”	 enough	 in	 the	 mainstream	
culture.	On	the	contrary,	such	narratives	were	reclaiming	the	male	managers’	
masculinity	 by	 presenting	 their	 jobs	 in	 a	 different	 but	 heroic	 way,	 so	 that	
China’s	 NGO	 sector	 could	 be	 accepted	 at	 least	 like	 a	 normal	 profession,	 no	




at	 AF	 at	 the	 first	 glance.	 AF’s	 66	 employees	were	 divided	 into	 9	 levels	with	
different	 salaries,	but	 for	 the	workers	at	 the	same	 level,	 their	 titles	could	be	
different	given	their	different	working	teams.	So,	in	my	first	days	at	AF,	I	was	
really	confused	with	the	different	titles	and	my	colleagues’	real	positions	in	the	
organization’s	 hierarchy.	 Moreover,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 above,	 some	 senior	
managers	may	 need	 to	 save	 every	 penny	 in	 their	 daily	 life	 to	 support	 their	
family	finance,	while	some	other	workers	who	earned	much	less	may	have	a	
better	 living	 standard	 from	 their	 daily	 outlook.	 By	 saying	 “workers	 at	 the	
bottom”	here,	 I	 point	 to	 the	workers	 at	 the	 entry	 level	 of	 the	 organization’s	
hierarchy	 (salary	 range	 from	 300	 to	 450	 pounds	 per	 month),	 whose	 living	
standards	were	largely	based	on	how	much	they	could	earn	from	AF.	In	fact,	as	
these	workers’	salary	levels	just	reached	the	lowest	income	level	in	Shenzhen	
(or	 half	 of	 the	 average	 income	 in	 the	 city),	 their	 income	 is	 very	 close	 to	
immigrant	 workers	 of	 the	 manufacture	 factories	 in	 the	 suburban	 area.	 But	





least	 seven	 years	 working	 experience,	 the	 backgrounds	 of	 these	 entry-level	
workers	 were	 quite	 diverse.	 Some	 of	 them	 were	 young	 women	 who	 just	
graduated	from	the	college;	some	were	new	parents	who	had	been	struggling	
in	the	city	for	years.	 	 	
Both	 practitioners	 and	 scholars	 have	 discussed	 the	 low	 payment	 issues	 of	
China’s	NGO	workers.	Some	scholars	focus	on	the	limited	financial	resources	in	
the	 whole	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector,	 calling	 for	 more	 domestic	 donors	 and	
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foundations	(e.g.	Deng,	2015;	Lai	et	al.,	2015;	Kwan	Chan	and	Lei,	2017;	Zhu,	Ye	
and	 Liu,	 2018).	 Such	 arguments	 are	 strengthened	 given	 the	 withdrawal	 of	
international	donors	and	the	repeatedly	political	repression	from	the	Chinese	
state.	 Such	 research	 recognizes	 the	 external	 environment	 that	 shapes	many	
Chinese	 NGOs,	 but	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	 the	 introduction	 chapter,	 the	mainstream	
literature	neglects	 the	 rapidly	heterogeneity	happening	within	 the	 sector;	 in	
particular,	it	lacks	analysis	of	how	low	payment	and	inequalities	can	be	created	
from	 the	 internal	 structure	 of	 different	 NGOs.	 The	 emerging	 Chinese	
foundations	in	many	ways	are	no	longer	in	the	funding	crisis	anymore,	different	
from	the	first-generation	Chinese	NGOs	whose	survival	were	highly	dependent	
on	 international	 donors	 and	 the	 tolerance	 from	 the	 government.	 When	 the	
entrepreneurs	 bring	 their	 ideals	 and	 experiences	 directly	 from	 their	 own	
companies,	the	high	payment	gap	and	the	factory-like	working	model	just	come	



























getting	 a	 job,	 but	 multiple	 jobs.	 At	 about	 12:30	 pm,	 Lisa	 would	 go	 to	 AF’s	
canteen	with	some	colleagues,	 take	a	 snap,	and	go	back	 to	work	 from	2	pm.	
Lisa’s	afternoon	work	often	finishes	at	6	pm,	but	after	the	dinner,	she	would	
take	her	laptop	back	to	the	dormitory	to	continue	her	work	until	9	or	10	pm.	 	





each	 room.	 Except	 for	 the	 two	 residents	 like	myself	who	were	 just	working	





decided	 to	enhance	 the	 “corporate-style	management”	at	AF	 to	 recruit	more	
new	managers	with	experiences	in	the	private	sector,	as	a	result	the	quotation	
of	 the	 entry-level	 position	 was	 cut	 off.	 Lisa	 finally	 had	 to	 accept	 a	 contract	
without	any	pension	or	other	social	insurances	at	AF,	with	a	temporary	title	as	
“consultant”.	Since	the	contract	provided	her	about	350	pounds	a	month	which	
just	 reached	 the	 lowest	 income	 line	 in	 Shenzhen,	 she	 could	 hardly	 find	 any	
affordable	 place	 to	 live	 in	 the	 city	 that	 had	 the	 highest	 housing	 price	 in	 the	




hours	 like	 Lisa.	 A	 very	 interesting	 phenomena	 is	 that,	 given	more	 “business	
elites”	have	been	recruited	at	AF,	the	senior	management	team	became	bigger	









maintain	the	“modern	gongyi	model”	in	this	organization.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	5.1	The	dorm	room	I	shared	with	another	three	female	workers	at	AF.	
Photo	by	the	author.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Given	 the	 quite	 different	 working	 schedules	 between	 Lisa	 and	 Tim,	 in	 our	
casual	chats	in	the	dorm,	Lisa	sometimes	did	show	her	confusions	with	Tim’s	
working	 schedule.	 But	most	 of	 the	 time	when	 talking	 about	Tim,	 she	would	
attribute	 Tim’s	 short	 working	 hours	 in	 office	 to	 his	 other	 “crucial	 duties	 of	
socializing	with	 important	people”,	and	then	 just	expressed	her	appreciation	
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with	 his	 education	 and	 family	 background,	which	 offered	him	 the	 skills	 and	
confidence	for	these	“crucial	duties	she	can	never	do”.	 	
Lisa	was	 often	 in	 anxiety,	which	made	 her	 sleepless	 at	 night.	Most	 of	 these	













Lisa’s	 financial	 obligation	 of	 becoming	 a	 good	 daughter	 comes	 from	 the	
Confucian	 filial	 piety	 in	 China,	 which	 viewed	 daughters	 as	 “debts”	 in	 their	
original	family.	This	patriarchal	tradition	is	still	prevail	in	many	parts	of	China,	
especially	the	rural	area	(Shen,	2016).	The	most	possible	way	to	get	these	debts	





































above	 focus	on	 “low-end	 industries”	only;	university	graduates	are	normally	




in	 the	 dilemma	 of	 the	 traditional	 patriarchic	 family	 and	 the	 embodied	
exploitation	in	the	workforce	(Liu,	2004;	Jieyu,	2007).	At	the	same	time,	Lisa’s	
story	 also	 tells	 us	 how	 the	 gendered	 anxiety	 caused	 by	 traditional,	 man-
dominated	 Confucian	 culture	 could	 ultimately	 make	 the	 unfair	 working	
conditions	 and	 huge	 payment	 gaps	 tolerable	 in	 the	 increasingly	
commercialized	 NGO	 sector	 in	 China,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 particular	 social	










without	 any	 exposure	 to	 the	 business	world	 before.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Justin’s	
story	above,	whether	in	or	outside	the	office,	when	talked	about	their	family,	
most	male	workers	I	have	ever	met	at	AF	would	tell	almost	the	same	story	of	






















part	 of	 the	 national	 NGO	 regulation	 reform	 since	 2011,	 the	 Shenzhen	 Civil	
Affairs	 Bureau	 decided	 to	 purchase	 social	 services	 from	 the	 local	 social	
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organizations	 as	 part	 of	 its	 welfare	 supply.	 The	 booming	 funding	 from	 the	
government	soon	stimulated	the	industry	of	social	workers’	production,	some	
organizations	and	GONGOs	also	travelled	a	long	way	to	Jerry’s	college	to	hire	
social	 work	 graduates.	 Jerry	 was	 part	 of	 this	 supply	 chain	 of	 China’s	 social	
worker	production	 in	 the	past	decade	(Kwan	Chan	and	Lei,	2017).	 Jerry	and	
some	his	course	mates	(including	his	girlfriend,	they	got	married	in	Shenzhen	

































“Do	you	have	any	good	 job	recommendations	 for	me?	 I	 think	 I	will	
jump	from	AF	very	soon.	You	know	why	they	wanted	me?	Not	because	
of	 my	 development	 degree,	 not	 my	 past	 internships	 with	 NGOs,	
no…they	want	a	man	who	can	travel	frequently	to	meet	the	partner	










daddies”	 in	any	formal	or	 informal	conversations	with	 its	workers;	until	one	
day,	a	roommate	in	my	dorm	talked	about	them	in	a	quite	simple	sentence:	“the	









donors	 in	 China	 (Kang,	 2019).	 But	 just	 as	 Ishkanian’s	 research	 shows,	 NGO	











177)	observes	 the	 rise	of	 a	 ‘new	man’	 since	China’s	 economic	 liberalization:	
“This	man,	as	a	reincarnation	of	an	old	spirit,	keep	his	eyes	wide	open,	both	at	
work	 and	at	 home,	 checking	 and	 examining	how	everyone	 around	him—his	
neighbors,	 colleagues,	 and	 friends—manage	 their	 lives.	 Life	 has	 become	 a	
management	 of	 material	 things,	 comparable	 to	 and	measurable	 in	 terms	 of	
other	people’s	possessions.	 	 Based	on	Liu’s	 research,	 some	researchers	also	
find	that	the	marketization	reform	in	China	have	greatly	changed	the	gender	






their	 manhood	 and	 gain	 marriage.	 Masculinity	 in	 post	 socialist	 China	 is	
increasingly	being	defined	by	one’s	entrepreneurial	ability	and	 the	power	 to	
provide	and	consume”	(2010:	186).	 	
















us	 something	more	 than	 just	how	 to	make	a	 living	 in	 a	 rapidly	materialistic	
society.	In	AF	workers’	daily	narratives,	we	may	find	that	‘doing	gongyi’	is	still	
a	highly	moralized	job,	different	from	many	other	jobs	in	the	city.	Interestingly,	
this	 moralized	 job	 has	 been	 discussed,	 presented,	 and	 reproduced	 not	 in	 a	
‘modern’	way	as	it	expected	to	be.	On	the	contrary,	narratives	go	back	to	the	
socialist	 morality	 of	 Lei	 Feng,	 so	 that	 to	 be	 better	 incorporated	 into	 the	
mainstream	society	in	China.	As	a	new	‘noble	cause’,	gongyi	justified	most	of	the	
self-sacrifices	 that	 I	 encountered	 during	 my	 internship,	 if	 not	 all.	 The	
unbalanced	 work	 and	 family	 life	 among	 most	 of	 its	 male	 senior	 managers,	
which	turned	out	to	be	‘heroic’	performance	of	reclaiming	their	masculinity	and	
‘wolf	spirit’	in	the	Chinese	society.	In	Tim’s	case,	gongyi	went	even	further	to	be	
a	mere	 spiritual	work,	 a	 performance	beyond	 the	materialistic	 privileges	he	
enjoyed	in	his	daily	life.	In	some	other	cases,	this	‘noble	cause’	of	gongyi	also	
helped	female	workers	at	the	bottom	escape	from	the	traditional	patriarchy	of	






collaborations	 with	 the	 state,	 NGO	 workers	 understand	 their	 profession	 of	
“gongyi	workers”	 in	 very	different	ways.	The	 changing	 landscape	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 is	 creating	 a	polarized	 ecology	 in	 the	daily	work	of	NGO	workers:	 the	
flooding	funding	from	the	private	sector	and	the	endorsements	of	the	business	
elites	does	attract	a	great	number	of	“talents”	with	better	education,	family	and	
working	 backgrounds,	making	 the	 sector	more	 “prosperous”	 and	 “high-end”	
than	ever	before,	no	longer	seen	as	an	underground	industry.	But	at	the	same	
time,	under	the	modern	gongyi,	the	NGO	sector	in	China	does	not	reduce	social	
inequality	 but	 strengthen	 and	 reproduce	 it	 from	 its	 internal	 structure.	 The	
polarized	payment	and	living	conditions	among	AF	workers	are	creating	even	
more	social	inequalities	in	different	forms.	Cho	(2017)’s	ethnographic	research	
on	 the	 actual	 social	 work	 practices	 in	 Shenzhen's	 Foxconn	 industrial	 zone	
reveals	 how	 neoliberal-style	 outsourcing	 has	 created	 precarious	 labor	
conditions	 for	 frontline	 social	 workers.	 Her	 research	 finds	 that	most	 of	 the	
	 144	
government-commissioned	social	work	positions	in	the	factories	were	filled	up	
with	 migrant	 youth	 from	 the	 countryside,	 reproducing	 and	 perpetuating	
China's	rural–urban	divide.	These	social	workers,	normally	seen	as	part	of	the	
“white	collar	class”	and	“civil	society	actors”	in	sharing	the	state	responsibilities	




what	 is	 professionalism	 among	 China’s	 NGO	 workers	 while	 sustaining	 the	
existing	social	inequalities	in	the	society.	Although	in	the	new	foundations	like	
AF,	the	emerging	Chinese	entrepreneurs	have	reinvented	the	meaning	of	gongyi	
in	many	ways	 by	 bringing	 in	more	 commercialized	 knowledge	 and	 skills,	 a	
highly	moralized	gongyi,	as	we	discuss	in	the	last	section,	has	many	similarities	
with	the	narratives	of	Lei	Feng	in	the	reformist	era.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
In	May	2017,	when	I	had	almost	finished	my	fieldwork	in	China,	I	found	a	new	
man’s	image	and	personal	stories	appeared	in	AF’s	official	website.	Named	as	
Anthony,	 he	 took	 over	 Cindy’s	 job.	 	 Much	 like	 Tim,	 Anthony	 has	 been	
described	as	a	“young	gongyi	professional”	who	chose	to	give	up	the	business	
world	as	a	self-sacrifice	and	helped	AF	to	do	modern	gongyi.	In	fact,	Anthony	
had	also	worked	 in	 the	business	consulting	 industry	 for	several	years,	while	













Chapter	 6	 	 Everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi:	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	
organizations	 	
	
Women	 Development	 Center	 (WDC)	 started	 its	 cooperation	 with	 AF	 in	 has	
started	since	2015.	WDC’s	history	can	be	traced	back	to	1990s;	it	was	one	of	the	
first-generation	Chinese	NGOs	that	have	been	supported	by	the	international	
donors.	 Its	 founder	Gillian	was	a	senior	government	official	 in	the	provincial	
government,	 but	 in	 1989,	 given	 her	 sympathetic	 stance	 with	 the	 student	
movements	 in	 Beijing,	 her	 political	 career	 has	 stagnated	 since	 then1 .	 As	 a	
participant	of	1995	World	Women’s	Conference	in	Beijing,	Gillian	was	one	of	
the	 first	 local	partners	and	consultants	of	various	 international	development	
agencies	 in	 China.	 Although	 Gillian	 and	 her	 organization	 had	 been	 affiliated	





simple:	most	of	 its	 international	donors	began	 to	 leave	China.	From	2009	 to	

















how	 these	 new	 foundations	 treat	 its	 partners?	 This	 is	 totally	





term,	 not	 just	 short	 term	disaster	 relief	work,	 for	which	 the	 project	 officers	
needed	 more	 help	 from	 WDC.	 In	 fact,	 Jim	 took	 the	 project	 as	 a	 way	 of	
implementing	 the	 participatory	 methods	 that	 he	 had	 been	 trained	 by	 and	
applied	with	his	 former	donors,	or	 in	his	words,	“to	bring	 in	the	elements	of	
development	work”.	Jim	told	me	in	an	exciting	tone	that	working	with	AF	was	
not	simply	for	money,	but	to	change	the	domestic	donors	in	another	way:	
“They	 [AF]	 say	 that	 everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi,	 they	 say	 public	
participation	is	important…OK,	let	me	tell	you	how	to	do	participation	
in	a	more	sophisticated	way.	We	are	not	just	to	implement	AF’s	ideas,	
but	 we	 try	 to	 involve	 more	 children	 and	 schoolteachers	 into	 our	
projects	 on	 campus...International	 donors	 are	 leaving,	 now	 the	
domestic	donors	are	so	crucial	for	the	whole	NGO	sector,	they	really	
need	to	learn	more	about	development”3.	




fits	 into	 the	 development	 path	 of	 Shenzhen.	 Chapter	 5	 talks	 about	what	 the	
‘modern	gongyi’	means	to	NGO	workers’	everyday	life.	In	Chapter	6	and	7,	I	turn	
to	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 in	 different	 places	 at	 both	 organizational	 and	
individual	levels,	looking	at	how	gongyi	has	been	disseminated	from	the	new	
foundations	to	other	NGOs.	Looking	at	AF’s	national	network	across	the	country,	
the	 two	chapters	do	not	 take	 these	partner	organizations,	mostly	grassroots	
NGOs,	as	a	passive	learner	or	follower	of	“modern	gongyi”.	Instead,	as	we	can	








how	 gongyi	was	 performed	 and	 negotiated	 differently	 at	 the	 organizational	
level;	 I	 discuss	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	







its	 partner	 organizations	 across	 the	 country,	 AF	 was	 not	 just	 an	 important	
funding	 resource,	 but	 also,	 they	 had	 learned	 AF’s	 language	 of	 the	
commercialized	modern	gongyi	in	various	training	programs.	 	 On	the	project	
sites,	 AF’s	 partners	would	wear	 the	 same	 t-shirts	 and	 use	 the	 same	 slogan,	
‘everyone	can	do	gongyi’,	which	also	constituted	part	of	AF’s	branding	work.	




are	 not	 replacing	 the	 role	 of	 international	 donors	 in	 supporting	 grassroots	
organizations,	 but	more	 like	 producing	 and	 buying	 smaller	 organizations	 as	
their	subcontract	manufacturers.	 	
Furthermore,	by	studying	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	different	places	in	this	
chapter,	 I	 also	 suggest	 that	 this	 collaboration	 between	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	
organizations	was	deeply	embedded	in	the	various	forms	of	corporatism	in	the	
local	 society.	 The	 dissemination	 of	 the	 modern	 gongyi	 across	 the	 country	
cannot	 be	 simply	 attributed	 to	 commercialization	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	 sectors,	










to	 the	 creation	 of	 “modern	 gongyi”.	 But	 for	 other	 local	 governments	 in	 an	
underdeveloped	area	with	different	 social	 and	economic	environments,	 they	
might	have	their	own	imaginations	and	interpretations	of	this	modern	gongyi.	
The	other	 less	developed	places	 in	my	case	studies	 took	AF	as	an	 important	
external	 resource	 of	 implementing	 their	 poverty	 reduction	 policies.	 The	
symbolic	meanings	of	the	entrepreneurs	and	AF	as	a	‘innovator’	or	‘reformer’	
in	 doing	 modern	 gongyi	 China	 (distancing	 from	 the	 socialist	 legacies	 and	
GONGOs)	 were	 not	 that	 significant	 in	 these	 contexts.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 I	
present	in	this	chapter,	many	AF’s	partner	organizations	were	GONGOs	in	the	
local	society;	also	many	organization	leaders	had	governmental	affiliations	in	
various	 ways.	 Therefore,	 my	 research	 finds	 that	 in	 the	 practice,	 the	 wide	
dissemination	and	use	of	modern	gongyi	across	the	country	highly	depends	on	
whether	 AF’s	 projects	 and	 funding	 can	 be	 more	 aligned	 with	 the	 local	
government	agendas.	The	“modern	gongyi”	that	AF	promoted	finally	turned	out	
to	 be	 a	 helping	hand	of	 various	 local	 governments	 and	GONGOs	 in	 different	
places,	 rather	 than	 “distancing	 from	 the	 state”.	 Under	 this	 condition,	 as	 this	
chapter	suggests,	using	the	 language	of	gongyi	 in	the	 local	society	 is	also	the	
process	of	being	incorporated	into	the	local	state.	 	 	
Besides,	the	restrictive	NGO	regulations	and	decentralized	reform	in	China	also	






























had	 been	 identified	 as	 ‘capitalist	 tails’	 or	 ‘feudalist	 traditions’,	 so	 they	were	
eradicated	in	the	socialist	revolution.	However	after	the	economic	reform	since	




elites.	 Such	 debates	 were	 not	 only	 around	 economic	 issues,	 but	 also	 about	
political	 reforms	 (Lieberthal	 and	 Lampton,	 1992).	 Many	 study	 groups	 and	
salons	were	organized	by	university	scholars	for	public	debates.	 	 It	was	also	
the	 time	 that	 the	 term	 ‘civil	 society’	was	 translated	 from	English	 to	Chinese,	
known	as	‘gongmin	shehui’	(Calhoun	et	al.,	2006).	However,	after	the	failure	of	
the	student	movement	 in	1989,	all	 the	groups,	salons	and	 law	drafting	work	
were	asked	to	shut	down.	In	three	months,	a	set	of	national	regulations	were	







the	 independent	 labor	 unions,	 underground	 student	 organizations	 and	
religious	 groups	 were	 strictly	 prohibited	 (ibid.).	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 any	
possible	 nation-wide	 movement,	 the	 1989	 regulation	 also	 limited	 the	






between	 the	 headquarters	 and	 the	 regional	 offices	 should	 not	 be	 in	









consequently	 (Hershatter,	 2014).	 But	 the	 political	 climate	 changed	 in	 1998	
again.	In	1998,	a	popular	folk	religion	called	Falun	Gong	caught	the	attention	of	




Li	 Hongzhi	 finally	 turned	 his	 religion	 into	 a	 political	 group	 against	 Beijing	
(Penny,	 2005).	 Between	 1998	 and	 1999,	 all	 the	 NGOs	were	 required	 to	 re-
register	with	the	government	again.	As	a	result,	the	number	of	registered	social	
organizations	fell	from	220,000	in	1998	to	136,841	in	2000,	almost	a	third	less	




The	 third	 period	 started	 from	 2000s	 until	 now,	with	 the	 striking	 feature	 of	
growing	NGOs.	 There	 has	 been	no	 visible	 ‘tidying	up’	 policy	 since	 2000	 like	
before,	and	the	number	of	registered	social	organizations	in	China	has	reached	




time,	 which	 witnesses	 the	 social	 groups	 losing	 out	 in	 the	 economic	 reform	
getting	organized.	Howell	also	mentions	the	 increasing	strategies	of	NGOs	to	
circumvent	the	state	regulations	and	gain	legal	identities.	 	
However,	 Feng	 (2015)	 notices	 that	 the	 Regulations	 of	 the	 Management	 of	
Foundations	in	2004	could	be	more	influential	among	Chinese	NGOs	than	many	
other	 factors.	 Although	 relevant	 regulations	 on	 foundations	 had	 been	
established	in	the	1990s,	they	set	up	very	high	criteria	for	public	foundations:	
for	those	who	wanted	to	register	at	the	national	level,	the	initial	funding	had	to	





private	 foundations	 were	 allowed	 to	 register	 at	 the	 local	 level	 with	 initial	
funding	 of	 2	 million	 yuan	 (200	 thousand	 pounds).	 Since	 then,	 the	 private	
foundations,	 mostly	 founded	 by	 private	 companies	 and	 new	 riches,	 have	
outnumbered	the	public	ones,	rising	from	712	in	2004	to	6495	in	2017.	Some	
researchers	hold	that	a	more	tolerant	policy	in	2004	means	the	state	would	like	
to	 introduce	more	private	wealth	 to	 the	 third	sector,	which	provides	a	good	
foundation	 for	 other	 types	 of	 organizations	 and	 social	 welfare	 system	 to	
develop	(Xiaoming,	2015;	Howell	and	Duckett,	2019;	Kang,	2019).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
4	 The	three	sets	of	organizations	were:	private	non-enterprise	organizations;	




Researchers	 above	 analyze	 the	 recent	 third	 historical	 period	 from	 different	








NGO	 sector.	 However,	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 NGOs	 started	 since	 2000s	
cannot	 be	 simply	 attributed	 to	 the	 central	 government	 alone.	 Instead,	 the	
changing	 state-society	 relations	 at	 the	 local	 level	 have	 transformed	 the	way	
how	the	multi-level	state	think	about	NGOs	in	China	(Teets,	2013,	2015;	Hsu	
and	Hasmath,	2014b).	 	
For	one	 thing,	 the	national	policies	become	highly	selective	 for	various	 local	
governments	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 to	 apply	 them.	 In	 2014,	 an	 NGO	 called	 Liren	
(literally:	 “cultivating	 talents”)	 was	 shut	 down	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government.	
Their	22	rural	libraries	in	different	provinces	were	closed;	some	of	their	senior	
managers	were	also	arrested	by	the	national	security6.	However,	Liren’s	cross	
regional	 activities	 had	 started	 since	 2008,	 although	 the	 organization	 was	
registered	with	the	city	government	of	Chengdu.	In	fact,	most	of	Liren’s	rural	
libraries	were	founded	by	close	cooperation	with	various	local	governmental	
bodies,	 like	 education	 bureaus	 and	 public	 schools.	 That’s	 to	 say,	many	 local	
governments	 in	 different	 regions	 had	 at	 least	 tolerated	 such	 ‘illegal’	 cross-
regional	activities.	However,	in	September	2014,	in	only	one	month,	all	Liren	
libraries	 were	 asked	 to	 be	 shut	 down	 by	 their	 local	 governments	 for	many	
different	 reasons;	 its	headquarter	was	also	closed	 too	 in	 the	name	of	 ‘illegal	
cross-regional	activities’.	Local	governments	alone	cannot	take	such	quick	and	
well-coordinated	actions.	According	to	the	news	reports	of	Liren	workers,	the	
order	of	 repression	may	come	directly	 from	Beijing,	 for	 two	possible	 ‘highly	
politically	 sensitive’	 reasons:	 one	was	 its	 public	 declaration	 of	 its	 “liberalist	
stance”,	e.g.	their	close	links	with	human	rights	activists,	the	books	displayed	in	
	
6 	 Source:	 https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/rural-library-
chain-closes-citing-tremendous-pressure/	
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their	 libraries	 were	 also	 mainly	 translated	 from	 the	 Western	 countries	 in	
humanities	and	social	 sciences.	The	other	was	Liren	 founder’s	public	speech	
about	his	identity	as	a	Christian.	Given	its	founder’s	personal	connections	with	




politically	 sensitive	 and	 proactive	 in	 regulating	 NGOs,	 while	 	 local	
governments	 may	 be	 intending	 to	 treat	 NGOs	 in	 a	 more	 apolitical	 way	 by	
viewing	their	projects	as	a	complement	of	the	local	welfare	system.	 	 	 	











and	 more	 international	 organizations	 came	 into	 China.	 Most	 of	 these	
organizations	may	have	projects	in	multiple	regions,	but	most	of	their	project	
sites	 were	 in	 southwestern	 China,	 the	 regions	 with	 the	 least	 economic	
development	and	the	most	ethnic	minority	groups.	Although	most	of	the	INGOs	
cannot	get	recognized	from	Beijing	for	a	legal	status,	in	many	cases	they	were	
tolerated	 or	 even	 warmly	 welcomed	 by	 the	 local	 governments.	 Because	
southwestern	provinces	with	much	worse	social,	geographical,	and	economic	

















alleviation’	 programs,	 provinces	 in	 eastern	 China	 viewed	 them	 more	 like	
‘welfare	contractors’	or	‘deliverers’	of	the	local	states.	One	example	is	Shanghai.	
Due	to	the	one-child	policy	since	late	1970s,	many	Chinese	cities	have	to	face	a	
rapid	 aging	 population	 structure	 in	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 as	 the	 one-child	





social	work	 centers	 providing	 elderly	 care	 and	medical	 therapies,	 appeared	
with	the	booming	funding	from	various	local	government	bodies	(ibid).	 	















However,	even	under	 the	same	welfare	reform,	 the	national	political	 leaders	
have	 different	 priorities	 from	 the	 local	 states.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	
national	reform	was	 initially	 launched	 in	 the	sixth	plenum	of	 the	16th	China	
Communist	Party	Central	Committee,	against	the	background	of	‘constructing	





people,	 the	 national	 political	 leaders	 encouraged	 both	 central	 and	 local	
governments	to	do	more	social	service	purchases	from	social	organizations.	But	
at	 the	same	 time,	 the	central	 committee	also	mentioned	 the	urgent	needs	of	
‘keeping	social	stability’	that	all	the	social	services	should	respond	to.	Therefore,	
many	 local	 budgets	 of	 social	 service	 also	went	 to	 organizations	 that	 can	 do	
‘harmonious	society	construction’	like	offering	psychological	counseling	to	the	
local	activists	(ibid;	Cho,	2017).	Since	Xi	Jinping’s	leadership	in	2013,	a	new	type	
of	 social	workers	 has	 also	 been	 created:	 social	workers	 of	 communist	 party	
construction.	 The	 major	 work	 of	 these	 social	 workers	 includes	 organizing	
communist	 party	 members	 to	 learn	 the	 new	 speeches	 of	 Xi	 and	 do	 some	
volunteer	works	 in	 their	communities.	Meanwhile,	most	of	 the	social	service	
centers	have	been	asked	to	change	their	names	into	‘community	service	center	
for	communist	party	members	and	the	people’	(Womack,	2017).	 	 	
Except	 the	welfare	 reform	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 social	 service	 delivery,	 another	
striking	 feature	 since	Xi’s	 presidency	 is	 the	 (still)	 changing	policies	 towards	
INGOs,	 which	 greatly	 affects	 the	 landscape	 of	 domestic	 organizations.	 From	
2013	to	2016,	the	number	of	arrested	social	activists	and	human	rights	lawyers	
in	 China	 outnumbered	 the	 amount	 of	 Hu	 Jintao’s	 whole	 presidency	 (Vogel,	
2015).	Many	 of	 them	 have	 been	 accused	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘receiving	Western	
funding	to	overthrow	socialist	regime	in	China’.	The	national	securities	or	CABs	








governments	 have	 been	 told	 not	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Western	 donors	
anymore.	 	
To	 summarize,	 the	 first	 two	 historical	 periods	 of	 China’s	 NGO	 sector	 were	
largely	 dominated	 by	 the	 policies	 from	 the	 central	 state.	However,	 although	
there	are	many	positive	comments	on	the	increasing	numbers	of	organizations	
in	 the	 current	 third	 period	 since	 2000s,	 the	 factors	 in	 shaping	 the	 NGO	
regulation	 have	 been	 more	 complicated	 than	 before.	 The	 differences	 and	
dynamic	negotiations	between	the	central	and	local	states	greatly	affect	how	
NGOs	could	be	regulated	in	different	parts	of	China.	As	Landry	(2008)	suggests,	
the	 Chinese	 state	 is	 not	 a	 homogenous	 actor,	 rather	 it	 is	 a	 ‘fragmented	
authoritarianism’.	 Besides,	 the	 changing	 social	 structures	 in	 terms	 of	
demography	and	economic	development	also	contribute	to	the	shifting	nature	
of	China’s	NGO	sector,	regardless	of	the	long-lasting	national	security	concerns	
from	 Beijing.	 These	 differences	 and	 dynamics	 within	 the	 state	 apparatus	
provide	political	opportunities	for	new	foundations	like	AF	to	build	up	national	
influence	in	China.	At	the	same	time,	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	Chinese	state	










slogan	 “everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi”,	 which	 appeared	 repeatedly	 among	 AF’s	
workers	and	media	reports	throughout	my	fieldwork.	By	saying	“everyone	can	
do	gongyi”	here,	there	have	been	two	meanings	at	AF.	On	the	one	hand,	in	many	
news	 reports	 and	 interviews	 with	 AF’s	 entrepreneurs,	 they	 took	 ordinary	
Chinese	people’s	donations	in	their	everyday	life	as	a	very	important	indicator	
of	‘gongyi’;	therefore	in	those	reports,	the	slogan	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”	has	




much	 more	 ambitious	 than	 simply	 focusing	 on	 the	 various	 humanitarian	





social	environment	can	be	improved”.	 	 	 	
But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 leaders	of	AF’s	 executive	 team	may	have	different	
understandings.	When	 I	was	 doing	my	 fieldwork,	 AF	 had	 had	 three	 general	
secretaries.	 The	 first	 general	 secretary	 took	 her	 leadership	 position	 for	 two	
years	 before	 AF’s	 registration	 in	 Shenzhen,	mostly	 because	 she	was	 a	 close	
friend	and	business	partner	of	Luck	Lee,	and	a	pious	Buddhist	too.	The	second	
and	 the	 third	 general	 secretaries,	 Peter	 and	 James,	 were	 more	 likely	 to	
understand	 “everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi”	 as	 “working	 with	 grassroots	
organizations	in	different	places”,	since	then	the	foundation	began	to	set	up	its	
partnership	with	 various	 NGOs	 across	 the	 country.	Peter	 and	 James	 all	 had	







participation.	This	 is	how	more	social	 capital	 can	be	created	 in	our	
country”.	 	 	 	 	 	
But	to	build	up	partnerships	with	other	NGOs	in	different	geographical	areas	is	
never	easy	in	China.	AF’s	national	network	was	largely	based	on	several	natural	
disasters	 happening	 between	 2008	 and	 2013;	 it	 was	 during	 those	 natural	
disasters	that	it	started	to	support	the	disaster	relief	work	through	various	local	
organizations	 and	 voluntary	 groups,	 trying	 to	 organize	 them	 into	 a	 more	
“standardized”	network	step	by	step.	Given	the	repressive	NGO	regulations	in	
Beijing,	it	is	very	unusual	to	see	an	organization	like	AF	establishing	such	a	big	




a	national	network	are	particularly	 influential	 of	 creating	and	disseminating	
knowledge	in	the	whole	NGO	sector	in	China.	In	the	early	2016,	a	notice	from	
Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	raised	concerns	about	AF	leaders,	which	iterated	the	
strict	 prohibition	 of	 ‘illegal	 cross-regional	 activities’	 of	 NGOs.	 AF	 had	 good	











Under	this	condition,	 it	 is	crucial	 for	AF	to	build	up	a	good	relationship	with	
different	governments	at	 the	 local	 level	 so	 that	 to	ensure	 its	projects	 can	be	
done	from	one	place	to	another.	Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	that	most	







reforms	 also	 applied	 to	 its	 national	 network	 to	 enhance	 its	 management	
efficiency.	 One	 is	 standardization.	 The	 foundation	 had	 set	 up	 all	 the	 project	
details,	 as	 many	 as	 it	 could,	 from	 organizing	 local	 volunteers,	 distributing	
disaster	 relief	materials,	 collecting	 local	 information,	 to	 implementing	 post-
disaster	 infrastructure	 reconstruction	projects,	 etc.	AF	even	drafted	 samples	
for	its	partner	organizations	to	post	on	the	social	media	in	communicating	with	






The	other	 is	 to	 “make	 the	game	more	competitive”,	which	can	be	seen	as	an	
extension	 of	 the	 “wolf-spirit”	 promoted	 within	 AF.	 AF	 set	 up	 a	 series	 of	
variables	to	evaluate	their	partner	organizations	in	different	provinces,	which	
included	 key	 factors	 from	 the	 number	 of	 implemented	 projects	 and	
beneficiaries,	local	resource	mobilization	(like	volunteer	numbers),	how	many	
awards	 won	 from	 the	 local	 governments,	 to	 how	many	 “good	 pictures	 and	
stories	were	disseminated”	in	local	official	media.	All	these	variables	were	set	
as	 indicators	 to	measure	 the	 “public	 participation”,	 or	 in	 another	words,	 to	
achieve	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”.	Every	year,	AF	would	also	send	out	a	ranking	
of	their	partner	organizations	in	difference	provinces	based	on	those	variables,	





















background,	 I	 started	my	 second-stage	 fieldwork	with	 AF’	 local	 partners	 in	
several	different	provinces.	In	the	following	parts	of	this	chapter,	I	divide	these	
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In	 many	 aspects,	 AF’s	 local	 partner	 organization	 in	 the	 H	 province,	 Gongyi	
Volunteer	Center	(GVC),	was	an	ideal	one	in	AF’s	eyes.	GVC	started	its	disaster	
relief	work	 in	 the	 province	 since	 2006,	when	AF	 had	 not	 been	 founded	 yet.	
GVC’s	director	Perry	knew	many	AF	workers	very	well	before	they	started	their	
cooperation.	In	fact,	in	many	internal	meetings	and	pictures,	Perry	was	told	to	
be	 AF’s	 helping	 hand	 to	 establish	 its	 national	 network	 by	 attracting	 more	
grassroots	organizations	and	setting	up	the	organizational	evaluation	system.	
Until	 today,	 GVC	 is	 still	 helping	 AF	 to	 manage	 its	 national	 network	 of	 the	
disaster	relief	projects.	 	 To	a	large	degree,	GVC	had	been	thought	more	like	an	
extension	 of	 AF,	 rather	 than	 an	 independent	 organization:	 according	 to	my	
interviews	with	both	AF	workers	and	Perry,	AF’s	funding	took	at	least	80	to	90	
percent	of	GVC’s	annual	budget	(about	700	to	900	thousand	pounds	per	year);	
almost	 all	 its	 work	 was	 closely	 related	 to	 AF’s	 projects.	 In	 fact,	 in	 many	
occasions	 AF’s	workers	would	 call	 the	 GVC	workers	 directly	 as	 its	 ‘national	
network	 coordinators’,	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘partners	 from	G’	 like	what	 they	 call	
workers	from	other	partner	organizations.	The	office	of	GVC	in	the	city	of	G	was	


















Around	 2010s	 when	 Oxfam	 decided	 to	 withdraw	 most	 of	 their	 work	 and	
funding	from	H	Province,	GVC	turned	to	AF	for	help.	 	




of	 Oxfam’s	 “civil	 society	 training	 network”,	 through	 which	 he	 kept	 close	




of	 changing	 discursive	 and	 financial	 donors	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	which	 is	
never	 simply	 a	 new	 substitution	 of	 the	 old	 one.	 GVC’s	 transition	 from	 an	
international	donor	to	a	domestic	one	means	that	Chinese	NGOs	need	to	adjust	
their	working	strategies	and	the	relations	with	the	state	at	the	same	time,	it	also	
decides	what	other	organizations	they	can	be	networking	with.	 	 	 	 	
Perry’s	multiple	“hats”	on	his	head	did	help	AF’s	national	network	in	the	whole	
province.	 In	 the	past	 several	years,	every	winter	when	AF	started	 its	annual	
snow	disaster	 relief	work	 in	G,	GVC	would	make	 it	 as	 a	big	 event	 ceremony	
under	the	name	of	“targeted	poverty	alleviation”,	attracting	many	local	official	
news	media.	As	one	of	the	poorest	provinces	in	China,	since	Xi’s	leadership	in	















standardized	 project	 procedures.	 According	 to	 AF’s	 project	 implementation	
handbook,	before	each	project	started,	all	AF’s	partner	organizations	would	be	
asked	to	do	a	big	“project	launching”	ceremony	to	attract	media	attention	and	
get	 governmental	 officials’	 endorsement.	 The	 number	 of	 such	 activities	 and	
participants	was	also	part	of	the	organizational	evaluation	in	terms	of	realizing	
“everyone	can	do	gongyi”.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	






also	 “passionate”	 with	 their	 work,	 always	 ready	 to	 “occupy	 more	 markets	
(regions)”	not	covered	by	AF	network	yet.	Like	AF’s	human	resource	structure,	










running	 like	a	 family	business.	One	of	GH’s	 founders	Humphrey	was	also	an	
active	member	of	Oxfam’s	civil	society	network	years	ago,	where	he	got	to	know	
Perry.	GH’s	development	has	also	been	greatly	 supported	by	Oxfam	 from	 its	
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exactly	 the	 same	 as	 those	 in	 AF’s	 promotion	 leaflets.	 GH	 stated	 its	














INGO	worker,	he	went	 to	Gansu,	Yunan	and	Sicuan	Provinces	 to	work,	 all	of	
which	are	the	poorest	regions	 in	China.	However,	Humphrey	also	 found	that	
although	 these	 regions	 are	 poorer	 than	 others,	 they	 enjoyed	 the	 most	
international	aids	and	therefore	contributed	to	some	of	the	most	prosperous	




of	 NGOs	 in	 J,	 I	 would	 do	 it”.	 From	 Humphrey’s	 word,	 he	 took	 gongyi	 as	 an	
equivalent	 of	 NGO	 development.	 In	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 found	 him	 not	 very	




related	to	the	general	public.	 	 	 	
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found	 it	 very	 difficult	 to	 get	 registered	 with	 the	 local	 government.	 In	 an	
interview	with	him,	he	attributed	his	difficulties	to	the	“backwardness	of	the	










AF:	 GH	 helped	 to	 coordinate	 the	 local	 volunteer	 groups,	 and	AF	 offered	 the	
materials	 and	media	 resources	 (including	 coverage	 from	 People’s	 Daily	 and	
China	 Central	 TV,	 the	 influential	 state-owned	 media	 in	 Beijing).	 The	 media	








the	 conference,	 the	 registration	 procedures	 in	 the	 city	 of	N	were	 simplified.	
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Humphrey’s	 organization,	 with	 other	 8	 organizations,	 got	 registered	 at	 the	
beginning	of	2013.	At	a	diner	with	Humphrey	and	his	wife,	he	explained	how	
AF	was	valuable	to	his	organization:	
“So,	 you	 see?	 AF	 is	 a	 quite	 useful	 political	 umbrella	 for	 our	
organization.	The	 local	government	may	not	understand	what	NGO	
means,	but	 they	all	know	AF	and	 its	 founders,	 they	understand	 the	
good	deeds	we	have	done	in	the	summer	flood.	Even	now	some	INGOs	
give	 me	 resources	 to	 do	 disaster	 related	 issues,	 I	 can	 just	 tell	 the	
officials	that	these	donations	are	just	like	AF.	Think	about	this,	if	now	
I	 call	 off	 the	 cooperation	 with	 AF,	 GH	 would	 be	 like	 the	 only	
organization	fully	funded	by	international	organizations	in	K	province.	
What	would	the	government	do	to	us?”	 	
Humphrey’s	 words	 can	 make	 more	 sense	 if	 we	 compare	 the	 two	 types	 of	
projects	sponsored	by	its	two	major	donors:	AF	and	Oxfam.	For	AF-sponsored	













on	 those	 fields	 that	 government	 would	 never	 support”.	 In	 fact,	 GH’s	 close	







Except	 the	 cooperation	 in	 specific	 disaster	 related	 projects,	 AF	 also	 tried	 to	
shape	GH’s	daily	work	by	disseminating	its	knowledge	of	how	to	do	gongyi.	But	
these	 efforts	 went	 not	 smoothly	 in	 the	 end.	 In	 2015,	 AF	 and	 several	 new	
domestic	 foundations	 launched	 a	 grant	 together	 to	 promote	 “professional	
gongyi”.	An	important	part	of	this	program	was	called	as	‘Gongyi-Business	Elite	
Plan’.	This	plan	aimed	to	attract	talents	from	the	business	world	to	work	for	
NGOs,	 so	as	 to	 raise	NGOs’	 ‘working	efficiency’	and	 their	 “professionality”	 in	
terms	 of	 fundraising,	 marketing,	 branding,	 and	 management.	 Ten	 business	
professionals	 would	 be	 paid	 by	 AF	 to	 work	 for	 its	 ten	 different	 partner	
organizations	 at	 ‘a	market	 price’:	 at	 least	 10	 thousand	 pounds	 per	 year	 per	
person.	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 told	 me	 that	 they	 did	 not	 want	 to	 join	 such	 a	
program	 at	 the	 first	 hand,	 since	 they	 did	 not	 think	 they	 really	 need	 a	




managers	 discussed	 their	 partner	 organizations,	 a	 project	 officer	 Anthony	
complained	about	Humphrey	and	GH	like	this:	






Anthony’s	words	 raised	 agreements	 among	 some	of	 his	 colleagues,	 the	 then	
program	director	Calvin	concluded:	
“To	select	which	partner	organization,	we	should	give	more	supports	




Humphrey	seems	a	bit	more	lightened	up	now	by	working	with	us”.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Finally,	 for	 the	 ‘Gongyi-Business	 Elites	 Plan’,	 AF’s	workers	 persuaded	GH	 to	
accept	 a	 very	experienced	 insurance	 salesman.	 “You	know,	 they	 told	us	 that	
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insurance	 salesman	 knew	 how	 to	 do	 promotion	 by	 knocking	 on	 everyone’s	
door,	that’s	what	we	need	for	social	mobilization	and	public	participation	today.	
So	we	finally	agreed	to	have	a	try”,	Sue	said.	But	only	three	months	later,	the	
insurance	salesman	recommended	by	AF	resigned	 from	his	 job;	Sue	 told	me	
that	the	salesman	couldn’t	understand	her	and	Humphrey	at	all,	or	in	her	words,	
“no	any	self-identity	with	our	organization	and	the	way	we	work”.	In	fact,	this	
program	created	a	very	 ironic	scene	 in	GH:	based	on	 the	“market	price”,	 the	








GH	 and	 GVC,	 the	 Humphrey	 couple	 often	 had	 conflicts	 with	 Perry	 and	 AF	
leaders	in	funding	distribution.	It	seemed	that	the	partnership	between	the	two	
organizations	may	not	be	that	strong	since	they	had	very	different	agenda.	But	
the	 longer	 I	 stayed	with	GH	workers,	 the	more	 I	 realized	 that	GH	were	 still	
sharing	 the	 same	 thinking	 pattern	 of	 gongyi,	 although	 there	 could	 be	
differences	in	terms	of	specific	working	skills	and	strategies	in	their	daily	work.	
It	should	be	noted	that	Humphrey’s	“stubborn	civil	society	ideas”	were	largely	
based	 on	 the	 anti-state	 politics	 in	 China.	 Although	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 put	
helping	the	social	minority	groups	as	his	working	priority	(rather	than	serving	
the	donors),	they	held	that	it	was	the	state	and	the	party-state	that	should	be	
responsible	 for	 these	 groups,	 rather	 than	 others.	 Like	 many	 Chinese	
intellectuals	who	take	private	entrepreneurs	as	a	“natural	ally	of	Chinese	civil	
society”	 in	 the	 post	 1989	 era,	 Humphrey	 thought	 it	was	more	 important	 to	







are	 still	 friends.	 Because	 we	 all	 have	 strong	 gongyi	 qinghuai	
(mentality	 or	 passion,	 情怀)”.	 “Then	what	 do	 you	mean	 by	gongyi	
qinghuai	 here?	 A	 warm	 heart	 to	 do	 good	 deeds?”	 I	 asked.	 “No,	 of	
course	not.	We	are	all	liberals,	we	believe	in	the	same	value,	like	what	
a	good	government	should	be	like	in	China…So	we	should	do	gongyi	
together!”	 	 	 	 	 	 	

















role	 that	 NGOs	 should	 play	 in	 contributing	 to	 Chinese	 society.	 In	 many	
circumstances,	Humphrey	and	Sue	 told	me	 that	 they	 thought	 ‘the	grassroots	
NGOs	in	China	are	quite	immature’,	so	 ‘they	should	be	more	“organized”	and	
“professional”	 by	working	with	 big	 donors’.	 Then	 I	 asked	 them	why	 a	more	








which	 often	 claimed	 that	NGOs,	 including	 their	 partner	 organizations	 in	 the	
local	societies,	were	important	in	producing	a	stronger	social	force	in	China	for	
a	 more	 peaceful	 social	 and	 political	 transformation.	 In	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	
encountered	 Tocqueville’s	 name	 repeatedly,	 in	 particular,	 his	 theories	were	
part	of	the	internal	training	contents	at	AF	in	August	2016.	During	my	visits	to	
different	 organizations	 across	 the	 country,	 I	 could	 also	 find	 Tocqueville’s	
Democracy	in	America	very	often	on	their	bookshelves.	 	 	
But	Tocqueville	never	mentioned	the	specific	strategies	of	how	to	make	NGOs	
stronger	 (particularly	 in	 China’s	 context);	 while	 AF’s	 standardized	 projects	





















alliances	 among	NGOs	 in	 China.	 In	 literatures,	 scholars	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	




various	 NGO	 regulations	 and	 the	 political	 censorship	 in	 China	 have	 greatly	




Also	 some	other	 scholars	 look	at	how	NGO	cooperation	could	be	possible	 in	
China’s	context,	particularly	they	examine	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	NGO	alliances	




the	 external	 political	 factors	 and	 mistrusts	 among	 different	 organization	
leaders	(e.g.	Kang,	2017;	Lai,	Zhu,	Tao,	&	Spires,	2015).	In	these	researches,	the	
political	 limitation	of	NGO	networking	 in	China	not	only	constrain	 the	social	
environment	 they	 are	 living	 in,	 but	 also	 it	 greatly	 shapes	 people’s	mindset:	
organizations	 need	 to	 be	 self-constrained	 and	 censored	 to	 survive	 in	 this	
dynamic	political	environment.	 	
But	what’s	missing	 in	the	current	discussion	 is	 that	most	researchers	do	not	
analyze	 the	 nature	 and	 internal	 structure	 of	 these	 so-called	 networking	 or	
cooperation.	 In	this	chapter,	 I	argue	that	 in	the	various	forms	of	 interactions	
between	NGOs,	new	knowledge,	 language	and	skills	of	gongyi	have	also	been	
disseminated	and	negotiated.	The	rise	and	fall	of	Chinese	NGO	alliance	may	not	
be	 necessarily	 attributed	 to	 the	 external	 political	 opportunities,	 since	
“collaboration”	or	 “cooperation”	may	also	 lead	 to	 interest	and/or	 ideological	
conflicts	 as	well	 as	 hierarchy	production.	 For	 example,	Wu	 (2012),	 suggests	
that	 the	 languages	 and	 ideologies	 used	 in	 China’s	 NGOs	 are	 borrowed	 from	
various	local	public	intellectuals,	activists	and	scholars.	This	would	suggest	that	
the	 activists	 and	 NGO	 leaders	 are	 natural	 allies.	 However,	 the	 potential	
collaboration	is	undermined	by	very	different	agendas.	This	is	illustrated	very	
clearly	 in	 Zhou’s	 (2018)	 research	 on	 China’s	 equal	 education	 campaign	 in	
Beijing	 	 where	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 human	 rights	 organizations	 and	 the	
community-based	NGOs	 led	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 their	 partnership.	 The	human	
rights	 activists	 saw	 the	 campaign	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 constitutional	 project	





The	 chapter	 reminds	 us	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 concepts	 like	 “partnership”	 or	
“collaboration”	 that	people	often	use	 in	studying	 the	 third	sector,	 since	such	
words	may	neutralize	or	conceal	the	mechanisms	of	hierarchy	making	process	
among	different	 social	organizations	 in	 the	 reality.	Besides,	 even	 though	 the	
Chinese	 state	 does	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 knowledge	
dissemination	 and	 organizational	 interactions	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 their	
impacts	 in	 shaping	 Chinese	NGOs	 could	 be	 also	 highly	 contextualized	 at	 the	
local	 level,	deeply	embedded	within	the	local	economic	conditions	and	social	











better:	 the	new	domestic	donors	 are	 trying	 to	 ‘modernize’	Chinese	NGOs	by	
large	scale	standardizing,	disciplining	the	smaller	organizations	with	different	
agendas.	 This	 trend	 has	 been	 strengthened	 by	 grassroots	 workers’	 popular	
belief	of	the	ideas	on	anti-state	politics.	However,	we	can	hardly	say	that	the	
new	donors	and	their	hegemonic	gongyi	is	de-contextualizing	or	escaping	from	
the	Chinese	society.	Rather,	 it	 is	better	 to	view	it	as	a	mirror	and	product	of	








only	a	 small	heater	 (there	was	no	 central	heating	 in	 the	 city).	 I	 knew	 it	was	
better	to	stay	in	the	room,	at	least	it	was	bright	and	smelled	good.	There	was	a	
stinky	 toilet	 just	 next	 door	 that	we	 had	 to	 share	with	more	 than	 20	 people	
working	on	the	same	floor,	a	quite	old	toilet	with	a	dirty	pit	and	a	rusty	faucet.	

























in	the	way	that	deliberately	separated	their	 ‘gongyi	 jobs’	 from	other	parts	of	
everyday	 life.	As	we	discussed	 in	Chapter	5,	 in	 the	 ‘learning	 from	corporate’	
reform,	AF	set	up	a	system	to	record	each	staff’s	working	hours,	including	the	





that	 how	 this	 well-designed	 office	 life	 would	 contribute	 to	 AF's	 various	
humanitarian	projects,	but	it	did	help	most	of	the	AF	workers	establish	a	new,	
professional	 identity	 as	 part	 of	 the	 'white-collar'	 community	 in	 one	 of	 the	
prosperous	 cities	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	 in	 many	 public	 speeches	 and	
presentations,	 I	 found	 that	 most	 of	 my	 AF	 colleagues	 would	 introduce	
themselves	by	their	official	titles	at	AF	to	show	the	professionalism1.	 	
But	 things	were	 quite	 different	 for	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 in	 the	 local	
society	 that	 I	 encountered.	 Given	 the	 limited	 size	 of	 these	 organizations,	 I	
hardly	 knew	 what	 their	 ‘official	 titles’	 were;	 most	 of	 them	 would	 simply	
introduce	 themselves	as	 ‘a	gongyi	people’	 (gongyi	 ren,	公益人),	or	 ‘a	person	
	








community),	 explaining	 who	 they	 were	 and	what	 they	 did	 by	 their	 various	
relations	with	the	local	GONGOs,	governmental	bodies,	business	circle.	Before	
my	fieldwork	with	AF’s	partner	organizations,	what	I	had	learned	in	AF’s	office	
were	not	 their	daily	operations	at	 the	organizational	 level,	but	mostly	about	
these	organization	leaders’	names,	their	personal	networks	and	backgrounds,	
as	well	as	their	various	social	relations	in	the	local	society.	 	




























is	 not	 just	 a	 concept	 of	 understanding	 the	 state	 politics	 in	 authoritarian	
countries,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 local	 society,	 it	 is	 an	 arrangement	 of	 organizing	
people’s	everyday	life	from	their	social	relations,	family	life,	to	their	religions.	
This	 chapter,	 like	 chapter	 6,	 divides	 the	 ‘gongyi	 people’	 into	 two	 types:	 the	
‘incapable	gongyi	people’,	and	those	‘successful’,	 ‘professional	gongyi	people’.	










Born	 in	1973,	Humphrey	 is	older	 than	Sarah	and	Perry,	but	very	 few	people	
would	call	him	“elder	brother”	in	the	NGO	sector.	In	AF’s	office,	quite	often	my	
colleagues	would	praise	him	for	his	hard	work,	but	GH	was	seen	as	a	negative	




my	 fieldwork,	 a	 study	of	Humphrey's	personal	history	makes	 it	 clearer	why	















sacrifice	 for	 his	 career	 development.	 However,	 when	 I	 tried	 to	 confirm	 this	
story	with	Humphrey	and	his	wife	Sue,	both	of	them	laughed	and	shook	their	
heads.	Sue	said:	“Oh	I	cannot	imagine	that	Humphrey	would	be	so	high	ended	
one	 day.	 He	 did	 work	 in	 Shanghai	 for	 some	 years,	 but	 never	 in	 any	 big	
companies”.	
Humphrey	was	born	into	a	village	in	Province	K	when	his	mother,	 like	other	
young	 students	 from	 Shanghai,	was	 asked	 by	Mao	 to	 give	 up	 schooling	 and	
educate	herself	in	the	countryside.	In	the	late	1980s,	as	a	state	“compensation”,	
Humphrey’s	family	finally	got	an	opportunity	to	go	back	to	Shanghai	to	work	






or	 in	governmental	positions.	 Instead,	 as	 I	 read	 from	an	article	written	by	a	








Buddhist,	 Sue	 was	 active	 in	 volunteer	 work	 and	 underground	 religious	
activities	when	at	grad	school,	and	finally	she	turned	Humphrey	a	Buddhist	too.	
So,	when	Humphrey	wanted	to	 launch	his	organization,	Sue	became	the	first	









man’s	 world,	 you	 need	 to	 join	 their	 hobbies,	 either	 drinking	 or	
smoking.	 Look	 at	 the	 AF	 senior	 managers,	 they	 are	 all	 heavy	







in	 their	everyday	 life	 from	project	management,	organizational	operation,	 to	
their	 family	 finance,	 it	was	 Sue	 rather	 than	Humphrey	 that	made	 the	major	
decisions.	 During	 my	 ethnography	 with	 this	 couple,	 although	 there	 were	
arguments	 from	 time	 to	 time,	 I	 could	 hardly	 see	 anyone	 of	 them	 as	 really	
‘dominating’	 either	 the	 office	 or	 their	 home.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 my	
observations	of	GVC,	between	Perry	and	his	wife.	In	both	couples,	the	husband	
and	wife,	as	the	co-founders	of	their	businesses,	enjoyed	more	equal	status.	 	 	 	 	 	
During	my	stay	at	Humphrey	and	Sue’s	home,	I	was	surprised	that	they	even	




















Inspired	 by	 AF’s	 modern	 gongyi,	 Humphrey	 tried	 to	 hang	 out	 with	 local	
entrepreneurs.	 In	 February	 2017,	 I	 had	 a	 chance	 to	 go	 with	 him	 for	 such	
occasion,	but	it	turned	out	to	be	a	quite	awkward	experience,	which	made	me	
realize	 the	 challenges	 that	 NGO	 leaders	 like	Humphrey	 had	 in	 getting	more	
integrated	into	the	local	elite	circles	for	“modern	gongyi”.	Humphrey	wanted	to	
thank	two	entrepreneurs	who	co-owned	a	 local	express	company,	since	they	
helped	Humphrey	 to	 send	 out	 disaster	 relief	materials	 in	 both	 summer	 and	
winter	 in	 the	 whole	 province	 for	 free.	 So,	 Humphrey	 hoped	 that	 these	 two	
entrepreneurs	 can	 continue	 their	 free	 express	 service	 in	 the	 next	 year	 and	













with	AF”.	 	 	 	
















help	 each	 other	 and	 support	 the	 local	 gongyi”,	 Humphrey	 said.	 But	 Wang	
seemed	confused,	“I	do	not	understand	your	gongyi	circle	at	all.	So	what	are	you	





founder	 with	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 this	 company.	 He	 nodded	 his	 head	 when	
Humphrey	and	I	came	in,	and	then	turned	to	Mr.	Wang	to	discuss	their	business.	
After	 about	 half	 an	 hour,	 Mr.	 Wang	 introduced	 Humphrey	 to	 Liang,	 and	
Humphrey	 expressed	 his	 gratitude	 again.	 Mr.	 Liang	 shook	 hands	 with	
Humphrey,	serving	him	tea,	and	then	turned	to	his	phone	calls.	I	thought	Mr.	
Liang	was	quite	busy	at	that	moment,	but	I	was	wrong.	After	several	phone	calls,	
















himself,	 “I	 planned	 to	 stay	 longer	with	 them	 so	 to	 know	 them	better.	 But	 it	
seems	that	we	are	still	too	different,	aren’t	we?”	
If	we	call	GVC’s	leader	Perry	a	local	elite	in	G,	then	Humphrey	and	Sue	must	be	
in	 a	 much	 lower	 social	 status.	 They	 came	 from	 very	 different	 social	
backgrounds,	enjoyed	a	totally	different	political	status	in	the	local	society.	And	
















whole	 organization	was	more	 like	 part	 of	 a	 traditional	 family	 group	 run	 by	
Perry	 and	 his	 wife,	 rather	 than	 any	 typical	 “professional”	 organization	 or	
“modern	gongyi”	that	I	had	heard	from	AF’s	office.	When	I	was	entering	Perry’s	
office	room	by	walking	through	GVC’s	office	for	the	first	time,	I	just	found	myself	
in	another	world:	outside	Perry’s	room,	the	organization	 looked	 like	 just	 the	
same	as	AF’s	office,	from	the	AF	logos,	leaflets,	even	the	big	fish-tank-like	crystal	






like	 a	 private	 tearoom	 for	 relaxing	 and	 socializing,	 rather	 than	 a	 real	
“professional	working	place”	like	the	other	parts	of	GVC’s	office.	





and	 then	 light	a	cigar	 for	him.	 In	our	dinner	 later,	 the	same	scene	happened	




















high	 quality	 of	 their	 tea,	 they	 also	 bought	 a	 tea	 plantation	 and	 set	 up	 a	 tea	
company	in	Taiwan	last	year.	That	is	to	say,	unlike	many	other	full-time	NGO	
workers,	gongyi	was	 only	 a	 "part-time	 job"	 for	 him.	 Comparing	 to	 his	 other	
businesses,	GVC	might	not	be	the	most	important	one.	Interestingly,	in	Perry's	
teahouse,	I	came	to	realize	that	he	and	his	wife	were	not	going	to	divide	their	
different	 jobs	 into	 separated	 time	 slots	 and	 geographical	 spaces.	 In	 that	
teahouse,	I	found	a	banner	in	the	entrance	stating	that	it	was	also	'the	G-City	








from	 the	 local	 business	 circle,	 including	 two	 bankers	 and	 one	 real	 estate	
developer.	In	the	discussion,	I	found	that	they	were	also	frequent	visitors	of	the	
teahouse,	buying	tea	and	participating	in	the	Buddhist	activities	there.	But	this	
time,	 the	 visitors	were	not	 only	 coming	 for	 tea	 but	 also	 to	 discuss	 donation	
issues	 and	 business	 cooperation	 with	 AF.	 In	 just	 one	 hour,	 the	 real	 estate	
developer	decided	to	donate	70	thousand	pounds	to	the	charity	marathon	to	be	
hosted	in	the	province.	The	charity	event	was	initiated	by	AF	to	launch	more	





city	government;	as	 the	new	tourist	area	was	part	of	 the	 “poverty	reduction	








conversation,	Perry	was	quite	positive	 that	 in	 the	next	year,	he	could	have	a	
bigger	say	in	how	to	distribute	the	donation	money	with	AF.	











AF	worker	 in	 the	 fish-tank	 office	 in	 Shenzhen.	 In	 fact,	 in	 our	 conversations,	











him	an	almost	 irreplaceable	actor	 in	 the	 local	 society	 in	 the	eyes	of	external	
donors;	regardless	of	the	language	or	policy	changes	in	China’s	NGO	sector.	In	
fact,	in	March	2017	when	I	visited	Perry,	he	just	decided	to	work	with	Oxfam	









Perry	was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 that	 I	 encountered	 in	my	 fieldwork	who	 can	 be	
called	as	 ‘the	successful	gongyi	people’	by	AF	workers.	 In	AF’s	 ranking	of	 its	











Lions	 Club,	where	 she	 can	meet	 other	 Buddhist	 entrepreneurs.	 However,	 in	
2012	the	local	Youth	Communist	League	(YCL)	came	up	to	her	and	suggested	
that	her	volunteer	group	can	be	legally	registered	as	long	as	it	is	under	YCL's	
supervision.	 Later,	 with	 the	 national	 NGO	 regulation	 reform,	 the	 local	
government	decided	to	invest	more	money	in	purchasing	social	services,	and	
then	Sarah's	organization	became	one	of	the	major	beneficiaries	of	government	
funding.	Although	Sarah	did	not	have	 funding	 from	international	donors	 like	
Perry,	how	they	had	been	gradually	incorporated	into	the	local	state	was	almost	
the	same:	firstly	recognized	as	an	economic	"success"	in	the	local	society,	then	
their	 efforts	 in	 combing	 their	 Buddhist	 faith	 and	 volunteer	 activities	 were	
tolerated	and	neutralized	by	the	local	state.	Finally,	their	close	cooperation	with	
the	 local	 state	 in	doing	gongyi	brought	 them	more	privileges	and	benefits	 in	




held	by	AF	 in	May	2017,	when	most	of	 its	partner	 leaders	were	there.	These	




of	 the	 province	 coming	 to	 visit	 Sarah,	 like	 Perry	 who	 was	 called	 as	 “elder	
brother	 (dage)”,	 Sarah	was	 also	 called	 by	 the	 organization	 leaders	 as	 “elder	




in	 understanding	 the	 changing	 landscape	 of	 the	 Chinese	NGO	 sector.	 By	 the	















It	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 these	people	 I	 talked	 to	had	no	 anxieties	 at	 all,	 but	 it	 is	
because	they	were	living	a	quite	different	life	and	therefore	what	gongyi	means	












In	 Osburg’s	 study	 of	 China’s	 new	 rich,	 he	 looks	 at	 how	 the	 personal	





King	 1991).	 Also,	 there	 are	 scholars	 emphasizing	 the	 adaptability	 and	
continuing	evolution	of	guanxi	 in	the	reformist	era	(for	example,	Bian,	1994;	




that	 the	 elite	 networks	 between	 the	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 local	
government	officials	are	“at	the	very	heart	of	capitalist	development	in	urban	
China”	 (ibid:	 32).	 Given	 that	 the	 networks	 provide	 opportunities	 for	 the	
personal	wealth	and	status	accumulation,	these	local	elites	are	more	“rallied”	
together	to	achieve	the	economic	growth	goals	set	up	by	Beijing.	In	particular,	
Osburg	 examines	 how	guanxin	 has	 been	 produced	 in	 certain	 new,	 exclusive	
spaces	of	leisure	in	the	city,	for	instance,	the	various	salons,	karaoke,	private	
clubs,	spas,	and	so	forth	(ibid.:	37-75).	Based	on	the	traditional	native-place	ties,	















these	 organizations	 have	 changed	 from	 international	 agencies	 to	 domestic	
entrepreneurs,	these	organizations	can	still	keep	an	extraordinary	status	in	the	
local	 society.	 The	 current	 highly	 commercialized	 gongyi	 language	 has	 given	
these	 ‘successful’	 NGO	 leaders	 more	 power	 in	 disciplining	 the	 other	
organizations	in	China’s	NGO	community.	 	
Secondly,	as	the	corruption	in	Chengdu	shows,	NGO	leaders	with	better	guanxi	
in	 their	 local	 society	 may	 not	 contribute	 to	 a	 more	 open	 and	 accountable	
environment	 for	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 although	 their	 organizations	 did	 have	
“stronger	 organizational	 capacity”	 in	 getting	 projects	 done	 in	 their	 local	
communities	 (Hsu	&	Hasmath,	 2014;	Hildebrandt,	 2013).	 In	my	 fieldwork,	 I	
found	it	difficult	to	talk	to	many	of	the	“big	bosses”	that	I	had	heard	in	AF’s	office.	
Perry	 and	 Sarah	were	 two	 of	 the	 very	 few	 leaders	 that	 I	 can	 get	 access	 to,	
although	both	of	them	were	also	very	cautious	of	talking	about	the	details	of	




the	 local	 resources”	 for	 their	gongyi	work.	 In	 this	 sense,	gongyi	 and	Chinese	










of	 claiming	 their	morality	 in	 the	 local	 society,	 though	performed	 in	different	
ways.	In	fact,	many	AF	workers	may	have	their	own	religions	in	their	private	
life,	but	most	of	them	were	reluctant	to	show	their	faith	in	the	workplace.	On	
the	one	hand,	 the	party-state	 in	China	 is	 still	 ruled	by	 the	Communist	Party;	
religious	groups,	 especially	Christian	home	churches,	have	been	under	 strict	
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the	 situations	 in	 AF’s	 local	 partners	 were	 quite	 different.	 Given	 the	 vague	
boundary	 between	 their	 private	 and	 non-private	 life,	 performing	 and	
discussing	Buddhism	was	also	part	of	their	NGO	and	business	work.	Just	like	
my	informant	Perry	said	to	me,	“the	mortal	life	can	be	also	a	pure	land,	we	need	





the	 church-based	 social	 networks	 become	 quite	 crucial	 for	 these	 small	
businesses	 in	 terms	 of	 informal	 financing	 and	 information	 exchange.	 More	
importantly,	being	a	Christian	in	the	local	society	has	become	a	symbol	of	most	
well	 to	do	 families,	 so	 that	 they	 can	present	 themselves	 to	 the	nonbelievers	
(mostly	immigrant	workers),	as	having	the	most	authentic	reason	to	embrace	
the	 Western-style	 life	 and	 a	 high-class	 culture	 taste.	 Boss	 Christians	 in	
Wenzhou	 maintained	 a	 higher	 social	 status	 by	 performing	 their	 faith	 in	
distinctive	ways,	 for	 instance,	 large	scale	drinking	and	banqueting	events	for	





fevers	 of	 Buddhism	 in	 reformist	 China,	 from	 the	 revival	 of	martial	 arts	 and	
supernatural	powers	in	the	1980s	to	the	numerous	reconstruction	projects	of	
traditional	 temples	 and	 monasteries	 across	 the	 country	 (Birnbaum	 2003;	
Palmer	2007;	Lai	2003).	But	the	way	that	different	groups	of	people	perform	
Buddhism	in	creating	a	social	hierarchy	is	much	like	the	Christians	in	Wenzhou.	
Although	all	 the	 three	NGO	 leaders	 I	discuss	 in	 this	chapter	were	Buddhists,	












was	 the	 only	 "language"	 that	 Humphrey	 could	 “speak”	 when	 he	 tried	 to	
socialize	with	the	local	business	circle	in	doing	modern	gongyi.	In	the	eyes	of	
Perry	 and	 some	 other	 AF	workers	 however,	 Humphrey’s	 practice	 of	 talking	
about	his	personal	belief	was	quite	“unprofessional”.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Conclusion	
In	September	2016,	AF	just	finished	another	round	of	recruitment,	with	four	
new	 project	 officers	 in	 different	 humanitarian	 projects.	 In	 an	 internal	 AF	
meeting	 I	 attended,	 the	 then	vice	general	 secretary	Calvin	made	a	 speech	 to	
























NGO	 leaders	 into	 two	 different	 types	 and	 discuss	 their	 different	 lives	 as	 a	
‘gongyi	people’	 in	the	 local	society.	 In	the	 introduction	of	this	thesis,	 I	 talked	
about	the	experience	of	meeting	a	group	of	the	disabled	and	their	donor	Oxfam	
in	 an	 unexpected	 way.	 During	 my	 fieldwork	 with	 Humphrey	 and	 this	
‘marginalized’	 groups	 in	 the	Nan	 city,	 I	 had	never	heard	any	of	 them	calling	
themselves	as	‘gongyi	people’.	Although	most	of	the	disabled	group	members	
also	had	other	jobs	to	do,	most	of	their	jobs	were	part-time	and	lower-paid	in	





local	society,	some	others	in	the	same	society	may	have	been	silenced.	 	 	 	
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Chapter	8	 	 Conclusion	 	




Do	 the	 best	 to	 provide	 more	 gongyi	 services	 for	 people’s	 social	
demands	in	different	levels	and	geographic	areas”1.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Guidelines	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	
Communist	 Party	 of	 China	 and	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 Promoting	 the	
Reform	of	Social	Development,	2012	













	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Cliff,	a	former	AF	worker	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
When	talking	about	gongyi,	people	talk	about	a	wide	range	of	issues	such	as	Lei	
Feng	spirits,	the	new	‘philanthropists’,	the	social	workers	in	the	state-funded	







politics,	 culture,	 and	knowledge	production	of	 the	NGO	sector	 in	China	have	
been	understudied.	By	looking	at	the	recent	development	of	gongyi,	this	thesis	
aims	to	 fill	 this	gap	 in	 two	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	 I	understand	the	 internal	
politics	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 from	 an	 organizational	 perspective,	
examining	 their	 organizational	 culture	 as	well	 as	 their	 interactions	with	 the	
local	state	and	business	circle.	On	the	other	hand,	I	look	at	how	gongyi	as	a	new	
profess	 works	 at	 the	 individual	 level,	 putting	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 into	 a	
bigger	picture	 of	 social	 change	 in	China.	By	 studying	 the	 language	of	gongyi	
from	 these	 two	aspects,	 I	 argue	 that	gongyi	 reveals	a	 complicated	picture	of	
Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 society	 today.	 The	 popular	 use	 of	 gongyi	 presents	 the	
increasing	 commercialization	 of	 Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 Chinese	

























shaping	gongyi	 in	different	 local	 contexts?	3)	what	did	 this	 gongyi	mean	 for	
ordinary	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers,	 in	 particular,	 how	 does	 gongyi	 shape	 the	
private	life	and	personal	identities	of	Chinese	NGO	workers,	and	how	do	they	
deal	with	gongyi	in	different	ways?	
The	 thesis	 answers	 these	 three	 questions	 by	 an	 ethnographic	 study	 of	 an	
entrepreneur	 founded	 foundation	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Shenzhen	 and	 its	 partner	
organization	 in	 different	 places.	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 aims	 to	 answer	 the	 first	
question.	 The	 two	 chapters	 discuss	 the	 new	 knowledge	 brought	 up	 by	 the	










is	 largely	a	product	of	 the	close	collaboration	between	 the	 local	government	
and	 the	 rising	 private	 sector.	 The	 foundation,	 doubted	 by	 the	 central	
government	 in	 some	 way,	 has	 been	 welcomed	 and	 incorporated	 into	 the	
neoliberal	development	model	in	Shenzhen.	The	city	government	has	become	
a	patron	of	emerging	entrepreneurs	and	their	foundations.	However,	in	GH	and	
GVC’s	 cases	 in	 two	 different	 provinces,	 the	 situations	 are	 quite	 different.	
Without	a	prosperous	private	economy	like	the	city	of	Shenzhen,	the	local	state	
played	a	more	decisive	role	in	defining	gongyi.	AF	and	its	partner	organizations	
















NGO	 workers	 to	 be	 more	 normalized	 and	 incorporated	 into	 mainstream	
Chinese	society.	But	at	the	same	time,	wolf-like	gongyi	workers	in	practice	is	
highly	masculinized	in	its	nature,	consolidating	the	widening	gap	of	men	and	
women	 in	 the	 workforce	 and	 at	 home.	 For	 those	 NGO	workers	 in	 the	 local	
organizations,	we	may	 find	gongyi	 becomes	a	highly	 relational	 thing,	 as	 it	 is	
greatly	shaped	by	their	relations	with	the	local	state	and	the	business	circles.	It	
is	not	only	"a	job",	but	also	a	way	of	living:	cultivating,	maintaining	and	bridging	
social	 relations,	 and	performing	 their	personal	 faith	 in	a	proper	way.	 In	 this	





have	 covered	 these	 two	 themes	 in	 different	 ways.	 Here	 I	 would	 like	 to	





Normally	 seen	 as	 a	 "new	 creature"	 since	 China's	 economic	 reform,	 non-
governmental	organizations	have	been	 taken	as	an	 indicator	of	a	new,	more	
autonomous	 associational	 life.	 Many	 scholars	 rely	 on	 insights	 from	 the	
literature	 on	 civil	 society,	 which	 usually	 assumes	 that	 social	 actors	 have	 a	
contentious	or	counterbalancing	relationship	with	the	state	(Cohen	and	Arato,	














Chinese	 NGOs	 have	 been	 highly	 regulated	 after	 the	 1989	 Beijing	 Student	
Movement.	Some	scholars	like	Howell	(2012)	rectify	this	with	the	Gramscian	
concept	of	civil	society,	suggesting	that	Chinese	NGOs	and	civil	society	are	more	
like	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 capitalist	 state.	Moreover,	 although	 the	 civil	 society	
approach	helps	understand	the	changes	and	dynamics	of	Chinese	politics,	it	is	
still	limited	in	explaining	the	status	quo.	Given	the	increasing	numbers	of	NGOs	
and	 the	 resilience	 of	 authoritarianism	 in	 China,	 the	 liberal	 civil	 society	
approach	 has	 limitations	 in	 understanding	 the	 changing	 landscape	 of	 the	
Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade.	 	 	 	 	
My	 research	 on	 the	 popular	 language	 and	 knowledge	 production	 of	 gongyi	




Firstly,	 in	 scholarly	history,	 corporatism	since	 the	1990s	has	been	 seen	as	a	
useful	 theory	 in	 understanding	 China's	 economic	 development	 model.	 The	
interaction	between	the	local	government	and	private	businessmen	is	the	key	
to	 contributing	 to	 China's	 economic	 growth	 (Oi,	 1995).	 My	 analysis	 of	 the	
changing	Chinese	NGO	 sector	 is	 inspired	by	 this	 academic	 tradition	 so	 as	 to	
present	 a	more	 complicated	 picture	 of	 Chinese	NGOs	 today.	 By	 increasingly	
complicated	picture	here,	I	go	beyond	the	state-NGO	relations	and	point	to	the	




working	 through	 many	 indirect	 ways,	 for	 instance,	 deeper	 collaboration	




groups	of	actors	in	this	thesis.	 	 	 	
But	at	the	same	time,	China’s	decentralization	reform	since	the	1990s	also	calls	
for	a	more	flexible	application	of	 the	corporatist	 framework	 in	analyzing	the	
social	 and	 political	 change	 among	 various	 regions	 (Hsu,	 2012).	 As	 I	 have	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6	 on	 China's	 NGO	 regulation	 change,	 the	 fragmented	
nature	of	 the	Chinese	state	has	also	contributed	 to	different	ways	of	dealing	
with	NGOs	in	different	places,	departing	from	a	unified	authoritarian	regulatory	
regime.	 Therefore,	 my	 study	 of	 gongyi	 in	 different	 places	 demonstrates	 the	
importance	of	discussing	the	various	forms	of	corporatism	in	different	parts	of	
China.	 The	 research	 presents	 the	 process	 of	 how	 the	 reproduction	 of	 a	
seemingly	 commercialized	 knowledge	 could	 be	 possible	 in	 China	 with	 the	
negotiations	and	reinterpretations	between	the	entrepreneurs,	NGOs,	and	the	
local	governments.	 	
The	 increasing	state	control	 towards	Chinese	NGOs	 in	 recent	years	does	not	
necessarily	mean	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	more	 formal,	 unified,	 or	 established	
platform	of	social	surveillance	at	the	national	level.	As	AF	and	its	entrepreneurs’	
stories	 tell	 us,	 in	 many	 cases	 these	 new	 organizations	 have	 been	 deeply	

















making	 of	 gongyi	 has	 been	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 deepening	 corporatism	 in	
different	parts	of	China	in	the	past	decade,	this	research	argues	that	gongyi	also	















its	 partner	 organizations	 reveals	 that	 the	 normalization	 process	 of	 Chinese	





As	 ordinary	Chinese	 living	 in	 the	 reformist	 era,	my	AF	 colleagues	 and	other	
informants	in	the	field	may	share	many	commonalities	with	other	Chinese:	they	
were	 eager	 to	 be	 a	manly	man	 in	 the	 own	 families	 and	 the	workplace	 (see	
chapter	4	and	5),	 anxious	with	 their	 incomes,	 career,	 and	 social	 status;	 they	
were	 asked	 to	 be	 more	 "professional"	 in	 the	 workplace,	 but	 such	






Chinese	NGO	workers’	everyday	life,	 is	 the	strengthening	of	"one	family,	 two	













maintain	 certain	 strategies	 and	 lifestyles	 of	 living	within	 the	 corporatism	 in	
one’s	 everyday	 life:	 becoming	 part	 of	 the	 local	 state	 affiliations,	 building	 up	
connections	with	 the	 local	officials	and	 the	business	elites	circle,	performing	






two	 years,	 AF	 is	 still	 one	 of	 the	 top	 foundations	 receiving	 the	 most	 public	
donations	and	media	coverage	in	China,	but	its	ranking	slides	down	a	bit	from	
3rd	to	8th.	As	 the	only	non-state	organized	 foundation	 in	 the	 top	10,	AF	has	
been	 gradually	 caught	 up	 by	 other	 GONGOs.	 For	 AF	 and	 all	 the	 other	











organizational	structure	and	internal	governance.	 	 	 	
	
But	grassroots	organizations	may	need	to	face	more	challenges	than	before.	In	
fact,	along	with	the	new	charity	 law,	another	 influential	 law	on	international	
organizations	 also	went	 into	 effect	 in	 January	 2017	 in	 a	 very	 silenced	way.	









government,	 but	 from	 Beijing:	 no	 matter	 whether	 the	 INGOs	 were	 legally	
registered	or	not,	working	with	them	in	China	means	political	danger.	Until	this	
year,	she	still	keeps	working	with	Oxfam	but	meanwhile,	she	has	been	invited	











his	 own	 NGO,	 providing	 cloth	 recycling	 services	 for	 the	 middle-class	
communities.	 Jerry’s	 NGO	 is	 fully	 funded	 by	 both	 AF	 and	 the	 municipal	
government,	as	Shenzhen	has	been	designed	as	the	first	city	in	the	country	to	
promote	the	waste	recycling	industry.	Now,	Jerry’s	organization	has	expanded	
to	 some	 other	 places	 like	 the	 city	 of	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 with	 the	 recent	
	 201	
donation	from	the	Alibaba	Foundation.	Taken	the	waste	recycling	industry	as	a	
good	 investment	 opportunity,	 many	 companies	 including	 Alibaba	 have	
invested	 in	 a	 number	 of	 waste	 recycling	 companies,	 social	 enterprises,	 and	
NGOs.	 	 	 	 	
Many	of	other	informants	are	still	in	the	NGO	sector	but	choose	to	work	in	other	




The	 online	 chat	 group	 of	 ‘Liberalists	 of	 China’s	 NGO	 sector’	 (I	mention	 this	
group	in	chapter	6)	is	still	active	until	very	recently.	In	an	evening	of	October	
2016,	when	I	had	already	left	AF,	I	found	this	group	was	active	again	as	usual,	










Humphrey.	 Until	 two	 hours	 later,	 Yvette,	 a	 junior	 project	 assistant	who	 just	
joined	AF,	 sent	 out	 a	message:	 “What	 is	wrong	with	 you	guys?	 I	 just	 cannot	
believe	that	discriminatory	languages	can	just	appear	in	this	liberalist	group	in	
such	a	straightforward	way.	I	am	quitting	from	this	group	now”.	 	 	 	
In	 the	 past	 two	 years,	 Hunter	 became	 a	 general	 secretary	 of	 another	




has	 been	 developed	 for	 more	 than	 three	 decades	 in	 the	 country.	 Such	 a	
'liberalist'	ideology	is	a	symbiosis	of	the	state-directed	reforms	as	well	as	the	





in	various	ways.	That	 is	what	 I	present	 in	 this	 thesis	as	 the	politics	of	doing	
gongyi.	But	we	should	also	admit	that	there	are	always	people	reminding	us	of	
the	 alternatives	 of	gongyi;	 I	 learn	 these	 alternatives	 from	 the	 closed	 factory	
women’s	 groups,	 from	 Yvette,	 and	 from	 the	 eliminated	 good	 husbands	 and	
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No.	 Gender	 Age	 Working	fields	 Date	 Code	
1	 	 Male	 25	 Poverty	reduction,	 	
T	Foundation	
07/07/2016	 A1	
2	 	 Male	 33	 NGO	capacity	training	 08/07/2016	 A2	
3	 Female	 24	 Former	AF	worker	 02/11/2016	 A3	
4	 	 Male	 28	 Former	AF	worker,	
Working	at	a	GONGO	now	
03/11/2016	 A4	
5	 Male	 26	 Former	AF	worker	 07/11/2016	 A5	
6	 Male	 30	 Child	protection,	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
07/11/2016	 A6	
7	 Female	 31	 Project	officer	at	AF	 11/05/2017	 A7	
8	 Female	 29	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 23/05/2017	 A8	
9	 Female	 32	 Project	officer	at	AF	 24/05/2017	 A9	





No.	 Gender	 Age	 Working	fields	 Date	 Code	
1	 	 Female	 62	 Rural	education,	 	
environmental	protection	
15/11/2016	 B1	
2	 	 Female	 52	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 16/11/2016	 B2	
3	 Male	 28	 Project	officer	at	AF	 19/11/2016	 B3	
4	 	 Female	 27	 Project	officer	at	AF	 22/11/2016	 B4	
5	 Male	 32	 Disaster	relief	 22/11/2016	 B5	
6	 Male	 30	 Child	protection,	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
07/11/2016	 B6	








9	 Female	 34	 NGO	capacity	training,	
L	Foundation	
21/07/2017	 B9	
10	 Female	 28	 Child	protection,	INGO	 22/07/2017	 B10	
11	 Male	 27	 Project	officer	at	AF	 23/07/2017	 B11	
12	 Female	 29	 Project	officer	at	AF	 24/07/2017	 B12	
13	 Male	 33	 NGO	capacity	training,	
N	Foundation	
25/07/2017	 B13	

































5	 	 Female	 30	 Community	development	 30/03
/2017	
T	 T2	
6	 Male	 30	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 04/05
/2017	
T	 T3	
7	 Female	 25	 Former	AF	worker	 04/05
/2017	
T	 T4	
8	 Male	 30	 Former	AF	worker;	




























13	 Male	 42	 NGO	capacity	training	 17/07
/2017	
H	 H3	
















16	 Male	 35	 Disaster	 relief	 and	 child	
protection;	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
03/05
/2017	
I	 I1	
	
